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Abstract
The capability of changing beliefs upon new information in a rational and effici nt way is crucial
for an intelligent agent. Belief change therefore is one of the central resea ch fields in Artificial
Intelligence (AI) for over two decades. In the AI literature, two different ki ds of belief change
operations have been intensively investigated: belief update, which dealwith situations where
the new information describes changes of the world; and belief revision, which assumes the
world is static. As another important research area in AI, reasoning about ctions mainly stud-
ies the problem of representing and reasoning about effects of actions. The e two research fields
are closely related and apply a common underlying principle, that is, an agent should change its
beliefs (knowledge) as little as possible whenever an adjustment is necessary. This lays down
the possibility of reusing the ideas and results of one field in the other, and vice verse. This the-
sis aims to develop a general framework and devise computational models thatare applicable in
reasoning about actions. Firstly, I shall propose a new framework foriterated belief revision by
introducing a new postulate to the existing AGM/DP postulates, which provides general criteria
for the design of iterated revision operators. Secondly, based on the new framework, a concrete
iterated revision operator is devised. The semantic model of the operator gives nice intuitions
and helps to show its satisfiability of desirable postulates. I also show that the computational
model of the operator is almost optimal in time and space-complexity. In order to deal with
the belief change problem in multi-agent systems, I introduce a concept of mutual belief revi-
sion which is concerned with information exchange among agents. A concrete mutual revision
operator is devised by generalizing the iterated revision operator. Likewise, a emantic model
is used to show the intuition and many nice properties of the mutual revision operat r, and the
complexity of its computational model is formally analyzed. Finally, I present a belief update
operator, which takes into account two important problems of reasoning about ction, i.e., dis-
junctive updates and domain constraints. Again, the updated operator is presented with both a
semantic model and a computational model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is mainly concerned with general frameworks and computational approaches of be-
lief change which can be applied in reasoning about actions. This work can be considered as
an attempt towards combining two fields of AI,reasoning about actionsandbelief change, to
obtain a framework, which can deal with more realistic scenarios than the state-of-th -art action
theories. Such a framework could be potentially employed to build the high-level r asoning
and control components of intelligent agents which are allowed to have both fallible beliefs and
fallible sensors.
In this chapter, I will first briefly sketch the basic ideas of belief change and reasoning about
actions. Then motivations and problems of combining the two fields are discussed. Thereafter,
the overall structure of the thesis is outlined.
1.1 Belief Change
As a very young field, belief change has not been recognized as a subject of its own until the
middle of the 1980’s[Hansson, 1997]. Since it so new, it does not even have a well established
name. Belief change is just one name of the field among others such as:database updating,
theory change, belief dynamicsandbelief revision. In general, belief change is about changing
the beliefs of minds and the data of databases to accommodate new information. As already have
been pointed out by[Keller and Winslett, 1985] that there are usually two types of reasons why
an agent should change its beliefs. One is because the world has been changed, and the other is
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that the agent has made a new observation of the static world.1 The first type,change-recording
incorporation of new information, is often calledbelief update. The termbelief revisionis
reserved for the second type,knowledge-addingincorporation of new information.2
The research subject which we now call belief change has mainly two ori-
gins [Hansson, 1997]. In philosophy, belief change has been studied to investigate the revi-
sion of scientific theories and logical theory. The first milestone of philosophical researches
on belief change is the series studies of Levi[1977; 1980] in the 1970’s, which have under-
pinned the major concerns of the field and provided the basic formal framework. The next
milestone is the AGMtheory(named after its originators Alchourrón, G̈ardenfors and Makin-
son) which has provided a more general and versatile formal frameworkfor studying belief
change[Alchourrón and Makinson, 1982; Alchourrónet al., 1985; G̈ardenfors, 1988]. In a nut-
shell, the AGM theory assumes the beliefs of an agent are represented bya eductively closed
set of sentences (or, abelief set) of some logical language, and mainly studies how to incor-
porate (remove) a new sentence into (from) a belief set in arational way. The AGM trio
have studied belief change mainly in two ways. They first have introduced theso-called ra-
tionality postulates, which they claimed should be respected by any rational belief change
operator. The guiding criterion of the AGM postulates is the so-calledminimal change prin-
ciple, that is to change the belief set as little as possible. Also, they have proposed mod-
els of constructing concrete rational belief change operators. The advnt of the AGM the-
ory finally helped the field to grow up as an important subject of its own. Sincethen be-
lief change becomes a flourishing and interdisciplinary field of researches. Many researchers
from different fields find the value of belief change in their own fields andthus get involved
in the development of belief change. The second origin of belief change iscomputer sci-
ence. Specifically, database theorist are interested in models of databaseupdat which are
more sophisticated than those of the usual relational database[Winslett, 1990]. One important
development in this direction is Doyle’s ”Truth Maintenance Systems”[Doyle, 1979]. Also,
the problem of updating a belief set (base) is an important topic in AI[Herzig and Rifi, 1999;
Dalal, 1988]. Parallel to the AGM theory, Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) have proposed a gen-
eral framework for belief update[Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991a].
Later on, various extensions of the classical belief change have been proposed and ex-
1see Section 2.3 for a detailed discussion on why such a distinction is necessary.
2In the literature, the word “belief revision” in commonly used in two distinct senses. Often, it is used as a
synonym of belief change to refer to the research field in general. Here, as well in the rest of this thesis, belief
revision means a particular type of belief change operators.
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tensively investigated. In particular, many belief revisionists are interestedin iterated be-
lief revision [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997; Nayak, 1994b], that is how should an agent revise
its beliefs in response to a sequence of new information. Recently,non-prioritized belief
revision, in which the new information is not always accepted in the revise belief set, has
also drawn considerable attentions from the community of belief change[Hansson, 1999;
Booth, 2001]. Non-prioritized revision can handle more realistic domains where there is no
strict correlation between the chronology of the information and the credibilityof heir con-
tents. The classical belief change is concerned with the beliefs of a single agent. There are also
extended models of belief change designed for multi-agent scenarios, e.g., bothbelief merg-
ing [Konieczny and Ṕerez, 1998; Gauwinet al., 2005] and belief arbitration [Revesz, 1997;
Liberatore and Schaerf, 1998] are about how to extract the coherent common beliefs out of a
set of (possibly mutually inconsistent) belief sets.
1.2 Reasoning about Actions
Reasoning about actions is one of the most important research areas, whose history can date
back to the very early stage of AI[McCarthy and Hayes, 1969]. The field mainly studies the
problem of representing and reasoning about effects of actions that can be performed by intelli-
gence agents. It is now commonly believed that declarative, logic-based approaches will be the
key to the advent of agents with high-level reasoning capabilities. A varietyof logic-basedthe-
ories of actionsexist, among which are the situation calculus[McCarthy, 1963; Reiter, 2001a]
the fluent calculus[Thielscher, 1999] and causal theories[McCain, 1997]. These approaches
have recently provided the basis for the high-level, logic-based agent programming languages
and systems GOLOG[Levesqueet al., 1997; Reiter, 2001b], FLUX [Thielscher, 2004a] and
CCalc [Giunchigliaet al., 2004], respectively. An important extension of these basic action
theories allows agents to reason about their knowledge and knowledge-producing actions (or,
sensing), e.g.,[Thielscher, 2000; Scherl and Levesque, 2003]. In declarative, logic-based ap-
proaches, an agent’s knowledge of the world is represented by sentenc s of some logical lan-
guage. The agent is equipped with a reasoning mechanism usually built upon a logical inference
engine. With its reasoning mechanism, the agent can perform several tasks autonomously: ver-
ifying the executability of actions, executing complex strategies, planning ahead, etc.
As proposed by McCarthy and Hayes[1969], the work on reasoning about actions has fo-
cused on a number of fundamental problems among which theframe problemis the most im-
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portant. In reasoning about actions, the frame problem is mainly concerned with representing
the effects of actions without explicitly mentioning the invariance (frame) of theworld; since
otherwise the domain specifications will be inefficient or even unmanageable[Reiter, 1991].
The key idea of almost all solutions to the frame problem employed in various action theo-
ries is the so-calledlaw of inertia or law of persistence, that is, the world does not change
unless it is forced to. As another important topic in reasoning about actions, the so-called
ramification problem[Ginsberg and Smith, 1987; Lifschitz, 1990] names the challenge to ac-
commodate actions whose execution causesindirect effect. Indirect effects typically are con-
sequences ofdomain constraints, namely, additional, general knowledge of domain specific
dependencies between world description components. It is now commonly believed that
merely taking into account formalizations of domain constraints as pure logicalsentences
is not adequate, since these sentences do not includeausal information[Thielscher, 1997;
McCain and Turner, 1995]. In fact, most state-of-the-art action theories take into account both
domain constraints and causal information.
1.3 Motivations and Problems
The aforementioned two research fields are closely related, since essentially both the principle
of minimal change and the law of inertia require an agent to change its beliefs (knowledge) as
little as possible whenever an adjustment is necessary. This suggests the posibility of reusing
the ideas and results of one field in the other, and vice verse. Recently, several researchers
have attempted to combine belief change with reasoning about actions[Shapiroet al., 2000;
Shapiro and Pagnucco, 2004; Jin and Thielscher, 2004; Hunter and Delgrande, 2005]. The
main motivation of doing so is that belief change can help frameworks of reasoning about ac-
tions to deal with more realistic scenarios, in which agents are allowed to have both fallible
beliefs and fallible sensors.
As one major disadvantage of the most state-of-the-art action theories (e.g.,
[Thielscher, 2000; Scherl and Levesque, 2003]), the beliefs (knowledge) of the agent are as-
sumed infallible, that is, what the agent believes (knows) must be true.3 Usually, these action
theories can only deal with trivial situations where the sensing information is con istent with
the agent’s current beliefs. In realistic scenarios, however discrepancies between the agent’s be-
3In this thesis, we do not distinguish between the beliefs and knowledge of anagent, and they both refer to agent’s
mental modelof the world.
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liefs and the real world can occur for many reasons: fallible sensors, unexpected changes of the
world, failures of action executions, etc. Also, an agent may very well bemaking observations
which contradict its current beliefs.
To deal with more realistic situations, frameworks of reasoning about actions must be en-
hanced with methods from belief change. As a simple solution, I propose to usbelief revision to
deal with sensing actions, and belief update to deal with ontic actions (i.e., actions w th physical
effects). More precisely, the agent maintains a (fallible) belief state; whenever a sensing (on-
tic) action has been performed, the belief state is accordingly revised (updated, respectively).4
E.g., assume the agent’s initial beliefs are represented by a belief stateK0. Then, after having
executed sensing actiona1, the agent’s belief state evolves toK1 through revisingK0 by the
sensing results ofa1 (cf. Figure 1.1). A successive execution of ontic actiona2 causes a further
evolution of the agent’s beliefs toK2, this timeK1 is updated by the physical effects ofa2.
K0 K1 K2
revision
a1
update
a2
Figure 1.1: Combining belief change and reasoning about actions
Note that the application of belief change in reasoning about actions offers a nice solution
to the frame problem, as we only need to specify the effects of actions; moreover, it also adds
more formality to reasoning about actions, as so far solutions to the frame problem in most
action theories are usually illustrated only by examples.
Unfortunately, belief change of its current status cannot be directly integrat d into rea-
soning about actions, since there are several important problems that need to be addressed.
Firstly, for the incremental adaptation of beliefs, the AGM postulates provedto be overly weak
too [Darwiche and Pearl, 1994; Darwiche and Pearl, 1997]. This has led to the development
4In reasoning about actions, there are also proposals in which the agentdoes not maintain a belief (knowledge)
state[Levesqueet al., 1997; Giunchigliaet al., 2004]. E.g., in the situation calculus, only the agent’s initial knowl-
edge of the world is explicitly specified; in order to to verify whether a sentence (denoting certain facts of the world)
holds after some actions, we need first to regress the sentence to another (p ssibly very large) sentence according
to the effects of performed actions; then this regressed sentence is verified against the agent’s initial knowledge.
Not surprisingly, such regression-based approaches will have very bad computational behavior[Thielscher, 2004b;
Thielscher, 2004a].
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of additional postulates for iterated belief revision by Darwiche and Pearl(DP), among oth-
ers [Freund and Lehmann, 1994; Lehmann, 1995; Boutilier, 1993]. Still, however, the AGM
and DP postulates together are too permissive in that they support belief revision operators
which assume arbitrary dependencies among the pieces of information whichan agent ac-
quires along its way. These operators have a drastic effect when the agent makes an ob-
servation which contradicts its currently held beliefs: The agent is forcedto cancel every-
thing it has learned up to this point[Nayaket al., 1996a; Nayaket al., 2003]. Secondly, the
mainstream study of belief revision has been focused on how a single agent revises its be-
liefs to incorporate new information. This research normally assumes that new informa-
tion is fully accepted. Obviously such an assumption is not applicable to multi-agent sys-
tems. There have been a variety of approaches which have been proposed in the liter-
ature to deal with the problem of belief revision in multi-agent systems[Revesz, 1997;
Liberatore and Schaerf, 1998; Konieczny and Pérez, 1998]. Multiple belief revision is another
one of the most important variations and extensions of the AGM theory, whichis losely
related to iterated belief revision and mutual belief revision[Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994;
Zhang, 1996; Zhang and Foo, 2001]. Unlike in the AGM theory, the new information is rep-
resented by a set of (possibly infinite) sentences in multiple belief revision. Thirdly, the
agents considered in the classical belief change are infinite beings, without any limitation
in memory, time, or deductive ability. When implementation is concerned, one has tocon-
sider additionally that any realistic agent is a finite being and that calculations take time.
Therefore, the beliefs of an agent should be represented by a finite belief state, and a satis-
factory revision operator should not only behave rationally but also consume less time and
space. Adapting belief revision to less idealized agents is far from trivial, as we need an ap-
proach which takes these characteristics of finiteness, memory and time limitationsint ac-
count [Wassermann, 1999]. Moreover, the classical studies have focused on formal and gen-
eral aspects of belief change. It is commonly believed that there is no general purpose means
of belief change that will do the right thing under all circumstance, and we must be explicit
about the ”ontology” or “scenario” underlying the belief change process [Winslett, 1990;
Friedman and Halpern, 1996]. To be applied in reasoning about actions, the KM theory
has unfortunately been shown problematic with both disjunctive updates anddomain con-
straints[Herzig and Rifi, 1999]. Note that the above-mentioned problems are by no means the
only ones, but in this thesis only these most important problems will be tackled.
The major contributions of the thesis are as follows. I first give a formal anysis of this
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problem of implicit dependence, and then I present, as a solution, anIndependencepostulate
for iterated belief revision. I give a representation theorem for the new postulate and prove its
consistency by defining a concrete belief revision operator. The indepence postulate together
with the AGM/DP postulates give us a new elegant framework for iterated belief r vision. I also
contrast the new framework to the most prominent existing approaches to iterated revision and
argue that it is so far the most satisfactory. I propose a computational iterated revision operator
which satisfies the AGM/DP and independence postulates. A formal assessment hows that this
revision operator is almost optimal in computational complexity and space-consumption. To
clearly display the intuition, I also present a possible world-based semanticsfor the revision
operator. It is worth mentioning that the revision operator can deal with beliefs with different
reliability degrees, as it exploits richer representation of beliefs. In order to deal with multi-
agent scenarios, I introduce a concept of mutual belief revision which studies the problem of
information exchange among agents. By generalizing the revision operator, a c ncrete mutual
revision operator has been devised. I show formally the nice logical properties of the mutual
revision operator, as well as its computational complexity. To apply belief update in reasoning
about actions, I first analyze the KM theory’s problems with disjunctive update and domain
constraints, and then I propose an update operator which does not suffer from these problems.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
As this work is interdisciplinary in nature, I assume the reader has basic knowledge on formal
logic, and computer science (specially, complexity theory). Ideas of beliefchange will however
be explained in detail throughout this thesis. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.5
• In Chapter 2, I give a survey on the classic frameworks for belief change. Firstly, the
AGM theory (for belief revision) is presented in detail. Then, the basic ideas of the KM
theory (for belief update) are sketched. Finally, the connections between b lief change
and some other research fields are briefly discussed.
• Chapter 3 is mainly concerned with general frameworks foriterated belief revision. I will
start by showing why iterated belief revision is a difficult problem. Thereafter, I first give
a formal analysis of this problem of implicit dependence, and then I present, as a solution,
5For the sake of readability, proofs are not given in the main body of the thesis, and they can be found in the
appendices.
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an Independencepostulate for iterated belief revision. In the end, the new framework is
compared with the most prominent existing approaches to iterated belief revision.
• In Chapter 4, computational approaches to iterated belief revision are studi d. Firstly,
based on Nebel’s cut base revision, the problems of pure qualitative approaches to iter-
ated revision are discussed. Then, I propose a computational revision operat r, which is
based on a very compact representation of belief states. This revision operator is formally
assessed in terms of its logical properties and computational complexity. Thereafter, I
will give a detailed comparison between my proposal with other well-known approaches.
• Chapter 5 introduces a concept ofmutual belief revision, which is concerned with how
agents can exchange their beliefs in a multi-agent system. To model mutual revision
processes, I first introduce two difference models: a possible world-based model, which
clearly shows the intuition and semantics, and a computational model. Then, with the
help of the semantic model, I show many nice properties of mutual belief revision. The
complexity of the computational model is also formally analyzed.
• Chapter 6 is about belief update operators, which take into account two important prob-
lems of reasoning about actions, i.e., disjunctive updates and domain constraints. Firstly, I
recall the well-known PMA and discuss its problems with disjunctive updates and domain
constraints. Then, I present another renown update operator, i.e., theWSS, which does
not suffer from these problems. Finally, I propose an update operatorfor possibilistic
belief states, based on ideas of the WSS.
• Finally, I present in Chapter 7 the conclusions and some possible directionsof the future
work.
Chapter 2
The Classical Belief Change
The capability of gathering information about the world and changing its beliefs based on the
new information is crucial for an intelligent agent. Belief change thereforeis one of the cen-
tral research fields in AI for over two decades. Technically, belief change studies the process
an agent adapts its beliefs to accommodate new, or more reliable information thatis possibly
inconsistent with the existing beliefs.
Before taking about belief change, one fundamental notion needs to be clarified, that is, what
are beliefs? In other words, what are the objects to be changed? This is not an easy question.
If cognitive states of human minds are considered directly, it would be obviously very difficult,
if not impossible, to study formally the way how they are being changed. Therefor , we should
abstract from irrelevant accompaniments of real cognitive states, in order to study and reveal
the essences of belief change. Informally, abelief state(or, anepistemic state) is a rational
idealization of a cognitive state of some individual at a given point of time[Gärdenfors, 1988].
As objects to be changed, belief states are the central entities of belief change. In the classical
belief change, very abstract models of belief states are studied. Usually,beliefs of an agent are
represented by a set of sentences of some logical language. From a black-box point of view, an
idealized interpretation of belief states is that they are supposed to be in reflectiv quilibrium.
Changes of a belief state should be caused by some external forces (also referred to asepistemic
inputs). In the classical belief change, such epistemic inputs are usually encoded by logical
sentences. In this chapter, the classical studies on belief change will be surveyed.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, I will recall the AGM theory
for belief revision, including the AGM postulates and two standard constructive models. Then,
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another interesting construction for belief revision, i.e., Grove’s system of spheres, is presented
in Section 2.2. Thereafter, I recapitulate briefly in Section 2.3 the KM theory fr belief up-
date. Finally, two research fields, which are intimately related to belief change, re discussed in
Section 2.4.
2.1 The AGM Theory
Most formal studies on belief change take as starting point the work of Alchourrón,
Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM) during the first half of 1980s[Alchourrónet al., 1985;
Alchourrón and Makinson, 1985], which is now commonly referred to as theAGM theory. In
the literature, the AGM theory are also called theAGM framework, theAGM paradigmand the
AGM model.
The AGM theory formally studies idealized models of belief change. Given anunderlying
logical languageL, it is assumed that beliefs of an agent can be represented by sentencesof L.
For the sake of generality, the concrete structure of the underlying languageL is deliberatively
unspecified, except it is assumed closed under logical connectives (i.e., ¬, →, ∧, ∨, ↔). To
be precise, ifα, β are members ofL, so are¬α, α → β, α ∧ β, α ∨ β andα ↔ β. Usually,
sentences and sets of sentences ofL are denoted by lower case Greek letters (e.g.,α, β, · · · ) and
capital Roman letters (e.g.,A,B,K, · · · ), respectively.
The logic of the underlying languageL is identified with a so-called logical consequence
operator. Formally, alogical consequence operatorCn is a function on subsets ofL that satisfies
the following properties:
• A ⊆ Cn(A) (inclusion)
• If A ⊆ B, thenCn(A) ⊆ Cn(B) (monotony)
• Cn(A) = Cn(Cn(A)) (iteration)
• If A derivesα in the classical truth-functional way, thenα ∈ Cn(A) (super-classicality)
• If α ∈ Cn(A), then there is a finite subsetA′ ⊆ A s.t.α ∈ Cn(A′)
(compactness)
• β ∈ Cn(A ∪ {α}) iff α→ β ∈ Cn(A) (deduction theorem)
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Note that the AGM theory is a very general framework, as it applies to any logical language
equipped with an logical consequence operator (e.g., propositional logics and first order predi-
cate logics).
Now, we are ready to define some basic notions. A sentenceα is called alogical conse-
quenceof a setA of sentences (written asA ⊢ α) iff α ∈ Cn(A). In the limiting case, a
sentenceα is called atautology(written as⊢ α) iff α ∈ Cn({}). Two sentencesα, β are said
to be logically equivalent(denoted byα ≡ β) iff ⊢ α ↔ β. A sentenceα is inconsistentiff
⊢ ¬α; and a setA of sentences isinconsistentiff there exists a sentenceβ such thatA ⊢ β
andA ⊢ ¬β. A setA of sentences is calledcomplete(or maximal), if for any sentenceα either
α ∈ A or ¬α ∈ A. A setA of sentences is calledlogically closed(or deductively closed)
iff A = Cn(A). It is not difficult to see that (due to properties ofCn) a logically closed set
of sentenceA is inconsistent iffA = L. Moreover, all tautologous (inconsistent) sentences are
logically equivalent. Therefore, we will use⊤ (⊥) to denote an arbitrary tautologous (incon-
sistent respectively) sentence. For the sake of succinctness, a singleton set is identified with it
unique element, e.g.,Cn(α) andα ⊢ β representCn({α}) andβ ∈ Cn({α}) respectively.
Ideally, an agent is supposed to be aware of and responsible for all logical consequences
of it beliefs. In the AGM theory, beliefs of an ideal agent are thereforerepresented by a set
sentences which is logically closed (also called abelief set). Technically, a belief set is just a
logical theoryas it is called by logicians, and it is usually denoted byK (possibly indexed).
The AGM theory formally studies three types of belief change operators onbelief sets:1
• Expansion:A new sentenceα is simply added to a belief setK, regardless of whether
it is inconsistent withK. The belief set that results from expandingK by α is denoted
K + α.
• Contraction: A sentenceα is retracted from a belief setK without acquiring any new
sentences. The result of contractingα fromK is denotedK − α.
• Revision: A new sentence is incorporated to a belief setK without rendering the new
belief set inconsistent. The result of revisingK by α is denotedK ∗ α.
In the AGM theory, expansion is the simplest type of belief change, and it is formally defined
1For the time-being, let us simply consider a belief change operator as a function which maps a belief set and a
sentence to a new belief set. In fact, it is quite controversial in the belief change community, what is the right notion
of belief change operators? More discussions on this issue can be found in Section 3.1.
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as follows:
K + α = Cn(K ∪ {α}).
The problem of expansion is that it is notconsistency preserving. Note that, if¬α ∈ K then
K + α is also inconsistent, even ifK is initially consistent. Therefore, expansion cannot be
considered as a rational operator on its own. The reason of introducingexpansion is merely
because it is used in studies of other belief change operators.
In contrast to expansion, as inconsistency cannot be caused by removing a sentence, con-
traction at first glance seems more innocent. Naively, one might define contra tion as to remove
a sentence directly as follows:
K − α = Cn(K \ {α}) (2.1)
Unfortunately, in general the operation defined by (2.1) does not guarantee a successful removal
of the specified sentence. To see this, let us consider the following counterexample:
Example 1. Let K = Cn({α, β, α ∧ β → γ}) and γ the sentence to be contracted. By
inclusion, we have{α, β, α ∧ β → γ} ⊆ K. It follows that{α, β, α ∧ β → γ} ⊆ K \ {γ}. By
super-classicality, we obtainγ ∈ Cn(K \ {γ}). Thereforeγ is regained inK − γ.
A fact revealed by Example 1 is that we might have to remove some other sentenc s in order
to prevent regaining the sentence to be contracted. What makes the situationmore complicated
is that there are often several choices on which sentences should be removed. For instance, in
Example 1, it is sufficient to remove any ofα, β, α ∧ β → γ. Obviously, as far as pure logical
strength is considered, it is not at all clear how to make a right selection. The AGM trio argue
that an contraction operator should make use of someextra-logical preference informationi
order to choose the right sentences to be removed. As we will see soon, several quite different
forms of extra-logical preference information are introduced in the AGM theory, in order to
construct concrete contraction operators.
Unlike expansion, revision incorporates a new sentenceα in a belief setK in a consistency
preserving way, i.e., the revised belief setK ∗ α should be consistent. Obviously, if¬α ∈ K,
some sentences ofK need to be given up in order to give way toα.
Example 2. Let K as defined in Example 1. IfK is revised by¬γ, then again at least one of
α, β, α ∧ β → γ should be removed, otherwiseK ∗ ¬γ will become inconsistent.
Analogous to contraction, in revision there are also several choices on which sentences
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should be removed. Therefore. constructions of concrete revision operators also should exploit
some kind of extra-logical preference information.
In the AGM theory, belief change are mainly studied in two aspects. On the oneha d,
the AGM trio have introduced the so-called rationality postulates for contraction and revision.
On the other hand, also several concrete constructions of belief change operators have been
proposed which satisfy these postulates.
2.1.1 The AGM Postulates
It is unrealistic that an unique contraction (or revision) operator is applicable to all application
domains. The AGM trio therefore have introduced the so-called rationality postulates for both
contraction and revision which they claim should be satisfied by allrational belief change oper-
ators. The guiding principle of the AGM postulates is that ofeconomy of informationor minimal
change, which means neither to give up currently held beliefs nor to acquire new beliefs, unless
forced to, in a process of belief change.
Postulates for Contraction
As contraction is a function on belief sets,K − α should be logically closed:
(K-1) K − α = Cn(K − α) (closure)
Contraction should not introduce any new sentences:
(K-2) K − α ⊆ K (inclusion)
If α /∈ K, thenK − α should be same asK, as no change is certainly the minimal change:
(K-3) If α /∈ K, thenK − α = K (vacuity)
Unless it is tautologous,2 α should be successfully expelled fromK.
(K-4) If 0 α, thenα /∈ K − α (success)
WhenK − α is expanded byα, all previously discarded sentences should be recovered:
2Note that a tautology is contained in any belief set.
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(K-5) K ⊆ (K − α) + α (recovery)
Contraction is syntax irrelevant:
(K-6) If α ≡ β, thenK − α = K − β (extensionality)
Usually, (K-1)-(K-6) are called thebasic postulatesfor contraction. Among them,
Postulate (K-5) is the only controversial one, which has been criticized byseveral re-
searchers[Hansson, 1991; Nieder´ e, 1991; Ferḿe, 1998].
As suggested by[Makinson, 1987], a simple response to these criticisms is to completely
drop (K-5). Contraction operators satisfies all the basic postulates, but(K-5), are calledwith-
drawal operators[Makinson, 1987].
However, there are also strong justifications for (K-5). First of all, Postulate (K-5) corre-
sponds closely to the minimal change principle, as it requires the change from K to K − α
be small enough so that a subsequentα-expansion suffices to recover all discarded sentences.
Also, [Hansson, 1991] has argued that recovery is a prominent feature by showing that, in the
presence of other five basic postulates, Postulate (K-5) can be derived from following Postulate
of core-retainment:
If β ∈ K andβ ∈ K − α, then there is a setA such thatA ⊂ K and
α ∈ Cn(A) andα ∈ Cn(A ∪ {β}) (core-retainment)
Informally, core-retainment says “beliefs that do not in any way contributes to the fact thatK
impliesα are retained inK − α”.
Another support for (K-5) is that, together with (K-2), it implies the followingproperty:
If ⊢ α, thenK − α = K (failure)
Obviously,failure is a promising property, since it is the minimal change to leave the original
belief set unchanged when required to retract a sentence that cannotbe removed.
In addition to be basic postulates, the AGM trio have also proposed twocomplementary
postulates, (K-7) and (K-8), for the cases where the sentence to be contracted isa conjunction.
Intuitively, the expulsion ofα or β requires more changes than the expulsion ofα∧β, since
α ∧ β must be given up in order to give upα or β. It is therefore reasonable to require that
beliefs contained in bothK − α andK − β be included inK − α ∧ β:
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(K-7) K − α ∩K − β ⊆ K − (α ∧ β) (conjunctive overlap)
As argued Nayak[1994a], if δ needs to be removed in order to removeα, andα needs to be
removed in order to removeα ∧ β, thenδ needs to be removed in order to removeα ∧ β. This
gives support to the following postulates:
(K-8) If α /∈ K − (α ∧ β) thenK − (α ∧ β) ⊆ K − α (conjunctive inclusion)
Postulates for Revision
Symmetrically, for revision there are also six basic postulates, (K*1)-(K*6), and two comple-
mentary postulates, (K*7) and (K*8).
As revision is a function on belief sets,K ∗ α should be logically closed:
(K*1) K ∗ α = Cn(K ∗ α) (closure)
The new information should be successfully accepted:3
(K*2) α ∈ K ∗ α (success)
The revised belief setK∗α should not contain more sentences than the result ofK expanded
by α:
(K*3) K ∗ α ⊆ K + α (expansion)
If α is consistent withK, we should not remove any sentence fromK:
(K*4) If ¬α /∈ K thenK + α ⊆ K ∗ α (preservation)
The revised belief setK ∗ α is consistent, unlessα is inconsistent:
(K*5) K ∗ α is inconsistent, only if⊢ ¬α (consistency)
Revision should also be syntax irrelevant:
3 Postulate (K*2) reflects the principle ofprimacy of the new information, that is, the new information is more
reliable (hence prioritized) than the original belief set. It is worth to mention that non-prioritized belief revisionin
which the new information is not always accepted is a relatively recent resea ch topic[Ferḿe and Hansson, 1999;
Booth, 2001; Hansson, 1999].
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(K*6) If α ≡ β thenK ∗ α = K ∗ β (extensionality)
Like those for contraction, the complementary postulates for revision also deal with con-
junctions:
(K*7) K ∗ (α ∧ β) ⊆ (K ∗ α) + β (conjunctive inclusion)
(K*8) If ¬β /∈ K ∗ α then(K ∗ α) + β ⊆ K ∗ (α ∧ β) (conjunctive vacuity)
In the presence of the basic postulates, Postulates (K*7) and (K*8) areequivalent to the
following postulate:
If ¬β /∈ K ∗ α then(K ∗ α) + β = K ∗ (α ∧ β) (iteration)
Note that the postulate of iteration gives a basic account for iterated belief rev sion, which will
be extensively investigated in Chapter 3.
As already mentioned, the AGM postulates are motivated by the minimal change pri ciple.
Indeed, Postulates (K*3) and (K*4) implies that ifα is consistent withK then no elements ofK
are removed:
If ¬α /∈ K, thenK ∗ α = K + α
Such trivial revision is also calledmild revision[Freund and Lehmann, 1994]. More interesting
and complicated are situations where the new sentenceα is inconsistent with the belief setK,
in which case some elements ofK have to be removed in order to accommodate the new belief.
This kind of revision is referred to assevere revisionor belief contraveningrevision.
Inter-definability between Contraction and Revision
Note that, according to Postulate (K-2), contraction should not introduce any new beliefs. This
is obviously not very realistic, as we usually give up a belief only if there is evidence against it.
Example 3. [Hansson, 1997] When I came home yesterday, I believed that my copy of
Rousseau’sThe Social Contractwas on the kitchen table. When I saw the empty kitchen ta-
ble, I gave up the belief.
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In this example, my belief in “The Social Contractwas on the kitchen table” was given
up due to its negation was observed. Therefore, it is essential not contra ted. In fact, Hans-
son[1997] argues that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to find realistic examples of such
pure contraction, which satisfies (K-2). Then why we study contraction aall? The main reason
is that contraction can used to construct more realistic belief change operat rs as stated inLevi’s
decomposition principle[Levi, 1977]:4
Every legitimate belief change is decomposable into a sequence of incorporation
(expansions) and contractions.
In fact, one major result of the AGM theory is that rational revision and contraction operators
can be defined in terms of each other. Formally, given a contraction operat r−, we can construct
a revision operator as follows:
Levi identity:K ∗ a = (K − ¬α) + α.
Note that the Levi identity is a direct support of Levi’s decomposition principle.
If the given contraction operator− is rational, then the revision operator∗ constructed via
the Levi identity is also rational.
Theorem 2.1. [Alchourrónet al., 1985; G̈ardenfors, 1988] If the contraction− satisfies (K-1)-
(K-4) and (K-6), then the revision operator∗ obtained via the Levi identity satisfies (K*1)-
(K*6).5
Theorem 2.2. [Alchourrónet al., 1985; G̈ardenfors, 1988] If the contraction− satisfies (K-1)
and (K-8), then the revision operator obtained via the Levi identity satisfies(K*1)-(K*8).
Conversely, given a revision operator, we can construct a contraction operator as follows:
Harper identity:K − α = K ∩ (K ∗ ¬α).
Similarly, if the given revision operator∗ is rational, so is the contraction operator− con-
structed via the Harper identity.
4The decomposition principle does not mean in practice all belief change operat rs should be constructed as
sequences of contraction and expansion, although it is possible in principle.
5Note that the satisfiability of controversial Postulate (K-5) is not required here.
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Theorem 2.3. [Alchourrónet al., 1985; G̈ardenfors, 1988] If the revision operator satisfies
(K*1)-(K*6), then the contraction operator obtained via the Harper identity satisfies (K-1)-
(K-6).
Theorem 2.4. [Alchourrónet al., 1985; G̈ardenfors, 1988] If the revision operator satisfies
(K*1)-(K*8), then the contraction operator obtained via the Harper identity satisfies (K-1)-
(K-8).
2.1.2 Maximal Consistent Subsets
As the rationality postulates does not uniquely determine a contraction operator, the AGM the-
ory also studies approaches to constructing concrete rational contraction operators. Due to the
inter-definability between revision and contraction, these approaches also can be used to con-
struct rational revision operators.
The constructive model of the so-calledpartial meet contractionis directly motivated by
the minimal change principle. Intuitively, the contracted belief setK − α should be a maximal
subset ofK which does not includeα. Formally,
Definition 2.5. [Alchourrón and Makinson, 1981] LetA be a set of sentences andα a sentence.
ThenA’s remainder setmoduloα (denoted byA ↓ α) consists of subsets ofA s.t.,X ∈ A ↓ α
iff:
1. X ⊆ A
2. α /∈ Cn(X)
3. There is no setX ′ s.t.,X ⊂ X ′ ⊆ A andα /∈ Cn(X ′).
It is worth to mention that an element ofK ↓ α is also a belief set (meaning that it is
logically closed) for any belief setK and any sentenceα.
Example 4. AssumeL is the propositional logic generated from atomsp and q. Let K =
Cn({p, q}). In Figure 2.1, each node denotes an element ofK (modulo logical equivalence);
and the upwards edges denote the deduction relation, that is, there is an edge frome1 to e2 iff
e1 ⊢ e2. Supposeq is to be contracted. It is not difficult to see that there are two maximal
subsets ofK which do not includeq: K ↓ q = {Cn(p),Cn(p ↔ q)}. Note that the remainder
setK ↓ α contains multiple elements. In order to obtain a contracted belief setK − q, a
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naive approach is taking the intersection of all elements ofK ↓ q. Note that, by doing so, an
q-contraction will remove surprisingly alsop, since
⋂
{Cn(p),Cn(p↔ q)} = Cn(p ∨ ¬q).
p ∧ q
p q p↔ q
p ∨ q p ∨ ¬q ¬p ∨ q
⊤
Figure 2.1: Internal structure of belief setK = Cn({p, q})
Formally, [Alchourrón and Makinson, 1982] has proposed the so-calledfull meet contrac-
tion (denoted by∼), which is defined as follows:
K ∼ α =
{
K if ⊢ α
⋂
K ↓ α otherwise
Note that∼ is indeed a function on belief sets, as it is well-known that the intersection of logic
theories is also a logical theory.
Full meet contraction has been shown too cautious, in the sense, that a sentence ofK will
remain inK − α iff it is a logic consequence of¬α:
Observation 2.6. [Alchourrón and Makinson, 1982] Let K a belief set. Then for any sen-
tenceα ∈ K:
K ∼ α = K ∩ Cn({¬α})
Via the Levi identity, a revision operator, calledfull meet revision, can be constructed based-
on full meet contraction. Also, full meet revision has been shown overly cautious.
Observation 2.7. [Alchourrón and Makinson, 1982] LetK be a belief set and∗ the revision
operator generated from full meet contraction via the Levi identity. Then forany sentenceα:
K ∗ α =
{
K + α if ¬α /∈ K
Cn({α}) otherwise
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Obviously, both full meet contraction and revision are almost of no importance in practice.
In order to construct more reasonable operators, the AGM trio have introduced the notion of
selection functions. Intuitively, whenK is contracted byα, a selection function helps to select
most plausible elements ofK ↓ α. Formally,
Definition 2.8. [Alchourrónet al., 1985] Let K be belief set. Aselection functiononK is a
functionf s.t., for any sentenceα :
1. If K ↓ α is non-empty, thenf(K ↓ α) is a non-empty subset ofK ↓ α.
2. If K ↓ α is empty, thenf(K ↓ α) = {K}.
Given a selection functionf on belief setK, thepartial meetcontraction, written as∼f ,
onK is defined as follows[Alchourrónet al., 1985]:
K ∼f α =
⋂
f(K ↓ α)
As shown by[Alchourrónet al., 1985], partial meet contraction satisfies Postulates (K-1)-
(K-6). Conversely, any contraction operator satisfying (K-1)-(K-6) can be reconstructed as a
partial meet contraction. In other words, partial meet contraction operators re exactly charac-
terized by the basic postulates for contraction.
Theorem 2.9. [Alchourrónet al., 1985] Let K be a belief set, an operator− on K satisfies
Postulates (K-1)-(K-6) iff there is a selection functionf onK s.t., for any sentenceα:
K − α = K ∼f α
By the Levi identity, we also can construct the so-calledpartial meet revision. According to
Theorem 2.3, partial meet revision should satisfy Postulates (K*1)-(K*6).
Note that full meet contraction is just a special case of partial meet contraction, where the
selection function always selects all elements of the remainder set. Therefore, it also satisfies
all basic postulates for contraction.
A maxichoice contractionon belief setK is another special case of partial meet contraction,
which is based a selection function onK selecting exactly one element ofK ↓ α for any
sentenceα [Alchourrón and Makinson, 1982].
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In contrast to full meet contraction, a maxichoice contraction is extremely incautious. This
is particular obvious, if we consider the behavior of the revision operator, called amaxichoice
revision, generated from a maxichoice contraction operators via the Levi identity.
Observation 2.10. [Alchourrón and Makinson, 1982] Let K be a belief set and∗ an opera-
tor generated from a maxichoice contraction onK via the Levi identity. Then it holds for all
sentencesα andβ that
If ¬α ∈ K then eitherβ ∈ K ∗ α or¬β ∈ K ∗ α.
Put in words, a maxichoice revision will render the revised belief setK ∗ α to be complete,
even ifK is initially not complete.
As already mentioned, a selection functionf onK is assumed to determine the most plau-
sible elements ofK ↓ α. So as if there is ordering of plausibility onK ↓ α. Obviously,
this plausibility ordering should be independent of which sentence is to be contra ted, in other
words, it is should be an ordering on all maximal subsets ofK (i.e.,
⋃
{K ↓ α |α ∈ L}).
Formally, a selection functionf onK is calledrelational if it is induced from a relation2
on all maximal subsets ofK as follows:
f(K ↓ α) = {K ′ ∈ K ↓ α |K ′′ 2 K ′ for all K ′′ ∈ K ↓ α}
It is also natural to require an ordering to be transitive. Formally, a selection function on
K is calledtransitively relationalif it is induced from a transitive relation2 on all maximal
subsets ofK.
The following result shows that the transitively relational partial meet contraction operators
are exactly characterized by the AGM postulates.6
Theorem 2.11. [Alchourrónet al., 1985] Let K be a belief set. An operator− on K is a
transitively relational partial meet contraction onK iff it satisfies (K-1)-(K-8).
6A selection function is calledconnectively relationaliff it is induced from a total relation2. Analogously, a par-
tial meet contraction operator− onK is transitively and connectively relational iff it is generated from a transitively
and connectively relational selection function. It is interesting to mention that the class of partial meet contrac-
tion operators induced from transitively relational selection functions is same to those induced from transitively and
connectively relational selection functions, that is, the connectivity conditi on 2 essentially does not impose any
additional constraint[Gärdenfors, 1988].
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Note that while the construction of (transitively relational) partial meet contraction and re-
vision are mathematically very elegant, they are not suitable for direct computer realizations. In
next section, I will present a constructive model which is more amenable to implementation.
2.1.3 Epistemic Entrenchment
As already mentioned, a concrete contraction (revision) operator shouldmake use of some extra-
logical preference information. In partial meet contraction (revision) such extra-logical prefer-
ence information is encoded by a selection function.
To make the realization easier,[Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1988] have proposed to use a
total pre-order on the underlying languageL as the extra-logical preference information.7
Definition 2.12. [Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1988] Let K be a belief set. An epistemic en-
trenchment (EE, for short)≤K onK is a binary relation overL obeying following conditions:
(EE1) Ifα ≤K β andβ ≤K γ thenα ≤K γ
(EE2) Ifα ⊢ β thenα ≤K β
(EE3) For anyα andβ, α ≤K α ∧ β or β ≤K α ∧ β
(EE4) WhenK is consistent,α /∈ K iff α ≤K β for all β
(EE5) If β ≤K α for all β then⊢ α
It is easy to see that an EE is indeed a total pre-order. The transitivity is required by the
condition (EE1). Sinceα ⊢ α, it follows from (EE2) that≤K is also reflexive. Assumeα, β are
arbitrary sentences. It follows from (EE3) eitherα ≤K α∧ β or β ≤K α∧ β. Assume, without
loss of generality,α ≤K α ∧ β. Sinceα ∧ β ⊢ β, it follows from (EE2) thatα ∧ β ≤K β. By
transitivity, we can obtainα ≤K β. Hence,≤K is total.
Note that an EE≤K is correlated with a belief setK. According to (EE4), ifK is consistent
then the minimal elements ofL wrt. ≤K are precisely those not contained inK. Therefore,
in general≤K cannot be an EE on another belief setK ′. Furthermore, according to (EE2) and
(EE5), a sentence is a maximal element ofL wrt. ≤K iff it is a tautology.
7A total pre-order≤ is a reflexive, transitive binary relation, s.t., for allu, v eitheru ≤ v or v ≤ u. If u ≤ v and
v 6≤ u, we also writeu < v, while u ≤ v andv ≤ u is abbreviated asu = v. We denote bymin(A,≤) the minimal
elements ofA wrt ≤, that is,min(A,≤) = {u ∈ A |u ≤ v for all v ∈ A}.
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Intuitively, an EE≤K is a preference relation onL. If α ≤K β thenβ is at least as en-
trenched asα, which means when one of them has to be given up it is preferred to retract α:8
(C≤) α ≤K β iff α /∈ K − (α ∧ β) or ⊢ α ∧ β
Theoretically, Condition (C≤) can be understood as a way of constructing an EE≤K from a
contraction operator− onK: for anyα, β ∈ L, we can determineα ≤K β by simply checking
whetherα /∈ K − (α ∧ β) or ⊢ α ∧ β?
From a pragmatic point of view, it is more interesting to construct a contractionoperator
from an EE. Based on Condition (C≤), Gärdenfors has proposed the so-calledentrenchment-
based contraction:9
(C-) K − α =
{
K if ⊢ α
{β ∈ K |α <K α ∨ β} otherwise
Like transitively relational partial meet contraction, G ardenfors’ entrenchment-based con-
traction is also exactly characterized by the AGM postulates.
Theorem 2.13. [Gärdenfors, 1988]
1. Let− be a contraction operator on a belief setK satisfying (K-1)-(K-8). Then relation
≤K derived from (C≤) satisfies (EE1)-(EE5).
2. Let≤K be an EE on a belief setK. Then entrenchment-base contraction operator−
defined by (C-) satisfies (K-1)-(K-8).
Rott has argued that (C-) is counterintuitive. Therefore, he has sugge ted instead the follow-
ing more natural definition[Rott, 1991]:
(C-R) K − α =
{
K if ⊢ α
{β ∈ K |α <K β} otherwise
Rott’s entrenchment-based contraction has been shown satisfying all the AGM postulates, but
the controversial (K-5).
It turns out surprisingly that, although the two entrenchment-based contration operators are
distinct, they obtain the same revision operator by the Levi identity[Rott, 1991].
8Note that, if⊢ α ∧ β thenα ≤K β due to (EE2) and (EE5).
9See[Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1988] for details on how (C-) is obtained from (C≤).
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To avoid reference to a contraction operator, Gärdenfors has also proposed the so-called
entrenchment-base revision:
(C*) K ∗ α =
{
L if ⊢ ¬α
{β ∈ L |¬α <K ¬α ∨ β} otherwise
It is been shown that entrenchment-base revision is exactly characterized by the AGM pos-
tulates:
Theorem 2.14. [Gärdenfors, 1988] LetK be a belief set. Then a revision operator∗ satisfies
Postulates (K*1)-(K*8) iff there exists an EE≤K s.t., Condition (C*) holds for any sentenceα.
In comparison to partial meet revision, entrenchment-based revision is morelike a proce-
dure in computer science. However, it is not possible to implement entrenchmet-base revision
directly, since if the underlying languageL is infinite so is an EE. Moreover, even for a finiteL
the size of an EE≤K could be very large.
2.2 System of Spheres
In this section, I present another interesting possible world-based constructive model construc-
tive model of belief change proposed by[Grove, 1988]. This model provides us nice and clear
pictures of the behavior of belief change. Strictly speaking, this model is not an riginal part of
the AGM theory, as it is not a contribution of the AGM trio.
Intuitively, a possible world represents a snapshot of the world at some pint in time. In our
setting, apossible world, denoted byW (possible indexed), can be represented by a maximal
consistent set of sentences ofL. Recall thatK ↓ α are the maximal subsets ofK which does
includeα, therefore the set of possible worlds, denoted byΘL, of L can be formally defined as
follows:
ΘL := L ↓ ⊥
Note that, a possible worldW ∈ ΘL is not only consistent but also complete, that is, for any
sentenceα, eitherα ∈W or¬α ∈W .
Example 5. AssumeL is the propositional language generated from two atomsp andq. Then
it can be shown that:
ΘL = {Cn({p, q}),Cn({p,¬q}),Cn({¬p, q}),Cn({¬p,¬q})}
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A possible worldW is called a model of a sentenceα (written asW |= α) iff α ∈ W , and
the set of all models ofα is denoted by[α], that is,[α] = {W ∈ ΘL |W |= α}. Similarly,
a possible worldW is a model of a setA of sentences (written asW |= A) iff A ⊆ W , and
[A] = {W ∈ ΘL |W |= A}. Conversely, given a set of possible worldsW ⊆ ΘL, we denote
by Th(W) the set of sentences which are true in all elements ofW:
Th(W) := {α ∈ L |W |= α for all W ∈ W} (2.2)
It is not difficult to see that for any setW of possible worldsTh(W) is a belief set since it is
logically closed.
As frequently repeated, a contraction (or revision) operator needs to employ some extra-
logical preference information to uniquely determine its contraction (revision) p licy. For this
purpose, we might think, in additional to a belief setK, there is a system of concentric spheres
surrounding[K].
Definition 2.15. [Grove, 1988] LetW be a set of possible worlds. A system of spheresS (SOS,
for short) centered onW is a family of subsets ofΘL such that:
1. If S1, S2 ∈ S, then eitherS1 ⊆ S2 or S2 ⊆ S1
2. W ∈ S, andW ⊆ S for all S ∈ S
3. ΘL ∈ S
4. For any consistent sentenceα, there exists a smallest sphereS such that[α] ∩ S 6= ∅
Note that the last condition is not redundant. It essential requires the set{S ∈ S |S ∩ [α] 6=
∅} to be well-ordered wrt.⊆, for any consistent sentenceα.
Given a belief setK and a SOSS centered on[K], those possible worlds which are closer
to [K] are considered more plausible.10
The plausibility relation encoded by a SOS has been show by Grove[1988] sufficient to
determine uniquely a contraction operator, as well as a revision operator.
Suppose belief setK is contracted byα. As the contracted belief setK − α should be
a subset ofK, we expect that[K − α] to be a superset of[K]. Since the only motivation of
10A SOS centered on[K] is depicted in Figure 2.2, where the rectangle surface representsΘL (i.e., each point on
the surface denotes a possible world).
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ΘL
[K]
Figure 2.2: A SOS centered on[K].
accepting more possible worlds is to excludeα (in other words, to make¬α possible), it is
reasonable that[K] is only enlarged by elements of[¬α]. As accepting[¬α] wholly might be
too radical, we would like to enlarge[K] by the most plausible elements of[α], i.e., those closest
to [K]. Such a contraction process is intuitively depicted in Figure 2.3, where[K−α] is denoted
by the filled part.
ΘL
[K]
[¬α]
Figure 2.3: SOS-base contraction
For any consistent sentenceα, let minS(α) denote the smallest sphere ofS that inter-
sects[α]. Formally, a contraction operator− on a belief setK is called asphere-basediff there
is a SOSS centered on[K] s.t., for any sentenceα:
K − α =
{
K if ⊢ α
Th([K] ∪ (minS(¬α) ∩ [¬α])) otherwise
The following theorem shows that sphere-based contraction is characterized by the AGM
postulates.
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Theorem 2.16. [Grove, 1988] LetK be a belief set. Then a contraction operator onK satisfies
(K-1)-(K-8) iff it is a sphere-based contraction operator onK.
Suppose belief setK is revised byα. Sinceα has to be incorporated inK ∗ α, [K ∗ α]
should be a subset of[α]. As we do not wantK ∗ α to differ more from theK than what is
motivated byα, it is reasonable to assume that[K ∗ α] consists of the most plausible elements
of [α]. Such a revision process is intuitively depicted in Figure 2.4, where[K ∗α] is denoted by
the filled part.
ΘL
[K]
[α]
Figure 2.4: SOS-based revision
Formally, a revision operator∗ on belief setK is calledsphere-based revisioniff there is a
SOSS centered on for[K], s.t., for any sentenceα:
K ∗ α =
{
L if ⊢ ¬α
Th(minS(α) ∩ [α])) othwise
It has been shown that sphere-based revision is also characterized by the AGM postulates.
Theorem 2.17. [Grove, 1988] LetK be a belief set. Then a revision operator onK satisfies
(K*1)-(K*8) iff it is a sphere-based revision operator onK.
Note that both sphere-base contraction and revision seem quite natural and promising, there-
fore they can be considered as supports for the rationality of the AGM postulates.
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2.3 The KM Theory
The distinction between update and revision was first informally made by Kellerand
Winslett [1985]. As argued by several researchers, revision is not suitable for situations
where the new information describes a change of the world[Ginsberg and Smith, 1987;
Winslett, 1988b]. In particular, Winslett has proposed an example of belief change, with which
revision will obtain undesirable results.
Example 6. [Winslett, 1988b] Initially, all we believed about a certain table is that there is either
a book on the table or a magazine on the table, but not both. How should we change our beliefs
after a robot is instructed to put the book on the table?
Assume “the book (the magazine) is on the table” is represented byb and (m respectively).
LetK = Cn({¬b ↔ m}). The new information can be represented byb. If K is to be revised
by b, then the revised belief setK ∗ b = Cn({¬b ↔ m, b}), provided∗ satisfies the postulates
(K*3) and (K4). So we believe now that the magazine is not on the table (¬m). This is obviously
unreasonable, as by common-sense the magazine should remain where it was.
Belief update is a type of belief change operation designed for situations where t e
new information reflects changes in the world. Formally, anupdate operationis a func-
tion ⋄ which maps a belief setK and a sentenceα to the updated belief setK ⋄ α.
It is now well-known that there is a fundamental difference between update and revi-
sion [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991a], which can be explained intuitively as follows. Given
a belief setK, the real world is conceived to be among the possible worlds[K]. WhenK is
revised byα, the world has assumedly not been changed. Therefore, it is reasonable th t the re-
vised belief setK ∗α is determined by elements of[α] which are closest to[K] (cf. Figure 2.4),
in other words,[K] is viewed as a whole. WhenK is updated byα. It is assumed thatα is
caused by changes in the world. Since we do not know which possible word in [K] is the real
world, it is better to give each of them equal consideration. Therefore,the updated belief set
K ⋄ α should be obtained by changing each possible world in[K] “as little as possible” so that
it becomes a modelα.
Informally, letW ⋄ α denote the set of possible worlds obtained from changingW as little
as possible to accommodateα. The above argument leads to the well-knownWinslett iden-
tity [Winslett, 1990]:
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Winslett identity: K ⋄ α =
{
L if [K] = ∅ or [α] = ∅
Th(
⋃
W∈[K]W ⋄ α) otherwise
2.3.1 The KM Postulates
In [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991a], the difference between update and revision has been for-
mally studied. In particular, Katsuno and Mendelzon also have introduced as t of rationality
postulates, numbered (U1)-(U9), to constrain the behavior of belief update operators. In the
original KM theory, the beliefs of an agent are represented as a sentenc of some finitary propo-
sitional logic and update is modeled as a binary function over sentences.
By generalizing the KM theory, Peppas et al,. have proposed a framework for belief
update, which is not restricted to finitary propositional logics.[Peppas and Williams, 1995;
Peppaset al., 1996]:11
(K ⋄ 1) K ⋄ α = Cn(K ⋄ α)
(K ⋄ 2) α ∈ K ⋄ α
(K ⋄ 3) If α ∈ K thenK ⋄ α = K
(K ⋄ 4) K or α is inconsistent iffK ⋄ α is inconsistent
(K ⋄ 5) If α ≡ β thenK ⋄ α = K ⋄ β
(K ⋄ 6) K ⋄ (α ∧ β) ⊆ (K ⋄ α) + β
(K ⋄ 7) If K is complete and¬β /∈ K ⋄ α then(K ⋄ α) + β ⊆ K ⋄ (α ∧ β)
(K ⋄ 8) If [K] 6= ∅, thenK ⋄ α = Th(
⋃
W∈[K] W ⋄ α)
Readers should be familiar withK ⋄1,K ⋄2,K ⋄5 andK ⋄6, since they also occur in the AGM
postulates for revision.
11To be precise, the original KM postulates consists of (U1)-(U8), and (U9) is a complementary postulate which
implies (U6) and (U7). Here,(K ⋄2)-(K ⋄6) and(K ⋄8) correspond respectively to(U1)-(U5) and(U8); whereas
(U9) is reformulated as(K ⋄ 7). Similarly, (U6) and(U7) can be reformulated as follows:
(U6’) If β ∈ K ⋄ α andα ∈ K ⋄ β, thenK ⋄ α = K ⋄ β
(U7’) If K is complete thenK ⋄ (α ∨ β) ⊆ K ⋄ α ∩ K ⋄ β
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Note that there are at least three major differences between the KM and AGM postulates.
First, (K*4) is replaced by a weaker version of (K ⋄ 3). So evenα is consistent withK, it
is not necessary thatK ⋄ α = K + α. Recall Example 6, it is in fact (K*4) which forces to
obtain undesirable results. Hence the weakening of (K*4) seems necessary and justified. The
second difference is that when the inconsistent belief setK (or, equivalentlyL) updated by a
consistent sentenceα, according to (K ⋄4), results in the inconsistent belief set; whereas ifK is
revised byα, according to (K ∗5), the revised belief setK ∗α should be consistent. This can be
explained as follows. The inconsistent belief set can be remedied with revision by adding new
information that supersedes the inconsistency. We can never repair the inconsistent belief set
using update, because specifies a change in the world. If there is no possible world compatible
with the belief set, we have no way of recording the change in the world. Another important
difference is that (K ⋄ 8) only occurs in the KM postulates. The postulate (K ⋄ 8) directly
corresponds to the Winslett identity.12 An immediate consequence ofK ⋄ 8 is the so-called
monotonicity[Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991a]:
(K⋄M) For any belief setsK,K ′ and any sentenceα,
if K ⊆ K ′ thenK ⋄ α ⊆ K ′ ⋄ α.
As we will see in Section 2.4.1, monotonicity is incompatible with the AGM postulates.
2.3.2 Similarity Structure
Based on the work of[Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991a], Peppas et al., have proposed a con-
structive model for belief update. The idea is quite similar to Grove’s SOS. Note that, to revise
a belief setK, we only need a SOS centered on[K]. This is not sufficient for updatingK,
since in this case we would like to change each possible world in[K] point-wise. Instead, we
need a SOS centered on each possible world. Formally, asimilarity structureis a function that
assigns to every possible worldW ∈ ΘL a SOSSW Recall that, for any consistent sentence
α, minSW (α) denotes the minimal sphere which intersects[α]. Given a similarity structure, we
can easily construct an update operator by lettingW ⋄ α = minSW (α) ∩ [α].
It has been shown that update operators induced from similarity structures are precisely
those satisfying the KM postulates.
12Observe, in (K ⋄ 8) the same update operator⋄ is applied to the belief setK and each possible worldW ∈ [K].
This is well-defined, since a possible world is essentially also a belief set.
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Theorem 2.18. [Peppaset al., 1996] An update operator⋄ satisfies (K ⋄ 1)-(K ⋄ 8) iff there
exists a similarity structure s.t., for any belief setK and any sentenceα:
K ⋄ α =
{
L if [α] = ∅ or [K] = ∅
Th(
⋃
W∈[K] minSW (α) ∩ [α]) otherwise
An update operator based on a similarity structure can be nicely depicted by Figure 2.5. Note
that there are two major differences between Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.4. Firstly, in Figure 2.4
there is only one SOS centered on[K], whereas in Figure 2.5 there is a family of SOSs (one for
each possible world in[K]). Secondly, in Figure 2.5 the centers of all SOSs are singleton sets.
· · · · · ·W1
[α]
Wi
[α]
Figure 2.5: Similarity structure-base update
It is worth to mention that, unlike extra-logical preference information employed in belief
revision (e.g., an EE), a similarity structure is not correlated to a fixed belief st. This means,
given a similarity structure, we can define an update operator which appliesto any belief setK
and any sentenceα. Therefore, the update operator induced from a similarity structure is trulya
binary function. Such binary operators are called by Hansson[1998] global, whereas an opera-
tor for a fixed belief set (e.g., an EE-based revision) is said to bel cal. In fact, many researchers
believe that it is more appropriate to view a local revision operator as a unary function (with the
belief set in background) which maps the new information to the revised beliefs t.
2.4 Related Research Fields
In this section, I will present two research fields, i.e., conditionals and non-m otonic reasoning,
which are closed related to belief change.
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2.4.1 Conditionals
One major motivation of the philosophic study on belief change is to develop an epistemic
semantic model forconditional sentences. A conditional sentences is of the formα≫ β, which
can be read as “Ifα, thenβ” [Gärdenfors, 1988]. If α contradicts what is already accepted in
a given belief setK, the conditional is called acounterfactuals(relative toK); otherwise it is
called anopen conditional(relative toK).
The most widely accepted proposal of the epistemic semantics for conditionalss ba ed on
well-known Ramsey test:
(RT) Accept a sentence of the form “Ifα, thenβ” in a belief setK iff the minimal change
of K needed to acceptα also requires acceptingβ.
As suggested by[Gärdenfors, 1988], if we consider≫ as a binary connective ofL, then the
Ramsey test can be reformulated in a more condensed way:
(RT*) α≫ β ∈ K iff β ∈ K ∗ α
Gärdernfors has shown that if a global revision operator∗ satisfies (RT*), then it must be
monotonic, that is,13
(K*M) For any belief setsK,K ′ and any sentenceα,
if K ⊆ K ′ thenK ∗ α ⊆ K ′ ∗ α.
Unfortunately, G̈ardenfors’ well-knowntriviality theoremshows that (K*M) is not compat-
ible with the AGM postulates. Formally, a belief setK is called non-trivial iff there are at least
three pairwise disjoint sentencesα, β, γ that are consistent withK, that is,¬α /∈ K, ¬β /∈ K,
and¬γ /∈ K.14 The triviality theorem essentially says there does not exist non-trivial global
revision operator which satisfies the AGM postulates and (K*M) simultaneously:
Theorem 2.19. [Gärdenfors, 1988] Let∗ be a global revision operator. Then the following two
conditions are incompatible:
1. There exists a non-trivial belief setK.
13The proof is not difficult. SupposeK ⊆ K′. For any sentenceβ, if β ∈ K ∗ α then according to the “if” part
of (RT) α ≫ β ∈ K ⊆ K′. It follows from the “only if” part of (RT),β ∈ K′ ∗ α.
14Two sentencesα, β are disjoint iff⊢ ¬(α ∧ β)
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2. ∗ satisfies (K*2), (K*4), (K*5) and (K*M).
Since Postulates (K*2), (K*4), (K*5) are commonly accepted and very plausible, we con-
sider (K*M) (hence (RT*)) as the culprit of the incompatibility.
An important lesson we learn from the triviality theorem is that it is improper to include
conditionals into the underlying languageL, as far as we accept the AGM postulates. In prin-
ciple, a set of conditionals can be considered as one particular form of extra-logical preference
information. Therefore, I suggest to distinguish a belief set from a beliefstate. The latter con-
tains, in addition to a belief set, the extra-logical preference information (e.g., an EE) which can
used to determine the belief change strategy. I will argue in Chapter 3 that it ismore appropriate
to consider belief change operators as functions on belief states (insteadof belief sets).
Note that an update operator⋄ can be used in the Ramsey test to avoid the trivializa-
tion. Since in the KM postulates, one source of the incompatibility (i.e., K*4) is weak-
ened, monotonicity is not any more a problem. In fact, monotonicity is a consequence
of the KM postdates (cf. (K ⋄ M) of Section 2.3.1) and considered a desirable prop-
erty for update. The immunity of the update to triviality theorem has attracted somere-
searchers to study the connections between belief update and conditionals[Gr hne, 1991;
Katsuno and Satoh, 1991].
2.4.2 Non-monotonic Reasoning
The triviality theorem reveals that the AGM revision is intrinsically non-monotonic. In fact,
belief revision and non-monotonic reasoning are often considered as “two sides of the same
coins”. The direct relation between revision and non-monotonic reasoning is formally studied
by [Makinson and G̈ardenfors, 1989].
Let K be a belief set and∗ a revision operator onK, a non-monotonic inference relation
|∼K,∗ can be induced as follows:
(NM) α|∼K,∗ β iff β ∈ K ∗ α
Intuitively, α|∼K,∗ β meansβ can be non-monotonically inferred fromα, given the background
belief setK.
Freund and Lehmann have shown that properties of a revision operator∗ corre-
sponds directly to well-known properties of the inference relation| ∼K,∗ induced by
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(NM) [Freund and Lehmann, 1994] (cf. Table 2.115)
AGM postulates Non-monotonic inference
(K*1) If ⊢ α→ β andγ|∼ α, thenγ|∼ β
If α|∼ β andα|∼ γ, thenα|∼ β ∧ γ
(K*2) α|∼ α
(K*5) If α 0 ⊥, thenα 6 |∼ ⊥
(K*6) If ⊢ α↔ β andα|∼ γ, thenβ|∼ γ
(K*7) If α|∼ γ andβ|∼ γ, thenα ∨ β|∼ γ
(K*8) If α ∧ β|∼ γ thenα|∼ β → γ
Table 2.1: The AGM postulates and properties of non-monotonic inference.
Readers are referred to[Makinson and G̈ardenfors, 1989; Freund and Lehmann, 1994] for
the explanations of the listed (non-monotonic) properties.
A non-monotonic inference relation is calledrational and consistency preservingiff it sat-
isfies all properties in Table 2.1. Freund and Lehmann have shown that there is an one-to-one
correspondence between rational and consistency preserving inference elations and revision
operators satisfying the AGM theory.
Theorem 2.20. [Freund and Lehmann, 1994]
1. LetK be a belief set and∗ a revision operator onK. If ∗ satisfies Postulates (K*1)-(K*8),
then inference relation|∼K,∗ defined by (NM) is rational and consistency preserving.
2. Let |∼ be a rational and consistency preserving inference relation. Then thereexists a
belief setK and a revision operator∗ onK, s.t.,
α|∼ β iff β ∈ K ∗ α
The direct translation between non-monotonic reasoning and belief revision suggests we can
use techniques of the one field to solve the problems of the other field. In particul , algorithms
for belief revision can be used to implement non-monotonic reasoning and vice verse.
15Note that, (K*3) and (K*4) do not appear in the first column of Table 2.1, since they follow respectively from
(K*7) and (K*8) (by assumingβ = ⊤). For the sake of conciseness,|∼K,∗ is abbreviated as|∼.
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Summary
In this chapter, I have surveyed two classic frameworks for belief change, i.e., the AGM theory
for belief revision and the KM theory for belief update. Revision and update are different
approaches to changing the beliefs of an agent in response to different typ s of new information.
Update is suitable for recording changes in the world; whereas revision ist add knowledge
about the static world. In both frameworks, belief change are studied from two perspectives.
On the one hand, a set of rationality postulates are introduced to constrain the general behavior
of belief change operators. On the other hand, there are also proposals of v rious constructive
models.
Chapter 3
Iterated Belief Revision: General
Frameworks
In many situations, an agent needs to adapt its beliefs incrementally in respons to a sequence of
observations. Therefore, iterated belief revision is a very important topicin belief change, that
has been studied by many researchers[F eund and Lehmann, 1994; Darwiche and Pearl, 1997;
Nayaket al., 1996a; Boutilier, 1993; Konieczny and Pérez, 2000; Jin and Thielscher, 2005b].
The classical AGM theory seems suitable and sufficient for one-step belief rev sion. How-
ever, for the incremental adaptation of beliefs, the AGM postulates provedto be overly
weak[Darwiche and Pearl, 1994; Darwiche and Pearl, 1997]. This has led to the development
of additional postulates for iterated belief revision by Darwiche and Pearl(DP), among oth-
ers[Lehmann, 1995; Boutilier, 1993; Nayaket al., 2003].
Still, however, the AGM and DP postulates together are too permissive in that they support
belief revision operators which assume arbitrary dependencies among thepieces of informa-
tion which an agent acquires along its way. These operators have a drastic effect when the
agent makes an observation which contradicts its currently held beliefs: The agent is forced to
cancel everything it has learned up to this point. In this chapter, I first give a formal anal-
ysis of this problem of implicit dependence, and then I present, as a solution, an i depen-
dencepostulate for iterated belief revision. I give a representation theorem forthe new pos-
tulate and prove its consistency by defining a concrete belief revision operat r. I also contrast
the postulate of independence to the so-called Recalcitrance postulate of[Nayaket al., 1996a;
Nayaket al., 2003] and argue that the latter is too strict in that it rejects reasonable belief revi-
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sion operators. The main contribution of this chapter is a general framework for iterated belief
revision, which is more satisfactory than any other proposals in the literature.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I give d s-
cussions on why iterated belief revision is a difficult problem, followed by theapproach
of [Darwiche and Pearl, 1994] for iterated belief revision. In Section 3.3, I formally analyze
the problem of the DP postulates to be overly permissive and propose an additional postulate to
overcome this deficiency. I give a representation theorem for the postulate along with a concrete
revision operator. In Section 3.5, a detailed comparison to related work will be given.
3.1 Why is it Difficult to Iterate
The AGM theory seems suitable and sufficient for one-step belief revision. But by a closer
look at the constructive models, we can observe immediately its problem for iterated belief
revision at least from a technical point of view. To make the argument moregr unded, let us
consider the constructive model based on EE,1 in which, to revise a belief setK, an EE≤K on
K is exploited. Recall, ifK is revised byα, Condition (C*) (cf. Section 2.1.3) can uniquely
determine the revised belief setK ∗α. Now suppose we want to subsequently reviseK ∗α byβ.
Clearly, for revisingK ∗α, an EE onK ∗α is needed. Unfortunately, providedK 6= K ∗α, it is
impossible to reuse≤K due to Condition (EE4) (of Definition 2.12). Nor does Condition (C*)
tell us how to construct an EE for the revised belief setK ∗ α. Therefore, the revision process
can not be iterated. The problem of the EE-based revision is that it takes ab lief set and some
extra-logical preference information (i.e., an EE), but only produces ar vised belief set. This is
referred to as the problem of categorial mis-matching by Hansson[2003].
Technically, iterated belief revision is possible only if we solve the problem ofcategorial
mis-matching. A naive solution of the problem of categorial mis-matching is to assume that
there exists an external source which assigns extra-logical preference information (e.g., an EE
or a selection function) to each belief set (cf.[Rott, 1992; Hansson, 1989]). Revision operators
constructed by using such an external source are calledexternal revisions. The problem of
external revisions is that they are based on some information source whichis external to the
agent’s beliefs. Therefore, the agent is supposed to adhere to the samerevision policy regardless
of its actual beliefs. Moreover, it is not at all clear where the external extra-logical preference
1It is not difficult to see that the following arguments apply to other constructive models as well.
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information comes from and how it is to be interpreted. Thus, this kind of revision operators
has later on been criticized by Rott as embodying a bad philosophy[Rott, 2003].
A more promising approach is to design belief revision operators which not only revise the
belief set but also the extra-logical preference information, so that the revised extra-logical pref-
erence information can be used for the subsequent revision of the revisd belief set. Recall, due
to Gärdenfors’ triviality theorem (see Section 2.4.1), we should distinguish a belief set from a
belief state. For the sake of generality, we consider abelief stateas anabstract objectfrom
which we can induce a belief set (or, the propositional beliefs) and the extra-logical preference
information (required by a revision operator). Canonically, the extra-logical preference infor-
mation can be represented by a set of conditionals, although it might appearin different forms.
Therefore, the extra-logical preference information of a belief state is also c lled itsconditional
beliefs. Usually, a belief state is denoted byK (possibly indexed). The belief set induced from
K is denoted byBel(K). A belief state is said to be consistent iff its belief set is consistent.
Two belief statesK1,K2 are called statically equivalent (written asK1 ≡ K2), if they have the
same belief set, i.e.,Bel(K1) = Bel(K2). For the sake of succinctness, we often writeα ∈ K
instead ofα ∈ Bel(K). The above analysis suggests it is more appropriate to regard aniter ted
belief revision operatoras a function on belief states (rather than on belief sets), i.e., it maps a
belief stateK and the new informationα to the revised belief stateK ∗ α. Note that the notion
of belief state is rather abstract at moment, we will see a more concrete form obelief states in
Chapter 4, when a computational iterated revision operator is concerned.
Following the AGM trio, we might argue that it is unrealistic to have a unique iterated belief
revision operator which makes sense in all domains. A more theoretically sufficient solution
is to provide a general framework for iterated belief revision. For this purpose, we need to
consider the problem of how to revise a belief state in a rational way. Furthermor , we would
like to postulate the behavior of rational iterated revision operations in a general way, which is
independent of the concrete form of belief states. Obviously, this is much more difficult than to
devise a concrete iterated revision operator. An iterated revision operator should revise a belief
state in a rational way. It seems reasonable to require that a rational iterated revision operator
will change the propositional beliefs as little as possible. To make this idea precise, we expect
any rational iterated revision operator to satisfy the following modified AGM postulates:
(K ∗ 1) Bel(K ∗ α) = Cn(Bel(K ∗ α))
(K ∗ 2) α ∈ Bel(K ∗ α)
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(K ∗ 3) Bel(K ∗ α) ⊆ Bel(K) + α
(K ∗ 4) If ¬α /∈ Bel(K) thenBel(K) + α ⊆ Bel(K ∗ α)
(K ∗ 5) K ∗ α is inconsistent, only if0 ¬α
(K ∗ 6) If α ≡ β thenK ∗ α ≡ K ∗ β
(K ∗ 7) Bel(K ∗ (α ∧ β)) ⊆ Bel(K ∗ α) + β
(K ∗ 8) If ¬β /∈ Bel(K ∗ α) thenBel(K ∗ α) + β ⊆ Bel(K ∗ (α ∧ β))
In the rest of this thesis, an iterated revision operator satisfying the modifiedAGM postulates is
called anAGM revision operators.
Note that an iterated revision operator is a global operator, in the sense, itdoes not only
apply (locally) to one belief state. Suppose∗ is an iterated revision operator. Given an belief
stateK, we can induced a local revision operator∗K on belief setBel(K), such that for any
sentenceα:
Bel(K) ∗K α = Bel(K ∗ α)
Obviously, an iterated revision operator satisfies Postulates (K∗1)-(K∗8) iff the induced (local)
revision operator for any belief state satisfies Postulates (K*1)-(K*8).
While minimizing the change of the belief set, unfortunately, the (modified) AGM postulates
impose almost no constraint on the change of the conditional beliefs. To seethi , assume, with-
out loss of generality, a belief state is of the form〈K,≤K〉, whereK is a belief set and≤K is an
EE onK. Suppose∗ is an iterated revision operator that satisfies the modified AGM postulates.
When〈K,≤K〉 is revised byα, the revised belief setK ∗ α is uniquely determined, however,
∗ can arbitrarily change≤K , as long as the revised EE≤K∗α satisfies Conditions (EE1)-(EE5)
wrt. K ∗ α. It is clear that such excessive freedom on the change of the conditional beliefs is
not desirable, and therefore the modified AGM postulates are too weak. But it is far from trivial
how the (modified) AGM postulates should be extended to impose reasonable constraints on the
change of conditional beliefs. In fact, this is the main problem I am going to tackle in the rest
of this chapter.
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3.2 The DP Theory
The problem of iterated belief revision has been studied by many researchers. In this section, I
recall a general framework for iterated belief revision proposed by Darwiche and Pearl (DP, for
short)[1997], which is the most commonly accepted in the literature.
In fact, the idea of regarding iterated revision operators as functions onbelief states is orig-
inally put forward by Darwiche and Pearl. However they represent thepropositional beliefs
of a belief state by a single sentence (instead of a belief set), as the underlyi g languageL is
assumed to be a propositional logic generated from a finite set of propositions (atoms). For such
belief states, Darwiche and Pearl also proposed a reformulation of the AGM postulates, which
is essentially equivalent to the modified AGM postulates (of Section 3.1), providedL is finite.
Base on that of[Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991b], Darwiche and Pearl provided a representation
theorem for their reformulated AGM postulates.
For the sake of generality, I present a generalization of the Darwiche and Pearl’s result,
which requiresL to be neither finite nor propositional.
Definition 3.1. Given a belief stateK, a faithful rankingon K is a total pre-orderK on the
possible worldsΘL, s.t., for any possible worldsW1,W2:
1. If W1,W2 |= K thenW1 =K W2
2. If W1 |= K andW2 6|= K, thenW1 ≺K W2
3. For any consistent sentenceα, there exists a set (denote bymin([α],K)) of the minimal
elements of[α] wrt. K.
whereW |= K abbreviatesW |= Bel(K). A faithful assignmenth is a function that maps a
belief stateK to a faithful rankinghK onK.
The intuitive meaning ofW1 K W2 is thatW1 is at least as plausible asW2. It is also
worth to mention that, for an infiniteL, the last condition of Definition 3.1 is not redundant.
Note that in [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] a possible world is represented by a proposi-
tional interpretation. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between int rpretations and
maximal consistent sets in a propositional logic, my definition indeed generalizes that of
[Darwiche and Pearl, 1997]. See[Peppas and Williams, 1995] for another generalization of
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Darwiche and Pearl’s, where a so-callednice orderis defined as a total pre-order on (model-
theoretic) first order interpretations. I can argue that my proposal is more general, in the sense
it does not refer to the model-theoretic definition of first order interpretations.
A faithful rankingK essentially represents a SOS centered on[K]. It does not come as
a surprise that the following representation theorem can be directly derive from the result of
[Grove, 1988].
Theorem 3.2. Suppose∗ is an iterated revision operator. Then∗ satisfies (K ∗ 1)-(K ∗ 8) iff
there exists a faithful assignmenth, s.t., for any belief stateK and any sentenceα:
Bel(K ∗ α) =
{
L if ⊢ ¬α
Th(min([α],hK)) otherwise
The faithful assignmenth (described in Theorem 3.2) is called afaithful assignment corre-
sponding to∗. Moreover,hK is called afaithful ranking onK corresponding to∗. In situations
whereh is not relevant,hK is simply written asK.
In general there could be more than one faithful assignment corresponding to an iterated
revision operator∗; however, if the underlying languageL is finite (modulo logical equivalence),
then it must be unique and is called thefaithful assignment correspondingto ∗.
3.2.1 The DP Postulates
Darwiche and Pearl first show by examples that the (modified) AGM postulates permit improper
response to the sequence of new information due to the excessive freedom they permit on the
change of the conditional beliefs. To save the space, I only present onof such examples.2
Example 7. [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] We are introduced to a ladyX who sounds smart and
looks rich, so we believe thatX is smart andX is rich. Since we profess of no prejudice, we
also maintain thatX is smart even if found to be poor and conversely,X is rich even if found
to be not smart. Now, we obtain some evidence thatX is in fact not smart, we remain of course
convinced thatX is rich. Still, it would be strange for use to say, ”if the evidence turns out
false, andX turns out smart after all, we would no longer believe thatX is rich. If we currently
believeX is smart and rich, then evidence first refuting then supporting thatX is smart should
not in any way change our opinion aboutX being rich.
2Readers are referred to[Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] for other examples.
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The following scenario shows that the modified AGM postulates do permit to change our
beliefs in a strange manner. Supposes andr represent respectivelyX is smart andX is rich,
andL is the propositional logic generated froms andr. Suppose our initial belief stateK, and
the revised belief stateK ∗ ¬s after we learned thatX is not smart are as described in Table 3.1
(which is allowed by the modified AGM postulates). It is easy to see that, according to our
initially belief state, we indeed maintain thatX is smart even if found to be poor andX is rich
even if found to be not smart, sincemin([¬r],K) = {W2} andmin([¬s],K= {W3}). But
if K ∗ ¬s is subsequently revised bys, we will surprisingly lose our belief inX is rich, since
{W2} = min([s],K∗¬s).
possible worlds K K∗¬s
W1 = Cn({s, r}) 0 2
W2 = Cn({s,¬r}) 1 1
W3 = Cn({¬s, r}) 1 0
W4 = Cn({¬s,¬r}) 2 1
Table 3.1: An example of undesirable revision
Motivated by their insufficiency, as supplements to the (modified) AGM postulates, Dar-
wiche and Pearl have proposed four postulates for iterated belief revision. The underlying prin-
ciple of the DP populates is quite similar to the principle of minimal change: An iteratedevision
operator should retain not only the propositional beliefs but also the conditional beliefs as much
as possible. As before, the original DP postulates are also tailored for finitela guages. Here, I
present a generalization of the DP postulates[Darwiche and Pearl, 1997].
(DP1) If β ⊢ α, then(K ∗ α) ∗ β ≡ K ∗ β.
When two pieces of information arrive in tandem such that the second is morespecific, then the
first is redundant; that is the second information alone would yield the same belief set.
(DP2) If β ⊢ ¬α, then(K ∗ α) ∗ β ≡ K ∗ β.
When two pieces of contradictory information arrive, the last one prevails; that is the second
information alone would yield the same propositional beliefs.
(DP3) If α ∈ Bel(K ∗ β), thenα ∈ Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ β).
3.2. The DP Theory 43
An informationα should be retained after accommodating a more recent informationβ that
impliesα given the current beliefs.
(DP4) If¬α /∈ Bel(K ∗ β), then¬α /∈ Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ β).
An informationα can not contribute to its own demise. Ifα does not contradictβ given the
current beliefs, then the revision of the current beliefs byα should not makeα contradictory
with β.
To see the power of the DP postulates, let us recall Example 7: Suppose nowthe iterated
revision operator∗ satisfies (DP2). Then(K∗¬s)∗s ≡ K∗s, due tos ⊢ ¬¬s. SinceBel(K) =
Cn({s, r}), it follows from (K*4) that r ∈ K ∗ s. Therefore it turns outr ∈ (K ∗ ¬s) ∗ s, in
other words, we keep believingX is rich after first learn that she is not smart, then the opposite.
Hence Postulate (DP2) guarantees that we will change our beliefs as expect d.
To provide formal justifications, Darwiche and Pearl have given a representation theorem
for Postulates (DP1)-(DP4). Their result however again depends onthe assumption thatL is a
finitary propositional logic.
Theorem 3.3. [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] SupposeL is a finitary propositional logic. Let∗
be an iterated revision operator satisfying Postulates (K*1)-(K∗8). Then∗ satisfies Postulates
(DP1)-(DP4) iff its corresponding faithful assignment satisfies the following conditions:
(DPR1) IfW1,W2 |= α, thenW1 K W2 iff W1 K∗α W2.
(DPR2) IfW1,W2 6|= α, thenW1 K W2 iff W1 K∗α W2.
(DPR3) IfW1 |= α andW2 6|= α, thenW1 ≺K W2 impliesW1 ≺K∗α W2.
(DPR4) IfW1 |= α andW2 6|= α, thenW1 K W2 impliesW1 K∗α W2.
This theorem gives an elegant characterization of the seemingly natural constraints that the
DP postulates impose on the change of the conditional beliefs: WhenK is revised byα, Con-
ditions (DPR1) and (DPR2) require not to change the relative plausible ord ring of any two
α-worlds (¬α-worlds, respectively); Conditions (DPR3) and (DPR4) require that ifnα-world
W1 is (strictly) more plausible than a¬α-world W2, thenW2 continues to be (strictly) more
plausible thanW2.
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3.2.2 Two Radical Revision Operators
The modified AGM postulates and the DP postulates together do not uniquely det rmine an
iterated revision operator. In the rest of this thesis, I will call an iterated revision operator a DP
revision operator, if it satisfies the modified AGM postulates as well as the DP postulates. In
this section, I present two interesting instances of DP revision operators,which are somehow
dual to each other.
[Boutilier, 1993] has proposed a specific revision operator (known asn tural revision)
which satisfies the modified AGM postulates and the following condition:
(CB) If ¬β ∈ Bel(K ∗ α), then(K ∗ α) ∗ β ≡ K ∗ β.
Along the line of Theorem 3.3,[Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] have given a semantical charac-
terization of Postulate (CB):
(CBR) If W1,W2 6|= K ∗ α thenW1 K W2 iff W1 K∗α W2
Note that nowW1,W2 6|= K ∗ α is the only case, where the relative ordering ofW1,W2 in
K ∗ α is not determined, sinceK∗α must satisfy conditions of Definition 3.1. Therefore, Con-
dition (CBR) imposes absolute minimization on the change of a faithful ranking permitt d by
the modified AGM postulates.
It is easy to see that the DP postulates are a weakening of Postulate (CB), inthe sense
Postulate (CB) implies all of the DP postulates but not vice versa[Darwiche and Pearl, 1994;
Zhang, 2004].
At first glance, it seems that Condition (CBR) complies with the principle of minimal
change. However, the following example shows that Postulate (CB) enforces very radical be-
havior.
Example 8. SupposeK is an initial belief state. Assume〈α1; · · · ;αn〉 is a sequence of sen-
tences, s.t.,α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn is consistent, which represents the sequence of the observations the
agent have made along its way. The current belief state is represented by((K ∗ α1) · · · ) ∗ αn.
Suppose now the agent observes¬α1. It is not difficult to see that by applying Postulate (CB)
repeatedly, we have(((K ∗ α1) · · · ) ∗ αn) ∗ ¬α1 ≡ K ∗ ¬α1, provided∗ satisfies Postulates
(K∗1)-(K∗8). In other words, the agent cancels all evidencesα1, · · · , αn, simply because¬α1
is observed.
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The above example shows that Postulate (CB) is too strict a criterion for iterated belief
revision operators and the most conservative way of changing the conditional beliefs is not
desirable in general.
The problem of natural revision can be informally explained as follows. Onthe one hand
natural revision respects the principle of primacy of the new information, sothat the information
is accepted; on the other hand it assigns the lowest plausibility to the new informati n, so that it
will be easily canceled by a subsequent revision.
While natural revision is the most conservative of all possible DP (more precisely, AGM)
revision operators, another revision operator, calledlexicographic revision(with “naked evi-
dence”)[Nayak, 1994b], sits exactly on the opposite side of the spectrum. Lexicographic revi-
sion satisfies, in addition to Postulate (DP1) and (DP2), another so-calledpostulate of Recalci-
trance:
(Rec) Ifβ 0 ¬α, thenα ∈ Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ β).
Semantically, Postulate (Rec) corresponds to the following condition[Nayaket al., 2003]:
(RecR) IfW1 |= α andW2 |= ¬α, thenW1 ≺K∗α W2.
According to (RecR), all possible worlds satisfying the new information become more reliable
than those violating the new information, hence (Rec) is also said to impose the principle of
strong primacy of update[Konieczny and Ṕerez, 2000], which is arguably only suitable when
the agent has full confidence in the new information. Based on Conditions (DPR1), (DPR2) and
(RecR), it it easy to see that lexicographic revision is the least conservativ of all possible DP
revision operators, effecting most changes in the faithful ranking permitted by the AGM and DP
postulates[Boothet al., 2005].
It is easy to easy that, in the presence of Postulates (K*1)-(K *8), we can derive (DP3) and
(DP4) from (Rec)[Nayaket al., 2003].
Unfortunately, Postulate (Rec) also enforces very radical behavior.According to Postulate
(Rec), as long asβ does not logically deduce¬α, the sentenceβ → ¬α should be canceled after
a successive revision byα followed byβ, no matter how strong the initial belief inβ → ¬α. A
simple example shows that this behavior may not be reasonable:
Example 9. All her childhood, Alice was taught by her parents that a person who hastold a lie
is not a good person. So Alice believed, initially, that if Bob has told a lie then heis not a good
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person. After her first date with Bob, she began to believe that he is a good guy. Then a reliable
friend of Alice warns her that Bob is in fact a liar, and Alice chooses to believ her. Now, should
Alice still believe that Bob is a good guy?
Supposel and g represent, respectively, Bob is a liar and Bob is a good person. Since
l 0 ¬g, it follows from Postulate (Rec) thatg ∈ Bel((K ∗ g) ∗ l), in other words, Alice should
not challenge Bob’s morality and still believe he is good, and hence to disbelieve what her
parents taught her. But by common-sense it is at least as reasonable to giv up the belief that
Bob is good. This shows that Postulate (Rec) is too strict a criterion for iterated belief revision
operators. As Postulate (Rec) has been shown corresponding to the least conservatism in the
change of conditional beliefs, the above argument is also a criticism of the least conservatism.
In [Zhang, 2004], it has also been argued that Postulate (Rec) is too radical because onlythose
revision operators are admissible which assign the highest plausibility to the new information.
Based on above arguments, I depict in Figure 3.1 a map of iterated revision operat rs. that
natural revision is also the most conservative AGM revision operator. Itis however of no practi-
cal interest to investigate the least conservative AGM operators because of the total freedom on
the change of conditional beliefs allowed by the modified AGM postulates.
DP AGMb b
natural lexicographic
most conservative least conservative
(CB) (Rec)
Figure 3.1: A map of iterated revision operators.
3.3 The Problem of Implicit Dependence
Although the DP theory seems a quite acceptable extension to the AGM theory for iterated be-
lief revision, it is not without problems. Specifically, the DP postulates are consistent with (CB),
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hence they do not block counter-examples against natural revision, likethe following one, pro-
posed by Darwiche and Pearl themselves:
Example 10. [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] We encounter a strange new animal and it appears to
be a bird, so we believe the animal is a bird. As it comes closer to our hiding place, we see
clearly that the animal is red, so we believe that it is a red bird. To remove further doubts about
the animal birdhood, we call in a bird expert who takes it for examination andco cludes that
it is not really a bird but some sort of mammal. The question now is whether we should still
believe that the animal is red.
As argued in[Darwiche and Pearl, 1997], we have every reason to keep our belief that the
animal is red, since birdhood and color are not correlated. However, natural revision enforces
us to give up the belief of the animal’s color. SupposeBel(K) = Cn({bird}). According to
Postulate (CB), sinceK∗red ⊢ ¬(¬bird) it follows that(K∗red)∗¬bird ≡ K∗¬bird.
In being compatible with (CB), the DP postulates are not strong enough to guarantee that
the belief of the animal’s color is retained. This can be intuitively explained as follows: After
observing the animal’s color, we are actually acquiring a new conditional belief, namely, that
the animal is red even if it were not a bird i.e.,¬bird ≫ red. However, the DP postulates do not
enforce the acquisition of conditional beliefs.
In the sequel, I first give a formal analysis of this weakness of the DP postulates, and then I
present an additional postulate by which this problem is overcome (at leastpartially).
As pointed out in G̈ardenfors’preservation criterion, the dependences between the beliefs
play an important role in the process of belief revision[Gärdenfors, 1990]:
If a belief state is revised by a sentenceα, then all sentences that are independent of the
validity of α should be retained in the revised state of belief.
The principle of minimal change that have been used in the AGM theory is based on almost
exclusively logical considerations. However, the dependence relations are extra-logical pref-
erence factors of the belief states. It is therefore necessary to formallystud the problem of
dependence.
To begin with, I define the notion of dependence between sentences wrt. abelief state.
Formally,3
3see[Fariñas del Cerro and Herzig, 1996] for a similar definition.
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Definition 3.4. SupposeK is a belief state. Letα, β two sentences. Thenβ is called todepend
onα in K iff β ∈ Bel(K) andβ /∈ Bel(K ∗ ¬α). Two sentencesα, β are said to bedependent
in K if eitherα depends onβ or β depends onα in K.
I will first show that there is a so-calledproblem of implicit dependencein the AGM theory.
Then I argue that problem of implicit dependence is overlooked in the DP theory. Without loss
of generality, assume that a belief stateK is of the form〈K,≤K〉, such that≤K is an EE onK.
For easy reference, I present again Condition (C*) used in the constructive model based on EE.
(C*) β ∈ K ∗ α iff either ⊢ ¬α or¬α <K (¬α ∨ β)
Consider, now, a (non-tautological) new evidenceα. Wheneverβ ∈ K, Condition (C*) implies
that if α 6<K α ∨ β, thenβ is (implicitly) dependent onα in K. Informally, we can consider
that sentences with lower plausibility have the tendency to depend on sentencs with higher
plausibility. This kind of dependency could be problematic. In particular, it ispo sible that
two initially independent sentences become, undesirably, dependent after a revision step. In
Example 10, for instance,red becomes dependent onbird after revising byred, sincered is
assigned by natural revision the lowest plausibility.
The general problem of natural revision is that it assigns the lowest plausibility to the new
information without asserting conditional beliefs for independence. Thusthe new information
depends on all other beliefs which survive the revision process. This explains why severe revi-
sion always cancels all previous evidences. Of course, this is not merely a problem of natural
revision: In the revised belief state〈K ∗ α,≤K∗α〉, regardless of the plausibility of the new
informationα, a beliefβ (logically unrelated toα) with a lower plausibility will depend on
α, unless the revision operator explicitly makes the conditionα <K∗α α ∨ β true. If initially
α 6<K α ∨ β, the validation ofα <K∗α α ∨ β means the revision operator should assert explic-
itly the conditional belief¬α≫ β. Symmetrically, a rational revision operator also should take
care of the implicit dependence of the new information on other beliefs with higher plausibility.
The analysis in the previous section shows that in order to overcome the probl m f implicit
dependence, the revision operator must explicitly assert some conditionalbeliefs. It is easy to
see that the DP postulates only require thepreservationof conditional beliefs when a belief state
K is revised withα: Postulates (DP1) and (DP2) neither require to add nor to remove certain
conditional beliefs (namely, those conditioned onβ) in caseβ ⊢ α or β ⊢ ¬α; Postulate (DP3)
requires to retain the conditional beliefβ ≫ α; finally, Postulate (DP4) requires not to obtain the
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new conditional beliefβ ≫ ¬α. Since none of the DP postulates requires to make independence
assumptions, a new postulates is necessary to avoid undesirable dependenci s.
3.3.1 Postulate of Independence
As already mentioned, the revision process may introduce undesirable dependencies in both
directions. That is, it could be that the new information becomes dependenton existing beliefs,
or that it is the other way around. Prior to stating the new postulate, I show that the DP postulates
impose some constraints on the retention of the independence information in onedirection. In
the presence of the AGM postulates, Postulate (DP2) implies the following:
(WDP2) If β ∈ Bel(K ∗ ¬α), thenβ ∈ Bel((K ∗ α)∗¬α)
Supposeβ ∈ Bel(K), Postulate (WDP) guarantees that ifβ is not dependent on the new infor-
mationα in K, then it also does not depend onα in K ∗ α.
Observation 3.5. Suppose∗ is an iterated revision operator that satisfies (K*1)-(K*8). If ∗
satisfies (DP2), then it also satisfies (WDP2).
In order to ensure the explicit assertion of independence information in theother direction,
I propose the following postulate ofIndependence( weak version) dual to (WDP2):
(WInd) If α ∈ Bel(K∗¬β) thenα ∈ Bel((K∗α)∗¬β)
Supposeα ∈ Bel(K), Postulate (WInd) guarantees that if the new informationα does not
depend onβ in K, then it also does not depend onβ in K ∗ α.
As it is too much to require that the new informationα is already believed (i.e,α ∈ Bel(K)),
I propose the following postulate ofIndependence(strong version):
(Ind) If ¬α /∈ Bel(K∗¬β) thenα ∈ Bel((K∗α)∗¬β)
Postulate (Ind) says that if the conditional belief¬β ≫ ¬α is not held inK, thenα does not
depend onβ in K ∗ α.
It is not difficult to see that (Ind) is a strengthening of (WInd), in the presence of the modified
AGM postulates:
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Observation 3.6. Suppose∗ is an iterated revision operator that satisfies (K*1)-(K*8). If ∗
satisfies (Ind), then it also satisfies (WInd).
Postulate (Ind) is sufficient to overcome the problem of implicit dependence, as can be
shown by reconsidering Example 10 (in whichBel(K) = Cn({bird})). According to (Ind),
(K∗red)∗¬bird ⊢ red, given thatK∗¬bird 0 ¬red. This shows that the new postulate blocks
unreasonable behavior which are admitted by the DP postulates.
3.3.2 Representation Theorems
In order to formally justify the new postulate, I will provide a representation theorem along the
line of Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.7.SupposeL is a finitary propositional logic. Let∗ be an iterated revision operator
satisfying Postulates (K*1)-(K∗8). Then∗ satisfies Postulate (Ind) iff its corresponding faithful
assignment satisfies the following condition:
(IndR) IfW1 |= α andW2 |= ¬α, thenW1 K W2 impliesW1 ≺K∗α W2.
Theorem 3.7 shows that Postulate (Ind) is quite natural and not overly constrained: Suppose
K is revised byα, Condition (IndR) requires a worldW1 conforming the new informationα to
become more plausible than a worldW2 violatingα, if W1 was at least as plausible asW2.
It is easy to see that Postulate (Ind) implies both (DP3) and (DP4), in the pres nc of the
modified AGM postulates:
Observation 3.8. Suppose∗ is an iterated revision operator that satisfies (K*1)-(K*8). If ∗
satisfies (Ind), then it also satisfies (DP3) and (DP4).
As we will see in Section 3.4.2 that Postulate (Ind) is also consistent with the modified
AGM, (DP1) and (DP2).
Base on above arguments, I suggest to use the modified AGM postulates alongwith Pos-
tulates (DP1), (DP2), and (Ind) to govern iterated belief revision. It is worth to mention that
Postulate (Ind) has later, and independently, been proposed in[Boothet al., 2005], where an
iterated revision operator is calledadmissibleiff it satisfies all above-mentioned postulates.
Booth et al., also proposed an interesting instance of admissible revision operators, namely,
the so-calledrestrained revision, which additionally satisfies the following postulate:
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(D) If ¬α ∈ Bel(K ∗ β) and¬β ∈ Bel(K ∗ α), then¬α ∈ (K ∗ α) ∗ β.
In [Boothet al., 2005], two sentencesα, β are also said to be counteracting if they satisfy the
premise of Postulate (D). It has also been shown that Postulate (D) is semantically characterized
by the following condition:
(DR) If W1 6|= α,W2 |= α andW2 6|= K ∗ α, thenW1 ≺K W2 impliesW1 ≺K∗α W2
It is easy to see that (D) is a weakening of (CB). However, Postulate (D)is criticized in
[Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] by the following example.
Example 11. [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] We believe exactly one of John and Mary committed
a murder. Now we get persuasive evidence indicating that John is the murdrer. This is followed
by persuasive information indicating that Mary is the Murderer. According to (D), we are forced
to conclude that Mary, but not John, was involved in the murder.
The following theorem shows that restrained revision is the most conservativ admissible
revision operator, effecting least changes in the faithful ranking permitted by reformulated AGM
postulates, (DP1), (DP2) and (Ind).
Theorem 3.9. [Boothet al., 2005] SupposeL is a finitary propositional logic. Let∗ be an
iterated revision operator satisfying Postulates (K*1)-(K∗8). Then∗ satisfies Postulates (DP1),
(DP2), (Ind) and (D) iff its corresponding faithful assignment satisfy thefollowing condition:
(R) IfW1,W2 6|= K ∗ α, thenW1 K∗α W2 precisely when
{
W1 ≺K W2 or,
W1 K W2 andW1 |= α,W2 6|= α
SupposeK is revised byα. Condition (R) says the relative ordering of the possible worlds
that are not models ofK ∗ α does not change, except forα-worlds and¬α-worlds on the same
plausibility level: They are split into two levels withα-worlds being (strictly) more plausible
than¬α-worlds.
A refined map of iterated revision operators can be found in Figure 3.2. Based bove argu-
ments, all rational iterated revision operators should be located in the innermost ellipse.
52 Chapter 3. Iterated Belief Revision: General Frameworks
DP AGMIndb bb
natural restrained lexicographic
most conservative least conservative
(CB) (D) (Rec)
Figure 3.2: A refined map of iterated revision operators.
3.4 A General Framework for Iterated Revision
In the representation theorem of the DP postulates (i.e., Theorem 3.3), as well as that of Postu-
late (Ind) (i.e., Theorem 3.7), the underlying languageL is assumed to be a finitary propositional
logic. An interesting question is can we extend those results to a general logiclan uage, which
needs not to be finitary nor propositional?
3.4.1 Representation Theorems for Infinite Languages
After a careful analysis of the proof in[Darwiche and Pearl, 1997], I found that the restriction
of L being propositional can be lifted without any problem. Moreover, the finiteness ofL is
exploited only in one direction of the proof. Therefore, the following sufficient condition for the
DP postulates still holds even ifL is neither finitary nor propositional.
Theorem 3.10.Let∗ be an iterated revision operator satisfying Postulates (K*1)-(K∗8). Then∗
satisfies Postulates (DP1)-(DP4) if it is induced from a faithful assignment that satisfies the
following conditions:
(DPR1) IfW1,W2 |= α, thenW1 K W2 iff W1 K∗α W2.
(DPR2) IfW1,W2 6|= α, thenW1 K W2 iff W1 K∗α W2.
(DPR3) IfW1 |= α andW2 6|= α, thenW1 ≺K W2 impliesW1 ≺K∗α W2.
(DPR4) IfW1 |= α andW2 6|= α, thenW1 K W2 impliesW1 K∗α W2.
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Similarly, I am able to obtain the following sufficient condition for Postulates (Ind) for
general languages.
Theorem 3.11.Let∗ be an iterated revision operator satisfying Postulates (K*1)-(K∗8). Then∗
satisfies Postulate (Ind) if it is induced from a faithful assignment that satisfies the following
condition:
(IndR) IfW1 |= α andW2 |= ¬α, thenW1 K W2 impliesW1 ≺K∗α W2.
Unfortunately, the other direction of Theorem 3.11 (as well as Theorem 3.11) does not hold
in general. The main reason is that, for infinite languages, there is no one-to-one correspondence
between an iterated revision operator and a faithful assignment: LetK1 be a belief state andK1
a faithful ranking onK1. SupposeW1 ≺K1 W2 and there does not exist consistent sentenceα
such thatW1,W2 |= α andW1 ∈ min([α],K1). It is not difficult to see that by swapping the
relative order ofW1 andW2 (the rest ofK1 remains unchanged), we obtain another faithful
ranking′K1 , such that for any consistent sentenceα, min([α],K1) = min([α],
′
K1
). In other
words, the relative ordering ofW1 andW2 is not relevant wrt.K1 . Suppose nowh is a faithful
assignment withhK1=K1 , and∗ is the iterated revision induced fromh. Obviously, we can
construct another faithful assignmenth′ which also corresponds to∗, such that, ifK = K1 then
h′(K) =′K1 ; otherwiseh
′(K) = h(K).
The following example shows that there indeed exists a faithful ranking in which some
possible worlds are irrelevantly ordered.
Example 12. SupposeL contains countably infinite sentences(αi)i≥0, such thatαi ⊢ ¬αj
iff i > j. Let K = Cn({α0}). Then by definingSi = [αi] for any consistent sentenceαi,
we can construct a SOS centered on[K] s.t., the minimal sphere intersects[αi] is exactly
Si. SinceL is infinite, each sphereSi infinitely many elements, hence contains at least two
elements (this is not the case ifL is finite). Take any two possibleWi,Wj such thatWi ∈ Si,
Wj ∈ Sj and0 < i < j. RemovingWi,Wj from Si, Sj and adding two spheresΘL \ {Wi}
andΘL \ {Wi,Wj}, we can construct a modified SOSS′. It is not difficult to see thatWi,Wj
is irrelevant ordered wrt. the faithful ranking corresponding toS′.
As we have seen changing the relative plausibility order of two irrelevant ordered possible
worlds will not affect the way an iterated revision operator revises the propositional beliefs in
the subsequent revision. Therefore, we should not expect the DP postulates and Postulate (Ind)
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restrict the changes of irrelevant ordering. An interesting problem is what constraints these
postulates impose on the change of relevant ordering? In order to do a form l analysis of the
problem, we first need to formally define the notion of relevant ordering:
Definition 3.12. Let K be a faithful ranking andW1,W2 two possible worlds. ThenW1 is
said to berelevantly at least as plausibleasW2 (denoted byW1 ⊳K W2) wrt. K iff there
is a sentenceγ such thatW1,W2 |= γ andW1 ∈ min([γ],K). W1 is calledrelevantly more
plausiblethanW2 (denoted byW1 ≺⊳K W2) iff W1 
⊳
K W2 andW1 ≺K W2.
Two possible worldsW1,W2 are called relevantly ordered inK iff either W1 ⊳K W2 or
W2 
⊳
K W1. As we have seen, in general, not all pairs of possible worlds are relevant y ordered
wrt. a given faithful ranking.
The following results given necessary and sufficient conditions of (DP1), (DP2) and (Ind)
in terms of the constraints they impose on the changes of relevant plausibility ordering.
Theorem 3.13. Suppose that an iterated revision operator satisfies Postulates (K*1)-(K*8).
The operator satisfies Postulates (DP1),(DP2) and (Ind) iff the operator and its corresponding
faithful assignment satisfy:
(DPR1⊳) If W1,W2 |= α, thenW1 ⊳K W2 iff W1 
⊳
K∗α W2.
(DPR2⊳) If W1,W2 6|= α, thenW1 ⊳K W2 iff W1 
⊳
K∗α W2.
(IndR⊳) If W1 |= α andW2 6|= α, thenW1 ⊳K W2 implies eitherW1,W2
are not relevantly ordered wrt.K∗α or W1 ≺⊳K∗α W2.
Theorem 3.13 shows Postulates (DP1), (DP2) and (Ind) also make a lot of sense in the
setting of infinite languages. SupposeK is revised byα. Conditions (DPR1⊳) and (DPR2⊳)
say if twoα-worlds (¬α-worlds) are relevantly ordered after revision iff they were relevantly
ordered, and their relative plausible ordering should not change; Condition (IndR⊳) says if a
α-worldW1 was relevantly at least plausible as a¬α-worldW2 thenW1 is relevantly (strictly)
more plausible thanW1 after revision, unlessW1,W2 become not relevantly ordered.
It is in principle possible that a belief state contains some irrelevant extra-logica preference
information. But in practice, we can hardly image that we will make use of suchkind of belief
states. An interesting question is how we could guarantee that a belief state willnot contain ir-
relevant extra-logical preference information? The following result shows that any two possible
worlds are relevantly ordered in a faithful ranking for finite languages:
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Observation 3.14.SupposeL is a finite language. LetK be a faithful ranking on some belief
stateK. Then for anyW1,W2 ∈ ΘL,W1 andW2 are relevantly ordered inK.
Given the above result, it is not difficult to see that Theorem 3.3 (the partregarding (DP1)
and (DP2)) and Theorem 3.7 can be directly derived from Theorem 3.13.
It is also worth to mention that a finite underlying language is not necessary condition to have
belief states without irrelevant extra-logical preference information. Wewill see in Chapter 4
how to define belief states without irrelevant extra-logic information for infinite languages.
3.4.2 An Iterated OCF Revision Operator
As limiting cases of admissible revision, i.e., restrained revision and lexicographic revision,
are shown to be too radical. In this section, I present an admissible revisionoperator which
lays between the two radical operators. The operator is based on Spohn’s roposal ofordinal
conditional functions(OCF, for short)[Spohn, 1988].
Originally, an ordinal conditional function (OCF)k is a mapping from the set of possible
worlds ΘL to the class of ordinals. Like in[Spohn, 1991], for mathematical simplicity, we
consider the range of an OCFk is N.4 For any possible worldW , k(W ) is called therank of
W . Intuitively, the rank of a world represents its degree of implausibility. The lower its rank,
more plausible is the possible world.
An OCF k is a general belief state from which we can induce a belief set and a faithful
rankingk (according to ranks of possible worlds), whereB l(k) is the set of sentences which
hold in all worlds of rank0:
Bel(k) = Th({W | k(W ) = 0}) (3.1)
Note that, unlike in[Spohn, 1988], it is not required that the set of possible worlds with rank
0 be non-empty. Therefore, the approach presented here can also deawith inconsistent belief
sets.
4Here,N represents the set of all natural numbers and the set of all positive integers (i.e., natural number greater
than0) is denoted byN+.
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An OCF is extended to a ranking of sentences as follows:
k(β) =
{
∞ if ⊢ β
min{k(W ) |W |= ¬β)} otherwise
(3.2)
Put in words, the rank of a sentence is the lowest rank of a world in which the sentence does
not hold.5 Hence, the higher the rank of a sentence, the firmer the belief in it, and the belief set
consists of all sentences with rank greater than0. In fact, it is not hard to see that an OCFk
determines an EE as follows:
α ≤k β iff k(α) ≤ k(β) (3.3)
Observation 3.15. Given an OCFk, the binary relation≤k defined by (3.3) satisfies (EE1)–
(EE5).
Now, I present a generalized revision operator (namedreinforcement OCF revision) which
also allows to assign different evidence degrees to new information. An OCF k is revised
according to new informationα with evidence degreem ∈ N+ as follows:
(kr,∗α.m)(W ) =
{
k(W ) − k(¬α) ifW |= α
k(W ) +m otherwise
(3.4)
Intuitively, reinforcement OCF revision can be depicted in Figure 3.3, where circles on the
left (right) side of the vertical dotted line representα-worlds (¬α-worlds respectively); the
vertical coordinate of a possible world denotes its rank. Moreover, changes of ranks are denoted
by the arrows: ranks ofα-worlds decreasesk(¬α), whereas ranks of¬α-worlds increasesm.
To see an concrete example, let us recall Example 7. Assume now our initial belief state
is represented by an OCFk as shown in the second column of Table 3.26 Sincek(¬¬s) = 1,
according to (3.4) and we have learn thatX is not smart with evidence degree2. It is easy to
see thatk(¬¬s) = k(s) = 1. Therefore, our revised belief statek∗¬s,2 is the one shown in the
last column. AsW1 is most plausibles-world in k∗¬s,2, whenk
∗
¬s,2 is revised bys we will still
believe thatX is rich.
5In Spohn’s original proposal, the rank of a sentence is the lowest rankof a world in which it is true. So the rank
of β there is equal tok(¬β) here.
6For the sake of simplicity,s andr are assumed the only atoms.
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0
m
k(¬α)
α-worlds ¬α-worlds
Figure 3.3: Reinforcement OCF revision
possible worlds k k∗¬s,2
W1 = Cn({s, r}) 0 2
W2 = Cn({s,¬r}) 1 3
W3 = Cn({¬s, r}) 1 0
W4 = Cn({¬s,¬r}) 2 1
Table 3.2: An example of reinforcement OCF revision.
Formal Properties
It is easy to see that the value of the evidence degree will not affect the logica contents of the
revised OCF.
Observation 3.16.Letk be an OCF andα a sentence, then for anym1,m2 ∈ N+,
Bel(kr,∗α,m1) = Bel(k
r,∗
α,m2
)
Assuming an arbitrary but fixed evidence degree for any new information, a standard iterated
revision operator is obtained and the satisfiability of the modified AGM postulatesalong with
Postulates (DP1), (DP2), and (Ind) is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.2, 3.10 and 3.11.
Theorem 3.17. Assume an arbitrary but fixed evidence degree for any new information.Then
reinforcement OCF revision satisfies all AGM postulates (K*1)-(K*8) as well as (DP1), (DP2)
and (Ind).
Incidentally, Theorem 3.17 shows that Postulate (Ind) is consistent with themodified AGM
and DP postulates. It is also obvious that reinforcement OCF revision does not satisfy (CB), (D)
or (Rec).
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I can even prove a stronger result with varying evidence degrees. Tohow the satisfiability
of the postulates in case of varying evidence degrees, we need the following result, which fully
characterizes the change of belief degrees of non-tautological sentenc s.
Observation 3.18. Let k be an OCF and〈α,m〉 be any new information. Then for any non-
tautological sentenceβ,
kr,∗α,m(β) =







k(β) +m if ⊢ α→ β
k(α→ β) − k(¬α) else if k(α→ β) = k(β)
min(k(α→ β) − k(¬α), k(β) +m) else
Since the belief degree of a tautological sentence is always∞, the above result actually
gives a full characterization of the change of beliefs degrees for all sentences.
As a direct consequence of Observation 3.18, it can be seen that the reinforc ment OCF
revision indeed has a reinforcement effect, in the sense that, the evidence grees of the new
information are accumulated.
Observation 3.19. Let k be an arbitrary OCF andα a new non-tautological sentence with
evidence degreem ∈ N+. Then
kr,∗α,m(α) = k(α) +m
From a pragmatic point of view, this is a desirable property in particular for domains where
several independent information sources provide new information. In this case, it is appropriate
to sum up the evidence degrees of the same information from different sources.
Finally, with the help of Observation 3.18, I am able to prove that reinforcement base revi-
sion satisfies Postulates (DP1), (DP2) and (Ind), regardless of evidence degrees.
Theorem 3.20.For arbitrarym1,m2 ∈ N+, reinforcement OCF revision satisfies the following
conditions:
(EDP1) Ifβ ⊢ α, then(kr,∗α,m1)
r,∗
β,m2
≡ kr,∗β,m2 .
(EDP2) Ifβ ⊢ ¬α, then(kr,∗α,m1)
r,∗
β,m2
≡ kr,∗β,m2 .
(EInd) If there existsm such thatkr,∗¬β,m 0 ¬α, then(k
r,∗
α,m1)
r,∗
¬β,m2
⊢ α.
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It is worth mentioning that revisions based on OCFs are particularly suitable for implemen-
tations of belief revision. For instance, in Chapter 4 I will present a algorithm for the revision
of belief bases which is equivalent to the belief revision defined by (3.4).
3.5 Discussions and Related Work
In the previous sections, I argue that a rational iterated revision operator should be a function on
belief states, which satisfies the modified AGM postulates, as well as, Postulate(DP1), (DP2),
and (Ind).
The notion of (iterated) revision operator itself is not uncontroversial among the belief re-
visionists. As in Darwiche and Pearl’s original work[1994], revision operators are most com-
monly viewed as binary functions which map a belief set and the new informationto the revised
belief set. This is problematic in two aspects. First of all, the revision operators s udied in
the AGM theory are local in the sense that a fixed belief set is assumed. Such revision op-
erators are more appropriately considered as unary functions, which map the new information
α to a revised belief setK ∗ α, with the understanding thatK is taken to be the background
knowledge[Rott, 1999]. Secondly, the extra-logical preference information should play a role
in the revision process. Based on the characterization of revision operat rs as unary functions,
[Nayaket al., 2003] have proposed to view belief revision as dynamic, in the sense that the
operator (i.e., the revision policy) itself evolves after each revision by taking the revised be-
lief set as the new background knowledge.7 While theoretically sound, the idea of dynamic
revision is technically quite confusing in the sense that realizing a dynamic revision seems
like devising an algorithm which evolves after each run. Most belief revisioni t now consider
that (iterated) revision operators to be functions on belief state[Lehmann, 1995; Rott, 1999;
Darwiche and Pearl, 1994; Williams, 1994b; Konieczny and Pérez, 2000], although there is no
consensus on what is a belief state.
Furthermore, while Postulate (DP1) is almost universally accepted, Postulate (DP2) seems
to be more problematic. In fact, it is mainly different attitudes to Postulate (DP2) which provoke
the disputation on the framework for iterated belief revision. In defense ofthe new framework,
I argue that, according to the semantical characterization (Conditions (DP1R) and (DPR2)),
Postulate (DP2) seems as reasonable as Postulate (DP1). If being informed aboutα does not
7Essentially, they consider the extra-logical preference information as part of the revision operator.
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change the relative ordering ofα-worlds, why should the relative ordering of¬α-worlds be
changed? This idea is also supported by Spohn, who argues that it is onlyreasonable to change
the relative ordering betweenα-worlds and¬α-worlds[Spohn, 1988].
To provide further support of Postulate (DP2), I show that it plays an important role in
the principle of minimal change. Recently, Rott[1999; 2000] has pointed out that “ it is
a pure myth that minimal change principles are the foundation of existing theories f belief
revision, as least as far as the AGM tradition is concerned”. His argumentis mainly based
on the fact that full meet revision (see Observation 2.7) perfectly satisfies all AGM postu-
lates [Alchourrón and Makinson, 1982; Rott, 2000]. Recall, full meet revision is defined as
follows:
K ∗a α =
{
K + α if K 0 ¬α
Cn(α) otherwise
(3.5)
Full meet revision is also calledamnesic revisionby Rott, as it completely “forgets” the prior
beliefs in a severe revision. It is worth to mention that amnesic revision does suff r the problem
of categorial mis-matching, as a belief setK and the new informationα uniquely determine
the revised belief setK ∗a α. Therefore, it is already an iterated revision which satisfies the
modified AGM postulates. Despite its radical behavior, amnesic revision surpri ingly satisfies
all DP postulates, but (DP2).
Observation 3.21.Amnesic revision∗a satisfies (DP1), (DP3), and (DP4), but violates (DP2).
The above result shows Postulate (DP2) helps to minimize on the change of prop sitional
beliefs.
At first glance, the existence of amnesic revision challenges the idea that abelief state should
contain some extra-logical preference information. I argue that it is more appropriate to consider
that (in amnesic revision) the extra-logical preference information contained in a belief stateK
is uniquely determined by its belief setBel(K). It is not difficult to see that amnesic revision is
induced from the following faithful assignmenth, such that, for any belief stateK:
W1 
h
K W2 iff W1 |= K orW2 6|= K
Put in worlds,hK splitsΘL into only two levels, such that all possible worlds (not) in[Bel(K)]
are in the same partition.
In the sequel, I will give a detailed comparison of the present framework with the most
prominent existing approaches to iterated revision.
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3.5.1 Freund and Lehmann’s Proposals
Freund and Lehmann[1994] were the first to point out that the AGM postulates
are inconsistent with the following original version of Postulate (DP2) (called (C2)
in [Darwiche and Pearl, 1994]), when revision operators are considered as binary functions on
belief sets.
(C2) If β ⊢ ¬α then(K ∗ α) ∗ β = K ∗ β.
To avoid the inconsistency, they have suggested to replace the original DPpostulates by the
so-calledminimal influencepostulate:
(K*9) If K1 ⊢ ¬α andK2 ⊢ ¬α, thenK1 ∗ α = K2 ∗ α.
According to (K*9), the revised belief setK ∗ α does not depend onK at all in the case of
a severe revision. This is of course a very strong restriction, which violates the intuition that
the prior beliefs should play a major role. Furthermore, in the presence of thAGM postulates,
(K*9) implies (C1), (C3), (C4) (original version of (DP1), (DP3) and(DP4)) and the following
weakening of Postulates (C2):
(C2′) If K ⊢ ¬β andβ ⊢ ¬α, then(K ∗ α) ∗ β = K ∗ β
Strong as it is, Postulate (K*9) on the other hand is, on the other hand, too weak to even rule out
amnesic revision.
However, we have seen that the modified AGM postulates are consistent with(DP2), which
means the culprit of the inconsistency between the AGM postulates and (C2) isthe a sumption
that revision operators are binary functions on belief sets. As already discussed, this assumption
is not accepted, if not denied, by many researchers. Therefore, theproposal of (K*9) is in some
sense not well-grounded.
A conclusion Freund and Lehmann have drawn is that the AGM framework isnot the right
one in which to study iterated revision. In a later work, Lehmann therefore has proposed another
framework for iterated revision, in which a belief stateK is a finite sequence of consistent
(propositional) sentences〈β1 : . . . : βn〉 (the revision history of the agent)[Lehmann, 1995]. In
Lehmann’s framework, the iterated revision operator is trivial:K ∗ α is simply defined as the
concatenation〈K : α〉 of K andα. Similarly, we might denote〈K1 : K2〉 by K1 ∗ K2. What
62 Chapter 3. Iterated Belief Revision: General Frameworks
seems more difficult to define, however, is a mapping ”Bel from a belief state to its belief set.
For this purpose, Lehmann has proposed the following set of postulates:
(I1) Bel(K) is a consistent logical theory
(I2) α ∈ Bel(K ∗ α)
(I3) If β ∈ Bel(K ∗ α), thenα→ β ∈ Bel(K)
(I4) If α ∈ Bel(K), thenK ∗ K1 ≡ (K ∗ α) ∗ K1
(I5) If β ⊢ α, then((K ∗ α) ∗ β) ∗ K1 ≡ (K ∗ β) ∗ K1
(I6) If ¬β /∈ Bel(K ∗ α), then((K ∗ α) ∗ β) ∗ K1 ≡ ((K ∗ α) ∗ α ∧ β) ∗ K1
(I7) Bel((K ∗ ¬β) ∗ β) ⊆ Bel(K) + β
Readers are referred to[Lehmann, 1995] for the relation between Lehmann’s postulates and the
AGM postulates. It is worth to mention that Postulate (I5) is in fact just an adaption of Postulate
(DP1).
To provide a constructive model, Lehmann has shown that his postulates characterize the
so-calledwidening ranked revision. A widening ranked model is a functiong which maps an
ordinal to a non-empty subset ofΘL s.t.,
1. for anyn,m, if n ≤ m, theng(n) ⊆ g(m), and
2. for anyW ∈ ΘL, there existsn with W ∈ g(n).
Given a widening ranked modelg, we can inductively define a rankr(K) and a set of worlds
p(K) for any belief stateK:
• r(〈〉) = 0 andp(〈〉) = g(0),
• r(〈K : α〉) = minO(K, α) andp(〈K : α〉) = g(r(〈K : α〉)) ∩ [α],
whereminO(K, α) is the minimal ordinaln s.t.,n ≥ r(K) andg(n) ∩ [α] 6= ∅.
The widening ranked revision (essentially, the mappingBel ) is then defined as follows:
Bel(K ∗ α) = Th(p(〈K : α〉))
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Lehmann has shown that the widening ranked revision generated from a widening ranked
model satisfies Postulates (I1)-(I7). Conversely, any revision operator that satisfies Postu-
lates (I1)-(I7) can be constructed as widening ranked revision. A majorproblem with widening
ranked revision is that it is based on a fixed widening ranked model which isexternal to the
agent’s beliefs. Therefore, it is a kind of external revision which has been criticized by Rott as
embodying a bad philosophy (cf. Section 3.1).
3.5.2 Revision Operators with Memory
Konieczny and Ṕerez have proposed yet another framework for iterated revision, which
considers as the agent’s belief state the sequence of consistent sentences he agent has
learned[Konieczny and Ṕerez, 2000]. Like in Lehmann’s approach, the revised belief stateK∗α
is just the concatenation ofK andα. However, Konieczny and Ṕerez have suggested a different
set of postulates for iterated belief revision, which are essentially a reformulation of the AGM
postulates along with the following one:8
(H7) K ∗ K1 ≡ K ∗ (∧Bel(K1))
Postulate (H7) is a sort of associativity law, which expresses the strong confidence in the new
information. It is not difficult to see that (H7) implies (Rec).
The postulates proposed by Konieczny and Pérez characterize the so-calledrevision opera-
tors with memory. Formally, a faithful assignment overL is a function which maps a sentence
α to a total pre-orderα, such that,
• If W1,W2 |= α, thenW1 =α W2.
• If W1 |= α andW2 |= ¬α, thenW1 ≺α W2.
Note thatα is nothing but a faithful ranking onCn(α).
Given a faithful assignment overL, we can inductively define a rankingK of the possible
worlds for any belief stateK:
• 〈〉= ΘL × ΘL,
8AsL is assumed finite in[Konieczny and Ṕerez, 2000], the conjunction∧Bel(K1) is a well-defined sentence.
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• for anyW1,W2: W1 〈K:α〉 W2 iff W1 ≺α W2 orW1 =α W2 andW1 K W2,
The revision operator with memory is then defined as follows:
Bel(K ∗ α) = Th(min([α],K)) (3.6)
A revision operator based on memory satisfies all DP postulates, except (DP2). Just like
Lehmann’s revision, a revision operator with memory assumes a fixed (external) faithful as-
signment, which means that the agent never changes its revision policy. Hence, Rott’s criticism
regarding widening ranked revisions also applies to revision operators with memory.
As a special case, the so-calledbasic memory operatoris generated from thebasic faithful
assignmentoverL which additionally satisfies the following condition:
• If W1,W2 |= ¬α, thenW1 =α W2.
Put in words,α partitionsΘL into two levels: the lower level contains allα-worlds while the
other level contains all¬α-worlds.
In fact, basic memory operator is equivalent to Nayak’slexicographic revision(with “naked
evidence”) (cf. Section 3.2.2). Not surprisingly, therefore, Konieczny and Ṕerez were able to
show that basic memory operator satisfies all DP Postulates.
In their later work, Konieczny and Pérez[2002] have suggested to lift the unrealistic restric-
tion by allowing the faithful ranking of the new evidence to be dynamic, meaningthat logically
equivalent evidences may come with distinct faithful rankings. The new revision operator has
therefore been nameddynamic revision operators with memory.
Konieczny and Ṕerez have shown that dynamic revision operator with memory satisfies
(DP1), (DP3) and (DP4), but violates (DP2). Based on this, they havecriticized (DP2) as too
strong[Konieczny and Ṕerez, 2000]. In particular, they have suggested the following counterex-
ample:
Example 13. Consider an electric circuit containing an adder and a multiplier. The atomic
propositionsadder ok andmultiplier ok denote respectively that the adder and the multiplier
are working. Initially we have no information about this circuit (Bel(K) = Cn({})), and we
then learn that the adder and the multiplier are working (α = adder ok ∧ multiplier ok).
Thereafter, someone tells us that the adder is actually not working (β = ¬adder ok). There
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is no reason to ”forget” that the multiplier is working, whereas imposed by (DP2) we have
(K ∗ α) ∗ β ≡ K ∗ β ≡ ¬adder ok, sinceβ ⊢ ¬α.
In favor of (DP2), I give a counterargument of Konieczny and Pérez’s criticism. First I
observe that a (dynamic) revision operator with memory is not a single revision operator, un-
like the AGM framework attempts to model. Since the new information is coupled with a
faithful ranking, a revision operator with memory (except basic memory revision) essentially
is a multiple revision operator which revises a belief state with another belief state. After ob-
serving that, it is no surprise that (DP2) is violated since this postulate is only intended for
single revision operators. This argument is supported by the fact that basic memory revision
does satisfy (DP2). From the perspective of single revision, the behavior imposed by (DP2) in
Example 13 is perfectly reasonable, since the evidenceα is supposed to be an atomic piece of
information. Note that, in case we learneda der ok andmutiplier ok subsequently, thanks
to Postulate (Ind), we will retainmultiplier ok after the¬adder ok-revision. In fact it is not
difficult to see that if we want the revision operator with memory to exhibit the behavior ex-
pected by Konieczny and Pérez, then the faithful ranking that comes withα should encode the
independence ofmultiplier ok andadder ok. This somehow highlights the subtle distinction
between revising by a conjunction of sentences and revising by a set of sentences (with different
plausibility degrees) (cf. the discussion in[Nayaket al., 1996b]), which will be further culti-
vated in Chapter 5. Based on the above argument, I consider (DP2) a welljustified postulate for
single revision operators, although it could be too strong for multiple revisionoperators.
3.5.3 Dynamic Revision Operators
Independently,[Nayaket al., 1996a] have also noticed the inconsistency between (C2) and the
original AGM postulates. Their solution to avoid inconsistency has been to view belief revision
as dynamic, which has been mentioned already. By doing so, it becomes possible to safely
accept the DP postulates. The framework of dynamic revision operators isnot too different
from the DP framework, except that the former makes explicit the idea of evolutionary revision
policy.
The problem of the DP postulates to be overly permissive has been also studied by Nayak
et al., [1996a; 2003]. They have suggested to strengthen the DP postulates by the following
so-called postulate of Conjunction:9
9In [Nayaket al., 2003], (Conj) is written as “Ifα 0 ¬β, then(K ∗ α) ∗µ β ≡ K ∗ (β ∧ α).”, where∗α denotes
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(Conj) If α 0 ¬β, then(K ∗ α) ∗ β ≡ K ∗ (β ∧ α).
In the presence of the modified AGM postulates, (Conj) is strong enough to imply (DP1), (DP3),
(DP4) and (Rec).
I argue that (Conj) is too strong, as (Rec) already is criticized in Section 3.2.2 of being too
strong. With regard to the postulate I have proposed, it is easy to see that (Ind) is a weakening
of Postulate (Rec). This raises the question whether Postulate (Ind) weakens too much. Let us
consider an example, taken from[Nayaket al., 1996a], which, at first glance, seems to show
that this is indeed the case.
Example 14. Our agent believes that Tweety is a singing bird. However, since there is no strong
correlation between singing and birdhood, the agent is prepared to retainthe belief that Tweety
sings even after accepting the information that Tweety is not a bird, and conversely, if the agent
were to be informed that Tweety does not sing, she would still retain the beliefthat Tweety is a
bird. Imagine that the agent first receives the information that Tweety is in fact not a bird, and
later learns that Tweety does not sing.
Nayaket al. claimed that it is only reasonable to assume that the agent should, in the end,
always believe that Tweety is a non-singing non-bird. Indeed, withBel(K) = Cn(singing∧
bird) it follows from Postulate (Rec) that(K ∗ ¬bird) ∗ ¬singing⊢ ¬bird, since0 ¬singing→
bird. Postulate (Ind), on the other hand, does not apply in this case. But the behavior which
is claimed to be the only reasonable one is not generally justified. Suppose, for example, the
agent initially believes firmly that¬singing→ bird. It is then possible, after revising by¬bird,
that the belief in¬singing→ bird is stronger than the belief in¬bird. In this case, after further
revising by¬singing, the agent believes that Tweety is a bird after all.
Summary
In this chapter, I have formally analyzed the problem of implicit dependencewhich is intrinsic
to belief revision but largely overlooked in the community over the past decade. As (at least a
partial) solution to the problem, I have proposed to strengthen the DP theory by a new postulate
of independence. The resulting framework for iterated belief revision now consists of the (mod-
ified) AGM postulates, (DP1), (DP2) and (Ind). I have informally argued for the new postulate
the evolved operator after aα-revision. Accordingly, they have reformulated the DP postulates in the sam pirit.
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(Ind) by means of examples, and I have given a formal justification by an elegant semantic char-
acterization. Also, a detailed comparison to related work has shown that the new framework
is the most satisfactory one thus far in the literature. As a conclusion, I argue that the new
framework provides better criteria for the design of rational iterated beliefr vision operators.
Chapter 4
Iterated Belief Revision:
Computational Approaches
In the classical belief revision, the agents considered are infinite beings,without any limitation
of memory, time, or deductive ability. When realization is concerned, one hasto consider ad-
ditionally that any realistic agent is a finite being and that calculations take time. Threfore,
the beliefs of an agent should be represented by a finite belief state, and as tisf ctory revision
operator should not only behave rationally but also consume less time and spce[Nebel, 1994;
Williams, 1995]. Adapting belief revision to less idealized agents is far from trivial, as we need
an approach which takes these characteristics of finiteness, memory and timelim tations into
account[Wassermann, 1999]. In order to construct a realizable revision operator, we first need
to find afeasible representationof belief states. Note that a belief state induces a belief set (the
logical contents) and the extra-logical preference information. Apparently, it is not feasible to
represent directly a belief set on a computer, since it is infinite in general; even if the underlying
languageL is finite, the size of a belief set could also be very huge as it is logically closed.
Many researcher[Wobck, 1992; Nebel, 1994] have therefore suggested to represent the logical
contents of a belief state by abelief base, that is, a finite set of sentences (not necessary logi-
cally closed). Moreover,[Nebel, 1998] has argued that the size of the extra-logical preference
information of a representationally feasible belief state should bepolynomially boundedin the
size of its belief base.1
1Formally, thesizeof S, denoted by|S|, is the number of symbols occurring inS; whereas thecardinality of a
setS, denoted by||S||, is the number of elements ofS.
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In this chapter, computational approaches to iterated belief revision will be studied. I will
propose a concrete computational iterated revision operator, which satisfies he AGM, DP and
Independence postulates. To clearly displays the intuition of the operator,I present an OCF-
based semantics. Also, a formal assessment shows that the operator is opimal in computational
complexity and space-consumption.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, Nebel’s cut base revision
is recapitulated along with its problems. Then, I present in Section 4.2 the so-called reinforce-
ment base revision. I will give a formal assessment of reinforcement base revision in terms of
logical properties, computational complexity, and etc. Finally, Section 4.3 contains a detailed
comparison to related work.
4.1 Cut Base Revision
Based on ideas of[Rott, 1991], Nebel has proposed so-calledcut base revisionwhich uses a
very compact representation of belief states. Formally, aprioritized base, denoted by〈B,≤B〉,
consists of a belief baseB and a total pre-order≤B onB.2 Note that, given a belief stateK of
the form〈B,≤B〉, the induced belief setBel(K) consists of all logical consequences ofB, that
is, Bel(K) = Cn(B).
Given a prioritized base〈B,≤B〉 and a sentenceα, the cut-set ofα, denoted bycut<B(α),
is defined as follows:
cut<B(α) = {β ∈ B | {γ ∈ B |β ≤B γ} 6⊢ α} (4.1)
Put in words, the cut-set ofα consists of all sentences in classes of(Bi, · · · , Bn), such that,
adding next lower classBi−1 leads to the implication ofα.
Cut base revision is then formally defined as follows:
〈B,≤B〉 cut α = cut<B(¬α) ∪ {α} (4.2)
Note thatcut<B(¬α) is subset ofB, therefore the size of〈B,≤B〉 cut α is linearly bounded
in the size ofB andα.
2Note that a prioritized base〈B,≤B〉 can also be represented by a totally ordered family of classes of sentencs
(B1, · · · , Bn), with α ≤B β iff there existi, j such thatα ∈ Bi, β ∈ Bj andi ≤ j.
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Nebel has shown that the total≤B on a belief baseB can be generalized to an EE≤Cn(B)
on the belief setCn(B):
Observation 4.1. [Nebel, 1994] Suppose〈B,≤B〉 is a prioritized base. Let≤Cn(B) be a binary
relation onL, such that, for any sentencesα, β:
α ≤Cn(B) β iff cut<B(β) ⊆ cut<B(α) (4.3)
Then≤Cn(B) satisfies (EE1)–(EE5), assumingK = Cn(B).
The following result shows that cut base revision applied to a prioritized base〈B,≤B〉 will
obtain essentially the same result as EE-based revision applied to the belief set Cn(B).
Observation 4.2. [Nebel, 1994; Williams, 1994a] Suppose〈B,≤B〉 is a prioritized base. Let
≤Cn(B) be the EE onCn(B) as defined by (4.3). Then
Cn(〈B,≤B〉 cut α) =
{
L if ⊢ ¬α
{β ∈ L |¬α <Cn(B) ¬α ∨ β} otherwise
Nebel’s proposal seems a nice step from theory to computation. Unfortunately, cut base
revision is not an iterated revision operator, since it maps a prioritized baseand the new in-
formation to a revised belief base, instead of a revised prioritized base. Asthe revised belief
base is not ordered, it is therefore impossible to do a subsequent revision. This problem is also
referred to by[Hansson, 2003] as the problem of categorial mis-matching. It is not difficult
to see that both constructive models of Section 2.1 also suffer from the problem of categorial
mis-matching.
It is an interesting question whether we can construct a satisfactory iterated revision oper-
ator by a slight modification of cut base revision? Unfortunately, the following discussion will
show that al least native approaches do not work. To make the presentation easier, I assume a
prioritized base is represented by a totally ordered family of classes of sentences(B1, · · · , Bn).
Suppose a prioritized base(B1, · · · , Bn) is revised by α and cut<B(¬α) =
⋃
{Bi, · · · , Bn}. According to (4.2), the revised belief base consists ofcut<B(¬α) andα.
Arguably, we have every reason to assume that sentences inut<B(¬α) are ordered as before.
The only problem is where to put the new informationα? Naively, we have two options: letα
be less plausible than all sentences ofcut<B(¬α) (cf. Figure 4.1(a)), or letα be more plausible
than all sentences ofcut<B(¬α) (cf. Figure 4.1(b)).
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Base on above discussion, we can define so-calledsk ptical cut base revisionas follows:
〈B,≤B〉 
s
cut α = 〈B1 = cut<B(¬α) ∪ {α},≤B1〉
whereβ ≤B1 γ iff β = α or β, γ ∈ cut<B(¬α) andβ ≤B γ.
As direct consequences of Theorem 2.14 and Observation 4.2, skeptical cut base revision
satisfies the AGM postulates. It is easy to see that skeptical cut base revision satisfies Postu-
late (CB)
Similarly, so-calledcredulous cut base revisionis defined as follows:
〈B,≤B〉 
c
cut α = 〈B1 = cut<B(¬α) ∪ {α},≤B1〉
whereβ ≤B1 γ iff γ = α or β, γ ∈ cut<B(¬α) andβ ≤B γ.
Bn
...
Bi
α
(a)
α
Bn
...
Bi
(b)
Figure 4.1: Two radical extensions of cut base revision
Analogously, credulous cut base satisfies the AGM postulates. It is also esy to see that
credulous cut base revision satisfies (DP1) and (Rec), but violates (DP2).
Since both (CB) and (Rec) are too radical, I argue that the two iterated revision operators
obtained by modifying cut base revision naively are not satisfactory.
4.2 Reinforcement Base Revision
The two radical cases in last section suggests that we might need to exploit additional (quanti-
tative) information in order to obtain more reasonable iterated revision operat rs based on cut
base revision.
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In the sequel, I present such a revision operator in which a belief state is represented by a
finite set of integer-weighted sentences. Formally,
Definition 4.3. [Jin and Thielscher, 2005a] An epistemic entrenchment base(EE base, for
short), denoted byΞ = 〈B, f〉, consists of a belief baseB and a mappingf fromB to N+.3 For
any sentenceβ ∈ B, f(β) is called itsevidence degree.
Given an EE baseΞ = 〈B, f〉, we denote byΞ|m the set of sentences inB whose evidence
degrees are exactlym:
Ξ|m = {β ∈ B | f(β) = m}
Moreover,Ξm denotes the set of sentences inB whose evidence degrees are at leasem:
Ξm =
⋃
{Ξ|i | i ≥ m}
The belief degree (also calledrank) of a sentenceβ in an EE baseΞ = 〈B, f〉 is defined as
follows:
RankΞ(β) =







0 if B 6⊢ β
∞ else if ⊢ β
max({m |Ξm ⊢ β}) else
(4.4)
Note that, for a sentenceβ ∈ B, it is possibleRankΞ(β) > f(β); in this caseβ is called
redundantin Ξ. Therefore, the evidence degreef(β) of a sentenceβ ∈ B is only the lower
bound of its belief degree. It is not difficult to see that redundant sentences can be removed
from an EE base without affecting belief degrees of all sentences.
The belief setBel(Ξ) of an EE baseΞ = 〈B, f〉 is identified withCn(B), which is also
exactly the set of all sentences with ranks greater than0.
EE bases are generalized prioritized bases, in the sense, a prioritized base〈B,≤B〉 can be
induced from an EE baseΞ = 〈B, f〉 by letting:
α ≤B β iff f(α) ≤ f(β)
Given an EE baseΞ = 〈B, f〉, the cut-set of a sentenceα, denoted bycutΞ(α), is obtained
3Note that an EE baseΞ = 〈B, f〉 can also be represented as a finite set of pairs:{〈β1, e1〉, · · · , 〈βn, en〉} with
βi ∈ B andf(βi) = ei.
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as follows:
cutΞ(α) = {β ∈ B |RankΞ(α) < f(β)} (4.5)
Note that the notion of cut-set defined by (4.5) generalizes that defined by (4.1). More pre-
cisely, letΞ = 〈B, f〉 be an EE base and〈B,≤B〉 be the prioritized base induced fromΞ, then
cutΞ(β) = cut<B(β) for any sentenceβ.
Not surprisingly, given an EE baseΞ = 〈B, f〉, we can also induce an EE≤Bel(Ξ) onBel(Ξ)
by stipulating:
α ≤Bel(Ξ) β iff RankΞ(α) ≤ RankΞ(β) (4.6)
Observation 4.4. [Wobck, 1992] Given an EE baseΞ = 〈B, f〉 , the induced binary relation
≤Bel(Ξ) defined by (4.6) is an EE onBel(B).
It is worth mentioning that the quantitative nature of EE bases allows to represent more fine-
grained beliefs, e.g., we can encode information like “α is much plausible thanβ”. Also, the
quantitative nature of EE bases endow us to have a fine-grained controlbelief revision.
In the current setting, an iterated revision operator now should be a function which maps an
EE base and the new information to the revised EE base. The discussion in Section 4.1 suggests
that the major problem is to find an appropriate evidence degree for the newinformation in the
revised EE base. Obviously, if the new information is purely a sentenceα, then the revision
operator has to assignα an evidence degree via a fixed scheme. It is unlikely that there exists
such a fixed scheme suitable for all different kinds of applications. Therefore, based on the same
considerations of[Spohn, 1988], I will consider a more general revision schema where the new
information consists of a sentenceα and anevidence degreem ∈ N+; standard AGM/DP
revision is easily obtained as a special case by using the same evidence degre for all new
information.
By a slight modification of cut base revision, I now define an iterated revision operator,
namedreinforcement base revision, as follows:
〈B, f〉 r 〈α,m〉 = {〈β, f(β) − RankΞ(¬α)〉 |β ∈ cutΞ(¬α)}
∪ {〈α ∨ β, f(β) +m〉 |β ∈ B}
∪ {〈α,m〉}
(4.7)
Note that, the evidence degrees of all sentences incutΞ(¬α) are degradedRankΞ(¬α) and the
new sentenceα is assigned evidence degreem. Unlike cut base revision, reinforcement base
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revision additionally adds a disjunctionβ∨α with evidence degreef(β)+m for every sentence
β ∈ B. Obviously, these disjunctions will not affect the logical contents of the revised EE base.
For those who are familiar with implicit dependence, note that these new addeddisjunctions are
necessary to avoid (undesirable) implicit dependence; since ifβ ∨ α is more plausible thanα
andβ, it will disqualify α andβ to be implicitly dependent.
It is easy to see that the size of〈B, f〉 r 〈α,m〉 is linearly bounded in the size of〈B, f〉
and〈α,m〉. Arguably, this is all one can expect from any satisfactory revision operator in terms
of space-consumption.
To see a concrete example, let us recall again Example 7. Assume our initial belief state is
now encoded byΞ = {〈r, 1〉, 〈s, 1〉, 〈r ∨ s, 2〉} and we first have learnt thatX is not smart with
evidence degree2. SinceRankΞ(¬¬s) = 1, according to (4.7), the revised EE baseΞ1 = Ξ r
〈¬s, 2〉 = {〈r∨s, 1〉, 〈¬s, 2〉, 〈r∨¬s, 3〉}.4 Suppose now we learn thatX is smart with evidence
2. SinceRankΞ1(¬s) = 2, we obtainΞ2 = Ξ1 r 〈s, 2〉 = {〈r ∨ ¬s, 1〉, 〈s, 2〉, 〈r ∨ s ∨ s, 3〉}.
It is not difficult to see thatRankΞ1(r) = 2, which means we continue to believe thatX is rich
(as expected).
4.2.1 Formal Assessment
I give in the sequel a formal assessment of reinforcement base revision. First of all, I will
show that reinforcement base revision is essentially equivalent to reinfocement OCF revision;
hence it shares all nice properties of the latter. Then, the degree of syntax relevance of and the
computational complexity of reinforcement base revision is analyzed.
Equivalence Result
To show the equivalence of reinforcement base revision and OCF revision, we need to define a
mapping from EE bases to OCFs. Formally, given EE baseΞ = 〈B, f〉, we can induce an OCF
4For simplicity, redundant sentences are removed and I will always do so in the rest of the paper
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kΞ by letting:5
kΞ(W ) =
{
0 if W |= B
max({f(β) |β ∈ B andW 6|= β}) otherwise
(4.8)
Put in words, the rank of a possible world is the maximal evidence degree ofall sentences it
does not satisfy.
The following result shows that the OCF induced from any EE base does not co tain irrele-
vant extra-logic preference information.
Observation 4.5. SupposeΞ = 〈B, f〉 is an EE base andkΞ is the OCF induced fromΞ. Let
W1,W2 be arbitrary two possible worlds. ThenW1,W2 are relevantly ordered.
Also, it is not difficult to see that an EE base and its induced OCF encode essentially the
same belief state.
Observation 4.6. SupposeΞ = 〈B, f〉 is an EE base, andkΞ is the induced OCF as defined by
(4.8). Then for any sentenceβ:
RankΞ(β) = kΞ(β)
Let us recall Example 7. It is not difficult to see that the EE baseΞ = {〈r, 1〉, 〈s, 1〉, 〈r ∨
s, 2〉} induces the OCFk shown in the second column of Table 3.2 and the revised OCFkr,∗¬s,2
corresponds exactly to the revised EE baseΞ1 = {〈r ∨ s, 1〉, 〈¬s, 2〉, 〈r ∨ ¬s, 3〉}.
To show the above example is not a coincidence, I need to exhibit that for any EE baseΞ
and new information〈α,m〉, the OCF induced from the revised EE baseΞ r 〈α,m〉 is exactly
the revised OCFkΞ
r,∗
α,m (cf. the commute diagram in Figure 4.2).
Observation 4.7. SupposeΞ is an EE base andkΞ is the OCF induced fromΞ. Let 〈α,m〉 be
any new information. Then for any possible worldW :
kΞ1(W ) = kΞ
r,∗
α,m(W )
whereΞ1 = Ξ r 〈α,m〉.
5 Being interested in computation, I assume that an EE base is finite. Without thisassumption, an EE base
Ξ = 〈B, f〉 can be induced from an OCFk as follows:
• f(α) = min{k(W ) | k 6|= W} for any non-tautologous sentenceα
• B = {α |α is non-tautologous andf(α) > 0}
For the current purpose, it is sufficient to have a mapping from EE bases to OCFs.
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Ξ Ξ r 〈α,m〉
kΞ kΞ
r,∗
α,m
(4.7)
(3.4)
(4.8) (4.8)
Figure 4.2: Equivalence of reinforcement base and OCF revision
As a direct consequence of Observation 4.6 and Observation 4.7, we have the following
equivalence result.
Theorem 4.8. SupposeΞ is an EE base andkΞ is the OCF induced fromΞ. Let 〈α,m〉 be any
new information. The for any sentenceβ:
RankΞ1(β) = kΞ
r,∗
α,m(β)
whereΞ1 = Ξ r 〈α,m〉.
Naturally, since the two are essentially equivalent, all formal properties ofrein orcement
OCF revision are inherited by reinforcement base revision, e.g., it followsimmediately from
Corollary 4.8 and Theorem 3.17 that reinforcement base revision satisfies all desirable postu-
lates.
Theorem 4.9. Assume an arbitrary but fixed evidence degree for any new information.Then
reinforcement base revision satisfies all AGM postulates (K*1)-(K*8) as well as (DP1), (DP2)
and (Ind), but violates (Rec).
Analogously, we can obtain the following formal properties of reinforcement base revision.
Observation 4.10. SupposeΞ is an EE base and〈α,m〉 is any new information. LetΞ1 =
Ξ r 〈α,m〉. Then for any non-tautologous sentenceβ:
RankΞ1(β) =







t+m if ⊢ α→ β
t′ − r else if t′ = t
min(t′ − r, t+m) else
wherer = RankΞ(¬α), t = RankΞ(β) andt′ = RankΞ(α→ β).
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Observation 4.11. SupposeΞ is an EE base andα is a new non-tautological sentence with
evidence degreem ∈ N+. LetΞ1 = Ξ r 〈α,m〉. Then
RankΞ1(α) = RankΞ(B,α) +m
Theorem 4.12.For arbitrarym1,m2 ∈ N+, reinforcement base revision satisfies the following
conditions:
(EDP1′) If β ⊢ α, then(Ξ r 〈α,m1〉) r 〈β,m2〉 ≡ Ξ r 〈β,m2〉.
(EDP2′) If β ⊢ ¬α, then(Ξ r 〈α,m1〉) r 〈β,m2〉 ≡ Ξ r 〈β,m2〉.
(EInd′) If there existsm such thatΞ r 〈β,m〉 0 ¬α, then
(Ξ r 〈α,m1〉) r 〈β,m2〉 ⊢ α.
Degree of Syntax Irrelevance
Strictly speaking, reinforcement base revision violates Dalal’s principle ofIrrelevance of Syn-
tax [Dalal, 1988], in the sense, the revised belief state is not purely determined by the logical
contents of the original belief state. However, it will be shown that reinforcement base revision
does not really depend on the syntax of EE bases.
Two EE basesΞ1 andΞ2 are calledepistemically equivalentiff their induced EEs (as defined
by (4.6)) are equivalent, that is, for any sentencesα, β:
α ≤Bel(Ξ1) β iff α ≤Bel(Ξ2) β
The following result shows two epistemically equivalent EE bases will yield logically equiv-
alent revised EE bases, when revised by same new sentence.
Theorem 4.13. Let Ξ1, Ξ2 be two epistemically equivalent EE bases, then for any sentenceα
and evidence degreesm1,m2 ∈ N+:
Bel(Ξ′1) = Bel(Ξ
′
2)
whereΞ′1 = Ξ1 r 〈α,m1〉 andΞ
′
2 = Ξ2 r 〈α,m2〉.
78 Chapter 4. Iterated Belief Revision: Computational Approaches
Two EE basesΞ1 andΞ2 are calledequivalent, denoted byΞ1 ∼= Ξ2, iff for any sentenceβ:
RankΞ1(β) = RankΞ2(β)
It is not difficult to see that two equivalent EE bases will lead to equivalent revised EE bases,
when revised by same new information.
Theorem 4.14.LetΞ1,Ξ2 be two equivalent EE bases and〈α,m〉 any new information. Then
Ξ1 r 〈α,m〉 ∼= Ξ2 r 〈α,m〉
4.2.2 Computational Complexity
In computational settings, complexity is a very important criterion of evaluating revision opera-
tors.6 Like in [Eiter and Gottlob, 1992], I will consider the so-calledproblem of counterfactual
(CF, for short), which decides ”K ∗ α ⊢ β?” for arbitrary belief stateK and sentencesα, β. In
complexity theory, problems like CF, which only can have answers “yes” or“n ”, are called
decision problems. It is obvious that the problem of CF is harder than the implication problem
(IMPL, for short).7 Therefore, if underlying languageL (e.g., a first order predicate logic) is un-
decidable, so is the problem of CF. In the sequel, I therefore assume a propositional underlying
languageL.
[Nebel, 1992] has shown that both SAT and VALID can be polynomially (many-to-one)
reduced to the problem of CF, given a revision operator satisfies Postulate (K ∗ 4) and(K ∗ 5).
This means the problem of CF is at least both NP-hard and coNP-hard.
Observation 4.15. [Nebel, 1992] For any revision operation satisfying Postulates(K ∗ 4) and
(K ∗ 5), the problem of CF isNP-hard andcoNP-hard.
It is follows immediately that in general the complexity of the problem of CF is beyond NP
and coNP, provided NP6= coNP.
For most well-known belief change operators in the literature, the problem of CF has been
shown located at the lower end of the so-calledpolynomial hierarchy[Eiter and Gottlob, 1992;
6I assume the reader has basic knowledge on complexity theory, or otherwise can be found in
[Papadimitriou, 1994]
7IMPL decides ”B ⊢ α?” for a finite setB of sentences and a sentenceα.
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Nebel, 1994; Liberatore, 1997]. Therefore, I will first briefly sketch the notion of polynomial
hierarchy. LetX be a class of decision problem. Then PX denotes the class of decision problems
that can be decided in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machineT that is allowed to
use a procedure (also referred to as anoracle) for deciding a problemQ ∈ X, whereby executing
the procedure only costs constant time. Similarly, NPX denotes the class of decision problems
that can be decided in polynomial time by a non-deterministic Turing machineT that is allowed
to use an oracle for deciding a problemQ ∈ X. Based on these notions, the complexity classes
∆pk,Σ
p
k andΠ
p
k are formally defined as follows:
∆p0 = Σ
p
0 = Π
p
0 = P
∆pk+1 = P
Σp
k
Σpk+1 = NP
Σp
k
Πpk = coΣ
p
k+1
Note thatΣp1 = NP andΠ
p
1 = coNP. The polynomial hierarchy is then defined asPH =
⋃
k≥0 ∆
p
k =
⋃
k≥0 Σ
p
k =
⋃
k≥0 Π
p
k ⊆ PSPACE. It is unknown whether the inclusion between
PH andPSPACE is proper, although strongly believed.
For problems in∆p2, it is often difficult to determine their exact complexity. But by restrict-
ing the number of oracle calls, we obtain an important special class∆p2[O(log n)] of problems
that can be decided in polynomial time by using onlylogarithmicallymany times of oracle calls.
Furthermore, inside∆p2[O(log n)] are the classes of so-calledboolean hierarchy. The classes
NP(k) and coNP(k) are defined as follows:
NP(0) = P
NP(2k + 1) = {S ∪ T |S ∈ NP(2k), T ∈ NP}
NP(2k + 2) = {S ∩ T |S ∈ NP(2k + 1), T ∈ NP}
coNP(k) = {S |S ∈ NP(k)}
The boolean hierarchyBH =
⋃
k≥0 NP(k) is equivalent to the class of problems that can be
solved in deterministic polynomial time using aconstantnumber of oracle calls.
Nebel has identified the exact complexity for cut base revision.
Theorem 4.16. [Nebel, 1994] For cut base revision, the problem of CF is∆p2 [O(log n)]-
complete.
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Since reinforcement base revision generalizes cut base revision, notsurprisingly, I am able
to show that the complexity of the former is also∆p2 [O(log n)]-complete.
Theorem 4.17.For reinforcement base revision, the problem of CF is∆p2 [O(log n)]-complete.
This theorem shows that reinforcement base revision is computationally optimal, since
∆p2 [O(log n)] is the lowest class beyond NP and coNP. Moreover, if the underlying language is
constrained toHorn sentences, then the problem of CF for reinforcement base revision becomes
tractable (i.e., can be solved in polynomial time).
It is also interesting to know how hard is it to compute the revised belief state, given an arbi-
trary belief state and new information? Unlike the problem of CF, now we dealwith a so-called
function problem, which can have more answers than “yes” or “no”. The complexity classes for
decision problems have natural counterparts for function problems: e.g.,FPNP (also referred
to as NP-easy) represents the set of all function problems which can be solved in polynomial
time by a deterministic Turing machine that is allowed to invoke a NP-oracle. It turns out that
the problem of computing a revised belief state (EE base) for reinforcement base revision falls
in an interesting complexity class, called NP-equivalent. Formally, a function pr blem is called
NP-equivalentiff it is both NP-easy and NP-hard. Note that NP-equivalent is the analogue f
NP-complete for function problems, in the sense that as far as a NP-equivalent problem can be
solved in polynomial time so are all other NP-equivalent problems.
Theorem 4.18.For reinforcement base revision, the problem of computing a revised belief state
is NP-equivalent.
4.3 Discussions and Related Work
I have proposed an iterated revision operator which not only satisfies alldesirable rational pos-
tulates but also is optimal in terms of computational complexity and space-consumption. In this
section, I will give a detailed comparison of my proposal with the most well-known existing
computational approaches to iterated revision.
4.3.1 Syntax Irrelevant Operators
In the literature, there are revision operators which do not exploit any explicit extra-logical
preference information. From a representation point of view, this seems an advantage; but
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these revision operators are also criticized asinflexible [Nebel, 1998], in the sense, they have
less control over what sentences are discarded and what sentencesare r tained. Obviously, such
revision operators obey Dalal’s principle ofIrrelevance of Syntax[Dalal, 1988]. The principle of
irrelevance of syntax is motivate by Newell’s influential proposal which state that the behavior
of an intelligent system should be specifiable on theknowledge level[Newell, 1982], i.e., the
behavior of the system is determined entirely by the contents of the its knowledge (beliefs)
despite their symbolic representation. In the sequel, I present two well-known syntax irrelevant
revision operators.
Full Meet Base Revision
The so-calledfull meet base revision[Nebel, 1994] is obtained directly from full meet revision:
B a α =
{
B ∪ {α} if B 0 ¬α
{α} otherwise
Radical as it is, full meet base revision satisfies all AGM postulates and Postulate (DP1), but
violates Postulate (DP2) and (Ind).
The complexity of full meet base revision has also been shown by Nebel.
Theorem 4.19. [Nebel, 1994] For full meet base revision, the problem of CF iscoNP(3)-
complete.
Although, the complexity of full meet base revision is lower than that of reinforcement base
revision, the former is obviously of no practice use due to its radical behavior; and I conjecture
that any useful revision operator will have a complexity beyondBH.
Dalal’s Operator
Based on a notion of distances between possible worlds,[Dalal, 1988] has proposed another
syntax irrelevant revision operator. According to Dalal, when a belief baseB is revised byα,
the revised belief base should be determined by models ofα that are “closest” to models ofB.
Formally, the distance between two possible worldsW1,W2, denote by||∆||(W1,W2), is
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the cardinality of their symmetric difference:
||∆||(W1,W2) = ||W1 \W2 ∪W2 \W1||
The distance between a possible worldW and a (consistent) belief baseB, denoted by
||∆||min(B,W ), is the minimal distance betweenW and models ofB:
||∆||min(B,W ) = min({||∆||(W1,W ) |W1 ∈ [B]})
Given a (consistent) belief baseB, we can induce a faithful rankingCn(B) on Cn(B) by
stipulating:
W1 Cn(B) W2 iff ||∆||
min(B,W1) ≤ ||∆||
min(B,W2) (4.9)
Dalal’s operator is then defined as follows:
Cn(B d α) =
{
Th(min([α],Cn(B)) if B is consistent
Cn({α}) otherwise
(4.10)
whereCn(B) is as defined by (4.9).
Note that Dalal’s operator does not tell us explicitly how to construct a revised belief base.
Unfortunately,[Cadoliet al., 1995] have shown a negative result which says that the size of the
revised belief baseB d α could be much larger than that ofB andα.
Theorem 4.20.[Cadoliet al., 1995] Suppose there exists a polynomialp such that for any belief
baseB and sentenceα, there is a revised belief baseBdα as defined by (4.10) and|Bdα| ≤
p(|B| + |α|). ThenΣp2 = Π
p
2 = PH.
As Σp2 = Π
p
2 = PH is commonly believed very unlikely, the above theorem essentially
shows that Dalal’s operator will cause super-polynomial space explosion.
It has been shown by[Katsuno and Satoh, 1991] that Dalal’s operator satisfies all AGM
postulates.. Moreover, Eiter and Gottlob have shown that the complexity of Dalal’s operator is
∆p2 [O(log n)]-complete
Theorem 4.21. [Eiter and Gottlob, 1992] For Dalal’s operator, the problem of CF is
∆p2 [O(log n)]-complete.
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This result shows that in general Dalal’s operator has the same complexity as reinforce-
ment base revision. However, unlike the latter, even if the underlying language only con-
sists of Horn sentences, the problem of CF for Dalal’s operator remains∆p2 [O(log n)]-
complete[Eiter and Gottlob, 1992].
4.3.2 Theory Base Transmutation
Theory base transmutationis a class of iterated revision operators proposed by
[Williams, 1994b], among which,conditionalizationandadjustmentare most prominent. Like
reinforcement base revision, both conditionalization and adjustment have intuitive OCF-based
semantics. Note that there are two major differences between reinforcement base revision and
theory base transmutation: first of all, both conditionalization and adjustment violate Postu-
late (Ind), and the latter also violates Postulate (DP2); secondly, theory base tr nsmutation
allows the input evidence degree to be0, and in this case they behave like contraction oper-
ators since in theory base transmutation the input evidence degree will be therank of the input
sentence. To facilitate the comparison between reinforcement revision andtheory base trans-
mutation, I assume the input evidence degree is always greater than0.
Conditionalization
OCF conditionalization was originally introduced by[Spohn, 1988], which can be viewed as a
qualitative version of Jeffrey’s Rule of probabilistic conditioning[Goldszmidt, 1992]:
(kc,∗α.m)(W ) =
{
k(W ) − k(¬α) ifW |= α
k(W ) − k(α) +m otherwise
(4.11)
It is easy to see that OCF conditionalization resembles very much reinforcement OCF revi-
sion. In fact, ifk(α) = 0 then the two coincide.
The follow result shows that in fact OCF conditionalization can be decomposed a a se-
quence of reinforcement OCF revision.
Observation 4.22.Letk be an OCF and〈α,m〉 be any new information. Then for any possible
worldsW ,
kc,∗α,m(W ) =
{
kr,∗
α,m−k(α)(W ) if k(α) < m
((kr,∗¬α,m′)
r,∗
α,m)(W ) otherwise
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wherem′ ∈ N+ is an arbitrary positive integer.
I give an intuitive picture of OCF conditionalization in Figure 4.3, in which two cases are
distinguished depending whetherk(α) > m or k(α) ≤ m.
0
k(α)
m
α-worlds ¬α-worlds
(a)k(α) > m
0
k(α)
m
α-worlds ¬α-worlds
(b) k(α) ≤ m
Figure 4.3: OCF conditionalization
OCF conditionalization changes the ranks ofα-worlds in exactly the same way as rein-
forcement OCF revision. Depending whetherk(α) > m or k(a) ≤ m, all ¬α-worlds are
uniformly moved downwards (or upwards respectively) to let the most plausible ¬α-worlds
have the rankm, which is necessary to makec,∗α,m(α) = m.
It is not difficult to see that OCF conditionalization satisfies (DP1) and (DP2), but violates
(Ind) (in casek(α) > m).
Formally, conditionalization is an EE base revision operator defined as fol-
lows [Williams, 1992; Benferhatet al., 2002]:
〈B, f〉 c 〈α,m〉 =













〈B, f〉 r 〈α,m〉 if B 0 α







{〈β, f(β) − RankΞ(α) +m〉 | f(β) > RankΞ(α)}
∪ {〈¬α ∨ β, f(β)〉 |β ∈ B}
∪ {〈α,m〉}
othewise
Note that, whenB 0 α conditionalization coincides with reinforcement base revision.
It is not difficult to see thatΞrα ≡ Ξcα for any EE baseΞ and new information〈α,m〉.
Therefore, the complexity of conditionalization is same as that of reinforcement base revision.
Theorem 4.23.For conditionalization, the problem of CF is∆p2 [O(log n)]-complete.
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Since it violates Postulates (Ind), it is not difficult to find a counterexample of conditional-
ization. Recall Example 7. Suppose nowΞ = {〈r, 6〉, 〈s, 5〉, 〈r ∨ s, 7〉} and we first have learnt
thatX is smart with evidence degree1. SinceRankΞ(s) = 5, this yieldsΞ1 = Ξ c 〈s, 1〉 =
{〈r ∨ s, 3〉, 〈r ∨ ¬s, 6〉, 〈s, 1〉}. Then we learn thatX is not rich with evidence degree2. Since
RankΞ(¬¬r) = 3, we obtainΞ2 = Ξ1 c 〈¬r, 2〉 = {〈r ∨ ¬s, 3〉}, 〈¬r, 2〉, 〈s ∨ ¬r, 3〉. So
strange enough, we now believeX is not smart, sinceRankΞ2(¬s) = 2.
Adjustment
OCF adjustment is an operator based on an absolute measure of minimal
change[Williams, 1994b]:
(kj,∗α.m)(W ) =
{
(k−α )
×
α,m(W ) if m < k(α)
k×α,m(W ) otherwise
(4.12)
where
(k−α )(W ) =
{
0 if W |= ¬α andK(W ) = k(α)
k(W ) otherwise
(k×α,m)(W ) =







0 if W |= α andK(W ) = k(¬α)
i else ifW |= ¬α andK(W ) < i
k(W ) else
Although its definition seems quite complicated, pictures in Figure 4.4 give us a nice intu-
ition of OCF adjustment. Unlike OCF conditionalization and reinforcement OCF revision, OCF
adjustment only changes the ranks of the most plausibleα-worlds. Moreover, whenk(a) ≤ m,
the relative plausibility ordering of¬α-worlds are not always preserved (cf. Figure 4.4(b)).
It is easy to see that OCF adjustment only satisfies Postulate (DP1), but violates (DP2) and
(Ind).
Formally, adjustment is an EE base revision operator defined as follows[Williams, 1992;
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0
k(α)
m
α-worlds ¬α-worlds
(a)k(α) > m
0
k(α)
m
α-worlds ¬α-worlds
(b) k(α) ≤ m
Figure 4.4: OCF adjustment
Benferhatet al., 2002]:
〈B, f〉 j 〈α,m〉 =






























{〈β, f(β)〉 | f(β) > RankΞ(¬α)}
∪ {〈α ∨ β, f(β)〉 |m < f(β) ≤ RankΞ(¬α)}
∪ {〈α,m〉}
if B 0 α







{〈β, f(β)〉 | f(β) > RankΞ(α)}
∪ {〈¬α ∨ β, f(β)〉 | f(β) ≤ RankΞ(α)}
∪ {〈α,m〉}
othewise
Like conditionalization, adjustment also has the same complexity as reinforcement base
revision.
Theorem 4.24.For adjustment, the problem of CF is∆p2 [O(log n)]-complete.
To see a counterexample of adjustment, let us recall again Example 7. As in Sect on 4.2,
assumeΞ = {〈r, 1〉, 〈s, 1〉, 〈r ∨ s, 2〉} and we first learn thatX is not smart with evidence
degree2, then the opposite with the same evidence degree. Now, sinceRankΞ(¬¬s) = 1, we
haveΞ1 = Ξ j 〈¬s, 2〉 = {〈r ∨ s, 2〉, 〈¬s, 2〉}. Moreover, sinceRankΞ1(¬s) = 2, we yield
Ξ2 = Ξ1 J 〈s, 2〉 = {〈s, 2〉}. Strangely, we do not believe any more thatX is rich.
4.3.3 Revising Possibilistic Beliefs
A problem of reinforcement revision (as well as of theory base transmutation) is that sentences
are weighted with integers. In particular, it is unclear how the evidence degree of the input
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information is obtained. Possibility theory is a more practical framework, in which the input
sentence comes with a possibility degree within interval[0, 1] [Benferhatet al., 2002].
In possibility theory, a belief state is represented by a possibility distributionπ which is a
mapping fromΘL to interval[0, 1]. Contrary to an OCF, a possible distributionπ assigns more
plausible worlds higher values, so thatπ(W ) = 0 meansW is impossible andπ(W ) = 1 means
that nothing preventsW from being the real world. A possibility distributionπ is calledfinite
iff its range is finite. In this thesis, we will only consider finite possibility distributions.
The belief setBel(π) encoded by a possibility distributionπ are sentences which are true in
all most plausibly possible worlds:
Bel(π) = Th({W |π(W ) = 1}) (4.13)
Moreover, given a possibility distributionπ, we can define two different measures on sen-
tences of the language:
• the possibility degreeΠπ(β) evaluates the extent to whichβ is consistent withπ:
Ππ(β) =
{
0 if ⊢ ¬β
max({π(W ) |W |= β}) otherwise
(4.14)
• the necessity degreeNπ(β) evaluates the extent to whichβ is entailed byπ:
Nπ(β) =
{
∞ if ⊢ β
1 − Ππ(¬β) otherwise
(4.15)
In the context, whereπ is obvious, we might denoteNπ(β) andΠπ(β), respectively, byN(β)
andΠ(β).
Possibilistic Conditionings
The revision of a possibility distributionπ by a total reliable informationα can be modeled by
Bayesian-style conditioning, i.e., for any sentenceα:
π∗α(W ) = π(W |α)
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whereπ(.|α) is the posterior possibility distribution conditioned onα.
Mainly, two methodologies of conditioning a possibility distribution are proposed. The so-
calledminimum-based conditioningdefined as follows is more of qualitative nature:
π(W |mα) =







1 if π(W ) = Π(W ) andW |= α
π(W ) else ifπ(W ) < Π(W ) andW |= α
0 else
Much closer to the genuine Bayesian is the so-calledpro uct-based conditioningwhich re-scales
all models ofα upwards:
π(W |×α) =







π(W )
Π(α) if W |= α andΠ(α) 6= 0
1 else ifW |= α andΠ(α) = 0
0 else
Bothπ(.|mα) andπ(.|×α) are justified to be called conditioning, sinceπ(W ) = π(W |α)⊗
Π(α), where⊗ is respective the minimum operatormin for minimum-based conditioning and
the product operator× for produce-based conditioning.
Based on Jeffrey’s rule in probability theory, revision of a possibility distribu ion π by an
uncertain input〈α,w〉 (with w ∈ [0, 1]) is achieved using the following definition:
π∗〈α,w〉(W ) = π(W |〈α,w〉)
where
π(W |〈α,w〉) =
{
π(W |α) if W |= α
(1 − w) ⊗ π(W |¬α) otherwise
Berferhat et al., have pointed out that there is an intimate relation between revision operators
based on OCFs and conditionings of possibility distributions. In particular, they proposed a
translation function form an OCFk to a possibility distributionπk by letting:
πk(W ) = e
−k(W ) (4.16)
The following theorem shows that adjustment and conditionalization in OCF corresponds,
respectively, to possibilistic minimum-based and product-based conditioning with uncertain in-
4.3. Discussions and Related Work 89
put.
Theorem 4.25. [Benferhatet al., 2002] Let k be an OCF, and〈α,m〉 (with m ∈ N+) be the
input information. Then for all possible worldsW ,
• πkc,∗
〈α,m〉
(W ) = πk(W |×〈α, 1 − e
−m〉))(W )
• π
k
j,∗
〈α,m〉
(W ) = πk(W |m〈α, 1 − e
−m〉))(W )
Note that the input information〈α,m〉 for OCF revision is mapped to as〈α, 1 − e−m〉 for
possibilistic conditionings.
Possibilistic Reinforcement Revision
In the section, I present the possibilistic versions for both reinforcementOCF and base revision.
Reinforcement Possibility Distribution Revision
By slightly modifying product-based conditioning, I obtain the followingreinforcement possi-
bility distribution revision:
π(W |r〈α,w〉) =
{
π(W |×α) if W |= α
(1 − w) × π(W ) otherwise
(4.17)
The following theorem shows that reinforcement possibility distribution revision corre-
sponds exactly to reinforcement OCF revision (see Figure 4.5).
k k∗α,m
πk πk(.|r〈α, 1 − e
−m〉)
(3.4)
(4.16) (4.16)
(4.17)
Figure 4.5: Correspondence between reinforcement OCF and possibilistic revision
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Theorem 4.26.Supposek is an OCF, and〈α,m〉 (withm ∈ N+) is the input information. Let
k∗〈α,m〉 be the revised OCF using reinforcement OCF revision. Then for any possible worldW ,
πk∗
〈α,m〉
(W ) = πk(W |r〈α, 1 − e
−m〉)
Reinforcement Possibility Base Revision
In the possibilistic version of reinforcement base revision, a belief state is rpresented by a
possibilistic baseΣ which consists of a finite set of weighted sentences. Formally, a possibilistic
baseΣ consists of a belief baseB and mappingg fromB to [0, 1]. Like an EE base, we might
represent a possibilistic baseΣ = 〈B, g〉 by a finite set of pairs:{〈β1, w1〉, · · · , 〈βn, wn〉}, such
thatβi ∈ B andg(β1) = wi. Now, g(βi) is called the possibilistic degree ofβi. Like in an EE
base, the higher its possibilistic degree, the more certain the sentence.
Given a possibilistic baseΣ = 〈B, g〉, the set of sentences which has at least possibility
degreew is denoted byΣw, i.e.,
Σw = {βi ∈ B | g(βi) ≥ w}
Moreover, we denote byΣ>w the set of sentences with possibility degree greater thanw, i.e.,
Σ>w = {βi ∈ B | g(βi) > w}
Given a possibilistic baseΣ = 〈B, g〉, the necessary degree ofβ (denoted byNΣ(β)) is
defined as follows:
NΣ(β) =







0 if B 6⊢ β
∞ else if ⊢ β
max({w |Σw ⊢ β}) else
(4.18)
Given a possibilistic baseΣ = {〈β1, w1〉, · · · , 〈βn, wn〉} and input information〈α,w〉 (with
w ∈ [0, 1]), the revised possibilistic baseΣ1 = Σ r 〈α,w〉 is obtained as follows:
Σ1 = {〈βi,
wi−w
1−w 〉 |wi > w}
∪ {〈α,w〉}
∪ {〈α ∨ βi, wi + w − w × wi}
(4.19)
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wherew = NΣ(¬α).
To show that possibilistic reinforcement base revision is equivalent to reinfo cement
possibility distribution revision, I define the mapping from a possibilistic baseΣ =
{〈β1, w1〉, · · · , 〈βn, wn〉}, to a possibility distributionπΣ as follows:
πΣ(W ) =
{
1 if W |= {βi, · · · , βn}
1 − max({wi |W 6|= βi}) otherwise
(4.20)
A possibilistic baseΣ and its induced possibility distributionπΣ encode essentially the same
belief state.
Observation 4.27.SupposeΣ is a possibilistic base, andπΣ is the induced possibility distribu-
tion as defined by (4.20). Then for any sentenceβ:
NΣ(β) = NπΣ(β)
Moreover, I can show that reinforcement possibilistic base revision is equivalent to rein-
forcement possibility distribution revision (see Figure 4.6).
Σ Σ r 〈α,w〉
πΣ πΣ(.|r〈α,w〉)
(4.17)
(4.20) (4.20)
(4.19)
Figure 4.6: Equivalence of reinforcement possibilistic base and distribution revision
Theorem 4.28.Let Σ be a possibilistic base and〈α,w〉 be the input information. Then for all
possible worldsW ,
πΣ(W |r〈α,w〉) = πΣ1(W )
whereΣ1 = Σ r 〈α,w〉.
As reinforcement possibility distribution revision has been shown corresponding to rein-
forcement OCF revision, the above equivalence result implies that reinfocement possibilistic
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satisfies Postulates (DP1), (DP2) and (Ind). Since the necessary degree of a sentence wrt. a pos-
sibilistic base is defined symmetrically to the rank of a sentence in an EE base, Algorithm E.1
also can be used to compute necessary degree of a sentence. The algorithm of possibilistic
reinforcement base revision can be found in Appendix E.
Summary
In this chapter, several computational approaches to iterated belief revision are studied. Firstly, I
have discussed the limitations of pure qualitative approaches. Then, I have proposed a so-called
reinforcement base revision based on a compact representation (named, EE base) of quantitative
belief states. With the help of its semantic model (i.e., reinforcement OCF revision), I have
shown that reinforcement base revision satisfies the postulate of independence (Ind) along with
the AGM/DP postulates. Note that, reinforcement base revision is applicable toany decidable
underlying language. Particularly, for propositional logics, I have shown that the computational
complexity of reinforcement base revision is optimal. As a more practical solution to iterated
belief revision, I have presented a so-called possibilistic revision, in whichpossibility degrees
of beliefs are real numbers in the unit interval[0, 1].
Chapter 5
Mutual Belief Revision: Semantics and
Computation
It is an interesting problem how people understand each other through information exchange.
Bypassing the communication and psychology issues, the problem can be described as a pure AI
issue as “how epistemic agents in a multi-agent system revise their beliefs as a result of belief
exchange”. The mainstream study of belief revision has been focused on how a single agent
revises its beliefs to incorporate new information. This research normally assumes that new in-
formation is fully accepted, no matter whether it is represented as a single formula or as a set of
sentences. Obviously such an assumption is not applicable to multi-agent system . There have
been a variety of approaches which have been proposed in the literatureto deal with the problem
of belief revision in multi-agent systems. The approach ofnon-prioritized belief revisionallows
an agent to revise its beliefs by partially accepting new information[Ferḿe and Hansson, 1999;
Hansson, 1999]. This research sheds light on belief change with defeasible information re-
sources but still focuses on the formalization of belief change from a single a ent point of
view. The acceptance or rejection of information resources is purely determin d by the epis-
temic subject rather than decided by all participated agents. The study ofbelie mergingor
knowledge arbitrationdirectly accounts for multi-agent belief change by pursuing a “fair” pro-
cess that are able to incorporate beliefs of agents into coherent group beliefs [Revesz, 1997;
Liberatore and Schaerf, 1998; Konieczny and Pérez, 1998]. These approaches sometimes force
agents to accept some democracy rules, such as majority, social welfare maximization and so
on, but disregard agents’ “personal” view of group consent.
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In this chapter, I propose an approach which takes another point of view to deal with the
problem of multi-agent belief revision. Belief changes in a multi-agent systemproceed with
two stages. In the first stage, all agents sit together to work out a mutually accept ble points of
view (a common understanding of the world) through a sequence of interchanges of respective
views. This process is similar to belief merging. Once such a common understanding has been
reached, in the second stage of belief change, each agent will adjust itsorig nal belief state in
order to form a new view of the world as a result of belief interchange.
To make the exploration simple, I will focus on the belief revision problem in the setting of
two-agent systems, so the mutual belief revision. I will present a semantic model based on OCF
to specify the above mentioned two stages of mutual belief revision. While the OCF model is
conceptually clear and constructively simple, it is not computation-friendly because it requires
to take an exponential input of possible worlds from each agent. In order to have an estimation of
computational complexity, I will present another model of mutual belief revision for EE bases.
I will prove that this model is essentially equivalent to the OCF model.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In next section, I will present an OCF-based semantic
model for mutual belief revision operation, followed by a discussion of its formal properties. In
Section 5.2, I present a computational model for mutual belief revision and some preliminary
results on its computational complexity. Finally I conclude the chapter with a briefdiscussion
of related work.
5.1 OCF Model of Mutual Belief Revision
In this section, I will explain the concept of mutual belief revision and present a semantic model
to specify the concept by using Spohn’s OCF, which has been widely employed in the litera-
ture[Spohn, 1988] and as well in Section 3.4.2.
Recall that with OCF a belief state of an agent is represented as a functionk which maps a
possible world to a natural number, i.e.,k : ΘL → N+. The set of all OCFs is denoted byκ.
OCF representation of belief provides a richer structure than the set repr sentation of beliefs
in the sense that it encodes both a belief set and the plausibility of beliefs. Thi is not only
necessary for modeling iterated belief revision (cf. Section 3.4.2) but also, s we will see, for
modeling mutual belief revision.
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5.1.1 Reaching a Common Understanding
I consider that a mutual belief revision procedure takes two stages. In thefirst stage, two agents
try to reach a common understanding (assuming to be logically consistent) through a sequence
of belief interchange. Once such a common understanding is reached, each agent performs a
belief revision process to adapt its belief state to the information it learnt fromthe other agent.
I will model these two stages separately.
The first stage of mutual belief revision is very similar tobelief merging. To reach a consis-
tent common understanding, several rounds of “belief interchange” might be needed. In each
round, each agent receives more information from the other and get morunderstanding each
other. To represent such a sequence of belief interchange, I will introduce the following con-
cepts.
Given an OCFk and a natural numberi, the set of worlds with ranks smaller than or equal
to i is called asphereof i with radiusi, denoted byk−(i). Formally,
k−(i) = {W | k(W ) ≤ i} (5.1)
In particular,k−(0) is called thecoreof k. The belief set of a belief statek, denoted byBel(k),
is the set of sentences which hold in the core ofk (cf. Section 3.4.2). Therefore, two OCFs
k1, k2 are called epistemically equivalent, denoted byk1 ≡ k2, iff k
−
1 (0) = k
−
2 (0). Two OCFs
k1, k2 are consistent iffk
−
1 (0) ∩ k
−
2 (0) 6= ∅.
Theinconsistency degree, denoted bydinc(k1, k2), of two OCFsk1, k2 measures their extent
of inconsistency:
dinc(k1, k2) = min{n | k
−
1 (n) ∩ k
−
2 (n) 6= ∅} (5.2)
Given two pairs of subsets of possible worlds〈s, t〉 and〈s′, t′〉, we say that〈s′, t′〉 is closer
than〈s, t〉, denoted by〈s, t〉 < 〈s′, t′〉, iff s ⊆ s′, t ⊆ t′ ands ∪ t ⊂ s′ ∪ t′.
Consider two belief statesk1 andk2 from two agents. We start with the cores ofk1 andk2;
if they do not intersect, the next round of belief interchange will continue onthe least radius
r such that〈k−1 (0), k
−
2 (0)〉 < 〈k
−
1 (r), k
−
2 (r)〉 and check the intersection of the corresponding
two spheresk−1 (r) andk
−
2 (r). The process continues until it reaches a radius big enough such
that the corresponding spheres intersect. The procedure can be represented by thesequence of
belief interchange: 〈k−1 (0), k
−
2 (0)〉, . . . ,〈k
−
1 (rn), k
−
2 (rn)〉, where
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1. ri+1 = min{r | 〈k
−
1 (ri), k
−
2 (ri)〉 < 〈k
−
1 (r), k
−
2 (r)〉};
2. rn = min{r | k
−
1 (r) ∩ k
−
2 (r) 6= ∅}.
This sequence clearly shows the procedure of “mutual understanding”: each agents grad-
ually broadens their views (possible worlds) in order to reach a common understanding. Af-
terwards, the belief state of each agent with the common understanding can be represented,
respectively, by belief statesk1 − rn andk2 − rn, where
(k − r)(W ) =
{
0, if k(W ) ≤ r;
k(W ), otherwise.
(5.3)
Therefore, the first stage of mutual belief revision defines a functionγ which takes a pair of
belief states (possibly inconsistent each other) and returns a pair of consistent belief states:
γ(k1, k2) = 〈k1 − rn, k2 − rn〉 (5.4)
wherern = dinc(k1, k2).
5.1.2 Performing a Mutual Revision
As described in the previous section, the first stage of mutual belief revision results a pair of
weakened belief states, which represents the (mutually consistent) remainingbeliefs of the two
agents. In the second stage of mutual belief revision, the weakened beliefstate of one agent will
be sent to the other agent as the new information, and vice verse. Both agent will review the new
information they just received and their original beliefs to form a new view of the world. Such
a process is similar to the normal single agent belief revision operation. The only difference is
that while an agent revises its beliefs, it not only tries to incorporate the information received
form other agent but also takes the other agent’s view of the information intoacc unt. In other
words, the agent views the new information as a belief state rather than a single entence or a
set of beliefs. In order to model such a process, I will define a belief revision operator which
allows to revise an OCF by another OCF.
Recall that I have proposed in Section 3.4.2 so-called reinforcement revision OCF which
can revise an OCF by a new evidence with an evidence degree. Reinforcment OCF revision
has been shown satisfying all AGM/DP postulates, as well as the independence postulate. By
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generalizing it, now I define an operator which allows to revise an OCF by another OCF.
Definition 5.1. Given two OCFsk andλ, the revision ofk by λ, denoted byk ⊗ λ, is defined
as follows:
(k ⊗ λ)(W ) =
{
k(W ) + λ(W ), if λ(W ) > 0;
k(W ) −mk,λ, otherwise.
(5.5)
wheremk,λ is the smallest radius of a sphere ofk which intersects the core ofλ:
mk,λ = min{i | k
−(i) ∩ λ−(0) 6= ∅} (5.6)
The idea behind the operator is the following. For any world the other agentdisbelieves,
the agent will degrade the world according to the other agent’s degree ofdisbeliefs. Contrarily,
for those worlds the other agent believes, the agent will upgrade these worlds according to its
original degree of belief.
We say that an OCFk encodes a sentenceα with evidence degreem > 0 iff for any possible
worldW ,
k(W ) =
{
0, if W |= α;
m, otherwise.
(5.7)
It is easy to see that an OCFk encodesα with plausibility m iff Bel(k) = Cn({α}) and
Rankk(α) = m. It is not difficult to see that the revision operator defined by (5.5) is indeed a
generalization of that defined by (3.4).
Observation 5.2. Let k be an arbitrary OCF andλ be an OCF encodes〈α,m〉. Then for any
possibleW ,
(k∗α,m)(W ) = (k ⊗ λ)(W )
In the second stage of mutual belief revision, each agent revises its beliefstat by mu-
tually accepting the point of views reached in the first stage. The construction is similar to
[Zhanget al., 2004]’s approach. Formally,
Definition 5.3. A functionM : κ × κ → κ × κ is an OCFmutual belief revisionif for any
k1, k2,
M(k1, k2) = 〈k1 ⊗ γ2(k1, k2), k2 ⊗ γ1(k1, k2)〉 (5.8)
whereγ is defined by (5.4).1
1Given a functionf , its i-th projection is denoted byfi.
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The diagrams in Figure 5.1 give an intuitive depiction of how mutual belief revision works.
The left diagram shows a special case wherek1 andk2 are consistent. It is obvious that the first
stage ends in just one round andγ(k1, k2) = 〈k1, k2〉. Therefore,M(k1, k2) = 〈k1 ⊗ k2, k2 ⊗
k1〉, and the core ofM1(k1, k2) (as well asM2(k1, k2)) is identified with the intersection of
k−1 (0) andk
−
2 (0). The right diagram illustrates general situations wherek1 andk2 are inconsis-
tent. In the example displayed, it is assumed that the belief interchange takes pl c only three
rounds andγ(k1, k2) = 〈k1 − r2, k2 − r2〉. ThenM(k1, k2) = 〈k1 ⊗ (k2 − r2), k2 ⊗ (k1 − r2)〉.
The core ofM1(k1, k2) is exactly the intersection ofk
−
2 (r2) and the innermost sphere ofk1.
2
Analogously, the coreM2(k1, k2) is the intersection ofk
−
1 (r2) and the innermost sphere ofk2.
It is easy to observe thatk−1 (r2)∩k
−
2 (rn) contains both cores ofM1(k1, k2) andM2(k1, k2), in
other words, the common understanding is accepted by both agents after mutual belief revision.
k1 andk2 consistent
k−1 (0) k
−
2 (0)
(M1(k1, k2))
−(0)
(M2(k1, k1))
−(0)
k1 andk2 inconsistent
k−1 (0) k
−
2 (0)
(M1(k1, k2))
−(0)
(M2(k1, k2))
−(0)
Figure 5.1: OCF-based mutual belief revision
5.1.3 Formal Properties
To justify the OCF model, I discuss in this section some of its formal properties. The following
result shows that belief states of agents become more consistent after mutual belief revision
unless no agent gives up any of their original beliefs.
Observation 5.4. The OCF mutual belief revision defined by Definition 5.3 satisfies the follow-
ing properties :
1. dinc(M(k1, k2)) ≤ dinc(k1, k2);
2. dinc(M(k1, k2)) = dinc(k1, k2) iff Bel(k1) ⊆ Bel(M1(k1, k2)) and Bel(k2) ⊆
Bel(M2(k1, k2)).
2Observe the analogy to the belief revision model based on SOS[Grove, 1988].
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The simple construction of the OCF model allows us to prove more interesting properties:
Observation 5.5. The OCF mutual belief revision defined by Definition 5.3 satisfies the follow-
ing properties (for eachi ∈ {1, 2}):
(M1) Bel(γ1(k1, k2)) + Bel(γ2(k1, k2)) ⊆ Bel(Mi(k1, k2));
(M2) if k1 andk2 are consistent, thenBel(Mi(k1, k2)) = Bel(k1) + Bel(k2);
(M3) ki andMi(k1, k2) are consistent iffBel(ki) ⊆ Bel(Mi(k1, k2));
(M4) M1(k1, k2) = M1(k1, γ2(k1, k2)),M2(k1, k2) = M2(γ1(k1, k2), k2);
(M5) if Bel(k1) ⊆ Bel(M1(k1, k2)) andBel(k2) ⊆ Bel(M2(k1, k2)),
thenMi(k1, k2) ≡Mi(M(k1, k2)).
(M1) ensures that the common understanding to be accepted by both agents. (M2) captures
the cooperative attitude of agents: if two agents have no disagreement, theneach of them will
accept the beliefs of another agent. Whereas, (M3) captures the self-interest features of agents,
which says if an agent is not going to accept any counter beliefs that contradicts its own, it does
not need to give up any of its beliefs.
(M4) shows that the information an agent gains from mutual belief revision isno more than
what it agrees with. In fact, (M1) and (M4) are two principal propertiesof mutual belief revision:
both agents benefit from mutual belief revision without loss of diversity ofviews. In general, it
is not necessary that two agents’ belief states will merge together, as described by (M5), they
may stuck in a stand-off (fixed-point) if both of them are not willing to make concessions (see
Example 15 of Section 5.2.1 for a concrete example).
5.2 Computational Model
An OCF is a function over possible worlds, the OCF model for mutual belief revision is not
computationally friendly. In this section, I present another construction ofmutual revision oper-
ator to investigate its computational properties. I will show that these two models are essentially
equivalent.
As in Section 4.2, a belief state is represented by an EE base in the computational model of
mutual belief revision.
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Given two EE basesΞ1 = 〈B1, f1〉,Ξ2 = 〈B2, f2〉, we define the inconsistency degree,
written asdinc(Ξ1,Ξ2), of Ξ1 andΞ2 as follows
dinc(Ξ1,Ξ2) =
{
0, if B1 ∪B2 0 ⊥;
max{i |Ξi1 ∪ Ξ
i
2 ⊢ ⊥}. otherwise.
(5.9)
Recall that we can relate an EE baseΞ to an OCFkΞ by the mapping defined by (4.8). It is
not difficult to see that inconsistency degree of EE bases closely resembles that of OCFs.
Observation 5.6. SupposeΞ1,Ξ2 are two EE bases andkΞ1 , kΞ2 are the OCFs induced from
Ξ1 andΞ2, respectively. Then
dinc(kΞ1 , kΞ2) = dinc(Ξ1,Ξ2)
Given two (possibly mutual inconsistent) EE basesΞ1,Ξ2, in order to reach a common
understanding, it is reasonable that both agents gradually give up leastplau ible sentences.
It is obvious that once all sentences with evidence degrees not greaterth ndinc(Ξ1,Ξ2) are
discarded fromΞ1 andΞ2, the two agents will reach a common understand.
Formally,i-cut of an EE baseΞ = 〈B, f〉, denoted byΞ− i, is a new EE base obtained from
Ξ by removing sentences with evidence degrees not greater thani:
Ξ − i = {〈β, f(β)〉 |β ∈ B andf(β) > i}
The above discussion leads to the following definition of functionγ which maps a pair of (pos-
sibly inconsistent each other) EE bases to a pair of mutually consistent ones:
γ(Ξ1,Ξ2) = 〈Ξ1 − r,Ξ2 − r〉 (5.10)
wherer = dinc(Ξ1,Ξ2).
The follows result shows that the functionγ defined by (5.10) is essentially equivalent to
that defined by (5.4).
Observation 5.7. SupposeΞ1,Ξ2 are two EE bases andkΞ1 , kΞ2 are the OCFs induced from
Ξ1 andΞ2, respectively. Then
γ(kΞ1 , kΞ2) = 〈kΞ′1 , kΞ′2〉
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WherekΞ′1 , kΞ′2 are OCFs induced respectively fromγ1(Ξ1,Ξ2) andγ2(Ξ1,Ξ2).
5.2.1 EE base Mutual Revision
Similar to the OCF model, in the second stage of mutual belief revision we need an operat r
which revises an belief base (new, however an EE base) by another belief base.
Here, I present a natural generalization of reinforcement base revision proposed
in Section 4.2. SupposeΞ1 = 〈B1, f1〉 andΞ2 = 〈B2, f2〉 are two EE bases. The result of
Ξ revised byΞ2, denoted byΞ1 ⊗ Ξ2, is defined as:
Ξ1 ⊗ Ξ2 = {〈β, f1(β) − r〉 |β ∈ B1}
∪ Ξ2
∪ {〈β ∨ α, f1(β) + f2(α)〉 |β ∈ B1 andα ∈ B2}
(5.11)
wherer = RankΞ1(¬
∧
B2), assuming
∧
∅ = ⊤.
It is easy to see that ifΞ2 only contains a single sentence, then the above EE base revision
operator coincides with that defined by (4.7). Moreover, the following results show that it is
essentially equivalent to the OCF-based revision operator defined by (5.5).
Theorem 5.8. SupposeΞ1 = 〈B1, f1〉,Ξ2 = 〈B2, f2〉 are two EE bases andkΞ1 , kΞ2 are the
OCFs induced fromΞ1 andΞ2, respectively. Then for any possible worldw:
(kΞ1 ⊗ kΞ2)(W ) = kΞ(W )
WhereΞ = Ξ1 ⊗ Ξ2 andkΞ is the OCF induced fromΞ.
Now we are ready to define a mutual belief revision operator on EE bases.
Definition 5.9. The EE base mutual belief revision operatorM is defined as follows:
M(Ξ1,Ξ2) = 〈Ξ1 ⊗ γ2(Ξ1,Ξ2),Ξ2 ⊗ γ1(Ξ1,Ξ2)〉 (5.12)
whereγ is defined by (5.10).
Let’s see some examples to check how this operator works.
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Example 15. SupposeΞ1 = {〈q, 3〉, 〈p, 2〉} andΞ2 = {〈q, 3〉 〈¬p, 2〉}. It is easy to see that
dinc(Ξ1,Ξ2) = 2 andΞ1−2 = Ξ2−2 = {〈q, 3〉}. According to (5.11), we haveM1(Ξ1,Ξ2) =
Ξ1 ⊗ (Ξ2 − 2) = {〈q, 6〉, 〈p, 2〉} andM2(Ξ1,Ξ2) = Ξ2 ⊗ (Ξ1 − 2) = {〈q, 6〉, 〈¬p, 2〉}, after
removing redundant sentences.
We may notice that the belief set of each agent remains the same but the evidenc degree of
the common belief is increased as a result of the mutual belief revision. Different from belief
merging, the conflicting opinions ofΞ1 andΞ2 on p is not solved. It is not difficult to see that
the inconsistency remains even operatorM is applied repeatedly.
Example 16. SupposeΞ1 = {〈q, 3〉, 〈p, 1〉} andΞ2 = {〈¬p, 3〉, 〈q, 1〉}. In such a case, we have
dinc(Ξ1,Ξ2) = 1, Ξ1 − 1 = {〈q, 3〉} andΞ2 − 1 = {〈¬p, 3〉}. According to (5.11), we have
M1(Ξ1,Ξ2) = {〈q ∨ ¬p, 6〉, 〈¬p, 3〉, 〈q, 2〉} andM2(Ξ1,Ξ2) = {〈q ∨ ¬p, 6〉, 〈q, 4〉, 〈¬p, 3〉}.
In this example, both agents confirm the common beliefsq ∨ ¬p with high degree. Agent 1
is convinced by agent 2 of¬p since agent 2 believes it in high degree and also has a common
understanding with it onq. Agent 2 does not gain any new belief but getsq more confirmed. As
a result of mutual belief revision, two agents reach a consensus.
The following equivalence theorem (as illustrated in Fig. 5.2) is a direct consequence of
Observation 5.7 and Theorem 5.8.
Theorem 5.10.SupposeΞ1,Ξ2 are two EE bases andkΞ1 , kΞ2 are the OCFs induced fromΞ1
andΞ2, respectively. Then
M(kΞ1 , kΞ2) = 〈kΞ′1 , kΞ′2〉
where〈Ξ′1,Ξ
′
2〉 = M(Ξ1,Ξ2) andkΞ′1 , kΞ′2 are the OCFs induced fromΞ
′
1 andΞ
′
2, respectively.
〈Ξ1,Ξ2〉 M(Ξ1,Ξ2)
〈kΞ1 , kΞ2〉 M(kΞ1 , kΞ2)
(5.12)
(5.8)
(4.8) (4.8)
Figure 5.2: Equivalence of EE base and OCF Mutual Belief Revision
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It follows directly from Theorem 4.6 and Theorem 5.10 that the EE base operator shares all
nice logical properties of the OCF-based operator.
Observation 5.11. The EE base mutual belief revision defined by Definition 5.9 satisfies the
following properties :
1. dinc(M(Ξ1,Ξ2)) ≤ dinc(Ξ1,Ξ2);
2. dinc(M(Ξ1,Ξ2)) = dinc(Ξ1,Ξ2) iff Bel(Ξ1) ⊆ Bel(M1(Ξ1,Ξ2)) and Bel(Ξ2) ⊆
Bel(M2(Ξ1,Ξ2)).
Observation 5.12. The EE base mutual belief revision defined by Definition 5.9 satisfies the
following properties (for eachi ∈ {1, 2}):
(M1′) Bel(γ1(Ξ1,Ξ2)) + Bel(γ2(Ξ1,Ξ2)) ⊆ Bel(Mi(Ξ1,Ξ2));
(M2′) if Ξ1 andΞ2 are consistent, thenBel(Mi(Ξ1,Ξ2)) = Bel(Ξ1) + Bel(Ξ2);
(M3′) Ξi andMi(Ξ1,Ξ2) are consistent iffBel(Ξi) ⊆ Bel(Mi(Ξ1,Ξ2));
(M4′) M1(Ξ1,Ξ2) = M1(Ξ1, γ2(Ξ1,Ξ2)),M2(Ξ1,Ξ2) = M2(γ1(Ξ1,Ξ2),Ξ2);
(M5′) if Bel(Ξ1) ⊆ Bel(M1(Ξ1,Ξ2)) andBel(Ξ2) ⊆ Bel(M2(Ξ1,Ξ2)),
thenMi(Ξ1,Ξ2) ≡Mi(M(Ξ1,Ξ2)).
5.2.2 Computational Complexity
In this section, I present the complexity results of two related problems. Firstof all, we are
interested in how hard is it to compute the result ofM(Ξ1,Ξ2), given two arbitrary EE bases
Ξ1,Ξ2. It turns out that the problem isNP-equivalent.
Theorem 5.13. The problem of computingM(Ξ1,Ξ2), for arbitrary EE basesΞ1 and Ξ2, is
NP-equivalent.
The second problem is to decide whether an arbitrary sentenceβ is entailed by both
M1(Ξ1,Ξ2) andM2(Ξ1,Ξ2). It turns out this decision problem inhabits the very low level
of the polynomial hierarchy.
Theorem 5.14. The problem of deciding whether bothM1(Ξ1,Ξ2) andM2(Ξ1,Ξ2) entail β,
for arbitrary EE basesΞ1,Ξ2 and sentenceβ, is ∆
p
2 [O(log n)]-complete.
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5.3 Discussions and Related Work
I have introduced the concept of mutual belief revision. We consider thata process of mu-
tual belief revision takes two stages: in the first stage, two agents get together trying to
reach a common understanding. This stage is quite similar to belief merging[Revesz, 1997;
Liberatore and Schaerf, 1998; Konieczny and Pérez, 1998]. Once such a common understand-
ing has formed, two agents revise their belief states in order to incorporate the common agreed
views into their own belief states. This idea is in the spirit of[Zhanget al., 2004] and also quite
similar to the so-called credulous conciliation operation[Gauwinet al., 2005]. Note that there
is a significant difference between belief merging and our work: the result of belief merging
is simply a coherent set of group beliefs; whereas mutual belief revision isconcerned with the
evolution of individual beliefs of agents. Moreover, unlike belief merging, our approach does
not force agents to loss of diversity of views. For instance, the two agents in Example 15 still
have conflicting views regardingp after mutual belief revision. With belief merging, however
at least one agent has to give up its belief regardingp. In our opinion, diversity of views is very
important, otherwise it does not make too much sense to let agents have individual beliefs. In
such a sense, mutual belief revision is more subtle an information exchange process than belief
merging. To model such a process, I introduce two difference models: anOCF-based model,
which clearly shows the intuition and semantics of the operation, and an EE-based model for
calculation. These models are generalizations of reinforcement OCF revision and base revision,
respectively. Note that it is also not difficult to obtain possibilistic models of mutual belief revi-
sion by generalizing possibilistic models of belief revision of Section 4.3.3 in the same spirit.
In the AI literature, the concept of mutual belief revision has be used fromdifferent per-
spectives.[van der Meyden, 94] names the process of reaching common awareness of knowl-
edge as mutual belief revision based on a Kripkean semantics. Different from this approach,
I do not concern how knowledge or beliefs is formed. Instead, the current approach is con-
cerned with how to maintain consistency of existing beliefs. This also differentiat s the belief
revision approaches from modal logic approaches in knowledge representation and reasoning.
[Zhanget al., 2004] presents a formalism in which negotiation is viewed as a process of mutual
belief revision. In this work, a set of AGM-like postulates are proposed tospecify mutual belief
revision operation. However, no semantic model or computational model is given. In addition,
I do not think we can view negotiation and mutual belief revision as the same concept though
they might share some similar ways in operation. In particular, Zhang et. al., have proposed
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a so-called the postulate ofno recantationfor negotiation which can be reformulated in our
setting as follows:
(M6) Bel(k2) ∩ Bel(M1(k1, k2)) ⊆ Bel(M2(k1, k2))
Bel(k1) ∩ Bel(M2(k1, k2)) ⊆ Bel(M1(k1, k2))
It states that every agent should commit itself to keeping its original demands/offer nce they
have been are accepted by the other side. It is not difficult to see that, in the presence of (M3),
Postulate (M6) implies the following postulate:
(M7) If Bel(k1) 6⊆ Bel(M1(k1, k2)) andBel(k2) 6⊆ Bel(M2(k1, k2)),
thenM1(k1, k2) ≡M2(k1, k2)
Postulate (M7) says that the beliefs of two agents will converge if both of them are willing
to make concessions. This might be a desirable property for negotiation, since the focus of
negotiation is how to reach an mutually beneficial agreement, once such an agreement is formed,
the divergence of beliefs among the agents will become unimportant. However, the divergence
of beliefs is always the focus of mutual belief revision no matter before or afte the process,
and indeed the OCF mutual belief revision does not satisfies Postulate (M7).In such a sense,
negotiation is more similar to belief merging than mutual belief revision.
Summary
In this chapter, I have introduced the concept of mutual belief revision. Aprocess of mutual
belief revision takes two stages; in the first stage, two agents get together trying to reach a
common understanding; in the second stage, two agents revise their belief states in order to
incorporate the common agreed views into their own belief states. In particular, I have presented
both a semantic model and a computational model for a concrete mutual revisionoperator by
generalizing reinforcement OCF revision and reinforcement base revision, respectively. I have
shown several desirable properties of the mutual revision operator, aswell the complexity of the
computational model.
Chapter 6
Belief Update, Revisited
In the previous chapters, we have mainly focused on belief revision. As pointed out
by [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991a] that belief update is more appropriate when the new in-
formation reflects changes of the world; it is therefore very useful form deling actions with
physical effects. In Section 2.3, I have already briefly sketched the basic ideas of belief up-
date, especially, the KM postulates. Now it is time to pay a revisit to belief update from a
perspective of reasoning about actions. Recall that, unlike belief revision, the main idea of
belief update is to change individually possible worlds as little as possible to accommodate
the new information. In particular, the constructive model of the KM postulates is based on
a similarity structure which maps a possible worldW to a SOSSW centered onW ; and the
result of updatingW by a sentenceα is the intersection of[α] with the minimal sphere of
SW that intersects[α] (cf. Figure 2.5). Unlike extra-logical preference information exploited
in belief revision (e.g., an EE or a faithful ranking), a similarity structure is not specific to
a particular belief set. At first glance, this seems an advantage as a single similarity struc-
ture can be used for any belief set; therefore the constructive model does not suffer from the
problem of iteration (cf. the discussion in Section 3.1). However, since a similarity structure
is external to the agent’s beliefs and the new information, the construction esse tially defines
a kind of external operator. Such external operators have been criticized by [Rott, 2003] as
embodying a bad philosophy. Also, several researchers[Herzig, 1996; Dohertyet al., 1998;
Zhang and Foo, 1996] have lately pointed out that the KM postulates are problematic with dis-
junctive updates and domain constraints, which are however considereduseful in reasoning
about actions. In this chapter, I first study systematically the above-mentiond problems of the
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KM postulates. Then, I will present an update operator for possibilistic belief states, which does
not suffer from these problems.
In this chapter, I assume that the underlying languageL is a propositional logic built on a
(possibly infinite) set AT of atoms.1 A literal is either an atom or its negation. The set of all
literals is denoted by LI, that is, LI= AT ∪ {¬p | p ∈ AT}. As usual, a (propositional) interpre-
tation is an assignment from AT to truth values{true, false}. For the sake of succinctness, I
will represent an interpretation by the set of atoms to which it assignstrue. In the obvious way,
an interpretation can be truth functionally extended to be a mapping fromL to {true, false}.
So far, we have considered maximal consistent sets of sentences as possible worlds. Obviously,
there is an one-to-one correspondence between maximal consistent setsof sentences and propo-
sitional interpretations. Therefore, I will simply use interpretations to represent possible worlds.
To avoid confusions, I will useI (possibly indexed) to denote a possible world (an interpreta-
tion). In the sequel, the notions regarding possible worlds (as defined in Section 2.2) will be
reused, except now a possible worldI is said to be a model of a sentenceα iff it mapsα to true.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. I first recall in the nexts ction the well-
knownpossible models approach(PMA), along with an analysis of its problems with disjunc-
tive updates and domain constraints. Then, in Section 6.2 I presentWinslett’s standard seman-
tics (WSS) and its some extensions. I will show that the WSS can appropriately handle both
disjunctive updates and domain constraints. Thereafter, in Section 6.3 I willintroduce an up-
date operator for possibilistic belief states by generalizing the WSS. Finally, Iconclude with
discussions and related work.
6.1 The PMA
Thepossible models approach(PMA, for short) was introduced by[Winslett, 1990] in the con-
text of reasoning about actions. Like Dalal’s operator (cf. Section 4.3.1), the main idea of the
PMA is based on a notion of distance between possible worlds.
Formally, the distance, denoted by∆(I1, I2), between two possible worldsI1, I2 is simply
1Although it is also assumed in Section 4.2.2 that the underlying language is propositional, the approaches pro-
posed in Chapter 4 actually apply to any decidable languages. However, the approaches that will be presented in
this chapter are specific to propositional languages, as their definitions exploit specific features of propositional
languages.
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their symmetrical difference, that is,2
∆(I1, I2) = I1 \ I2 ∪ I2 \ I1
Given a possible worldI and a consistent sentenceα, we denote by∆(I, α) the set of all
possible distances betweenI andα-worlds:
∆(I, α) = {∆(I, I ′) | I ′ ∈ [α]}
The distance can be used to measure the degree of the changes from onepossible world to
another. When a possible worldI is updated by a sentenceα, the set of all successor worlds,
denoted byI ⋄PMA α, consists of allα-worlds whose distance toI is minimal:
I ⋄PMA α = {I
′ ∈ [α] |∆(I, I ′) ∈ min(∆(I, α),⊆)}
By the Winslett identity, the PMA is then formally defined as follows:
K ⋄PMA α =
{
L if [K] = ∅ or [α] = ∅
Th(
⋃
I∈[K] I ⋄PMA α) otherwise
It is well-known that the PMA satisfies all of the original KM postulates.
Observation 6.1. [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991a] The PMA satisfies (K ⋄1)-(K ⋄6), (K ⋄8),
(U6′) and (U7′).3
Note that, in general∆(I, α) is not totally ordered wrt.⊆. Therefore, we can not construct
a SOS centered onI as shown in Figure 2.5. This explains why Postulate (K ⋄7) is not satisfied
by the PMA.
To see how the PMA works, let us consider Example 6 again. Recall that thebelief set
K = Cn({¬b ↔ m}) and the new information isb. Assumingb,m are the only atoms, we
need to consider only four possible worlds, viz,.I1 = {b,m}, I2 = {b}, I3 = {m} andI4 = {}.
Obviously,[K] = {I2, I3} and[b] = {I1, I2}. Since∆(I2, I1) = {m} and∆(I2, I2) = {}, we
haveI2 ⋄PMA b = {I2}. Similarly, since∆(I3, I1) = {b} and∆(I3, I2) = {b,m}, we have
2Notice that Dalal’s notion of distance is cardinality-based.
3These postulates correspond exactly to (U1)-(U8) of[Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991a].
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I3 ⋄PMA b = {I1}. It follows thatK ⋄PMA b = Th({I1, I2}). Therefore, unlike AGM revision
operators, the PMA does not conclude unintuitively that the magazine is notthe table.
6.1.1 Two Criticisms on the PMA
Despite its satisfiability of the original KM postulates, the PMA has been criticizedby sev-
eral researchers as being inadequate mainly for two reasons[Herzig, 1996; Dohertyet al., 1998;
Zhang and Foo, 1996].
Problems with Disjunctive Updates
The following example (originally contributed by Reiter) is often used to show that the PMA
fails to handle disjunctive updates.
Example 17. Suppose we throw a coin onto a chess board. Before this action, the coin isn’t
touching any squares, but when it comes to rest on the chess board, it could be touching just a
white square, it could be touching just a black square, or it could be touching both.
Letw andb represent, respectively, that the coin touches a white square and the coin touches
a black square. Then our initial beliefs can be represented byK = Cn({¬w,¬b}), and the
new information is represented byw ∨ b. It is not difficult to see thatK ⋄PMA (w ∨ b) =
Th({{w}, {b}}). So strangely enough, the PMA excludes the possibility that the coin touches
squares of both colors.
The above example shows that the PMA undesirably interprets “inclusive or” as “exclusive
or”. Unfortunately, Herzig and Rifi have shown that this is not a specific problem of the PMA
but of the KM postulates in general.
Observation 6.2. [Herzig and Rifi, 1998] Suppose⋄ is an update operator that satisfies (K ⋄2),
(K ⋄ 5) and (K⋄ 6). Then⋄ also satisfies the following condition:4
(XOR) If¬β ∈ K ⋄ α and¬α ∈ K ⋄ β thenα⊕ β ∈ K ⋄ (α ∨ β).
We can argue that, leave along Example 17, Condition (XOR) is also not desirable n terms
of expressiveness, as “exclusive or” can be expressed with “inclusive or”, but not vice versa.
4Here,⊕ denotes thexclusive or, that is,α ⊕ β = α ∧ ¬β ∨ ¬α ∧ β
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Therefore, we suggest to drop (K ⋄ 6) as a general property of belief update, as (K ⋄ 2) and
(K ⋄ 5) are quite promising and almost uncontroversial.
Problems with Domain Constraints
Besides the aforementioned problem, the PMA is also often criticized as unableto handle do-
main constraints. Recall that domain constraints are general dependencerelations between com-
ponents of the world. In reasoning about actions, handling domain constraint is one of the
center topics; in particular, the ramification problem is one fundamental probem of reasoning
about actions, which is concerned with handling effects that are indirectlyderived from domain
constraints.
As usual in reasoning about actions, I assume domain constraints of a particular domain are
indefeasible, and can be represented by a finite setDC of sentences. In principle, an update
operator, denoted by⋄DC, is said to take into account domain constraintsDC iff it satisfies the
following condition:
(DC) DC ⊆ K ⋄DC α
To obtain such an update operator⋄DC, [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991a] have proposed to
simply extend a (standard) update operator⋄ as follows:
K ⋄DC α = K ⋄ (α ∧
∧
DC) (6.1)
Unfortunately, the above naive extension does not work with the PMA. Toshow this, let us
consider the following benchmark example of the ramification problem:
Example 18. [Thielscher, 1997] Consider an electric circuit (depicted in Figure 6.1) consists of
a battery, two switches, and a light bulb. Now suppose we toggle the first switch in the particular
state displayed, where both the first switch and the light are off. Then, besides the direct effect
of the first switch becoming on, we also expect that the light turns on.
Let sw1 andsw2 mean respectively that ”switch 1 is on” and ”switch 2 is on”, andlt means
that ”the light is on”. Then the obvious connection between the components ofthe circuit can be
formally described by domain constraintsDC = {li ↔ sw1 ∧ sw2}, and the initial state of the
circuit can be described by belief setK = Cn({¬sw1, sw2,¬lt}). However, it is not difficult
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Figure 6.1: A simple circuit
to see thatK ⋄PMA (sw1 ∧ (li↔ sw1 ∧ sw2)) = Th({{sw1, sw2, lt}, {sw1}}). Therefore, the
PMA also admits{sw1} as a possible successor world, in whichsw2 magically becomes false.
This result of course contradicts our intuition.
Note that the PMA imposes a kind of absolute minimal change policy. The above discus-
sions show that absolute minimal change is not suitable for dealing with disjunctive updates
and domain constraints. Independently, the studies in reasoning about acti ns also suggest that
a solution to the ramification problem requires a suitable weakened version oflaw of persis-
tence[Lifschitz, 1990; Thielscher, 1997]. In next section, I present an update operator, i.e., the
WSS, which is based a weaken version of minimal change policy. I will show that the WSS can
deal with both disjunctive updates and domain constraints in a suitable way. Afterwards, I will
present a new update operator for possibilistic belief states by generalizing the WSS.
6.2 The WSS, and Extensions
The so-calledWinslett’s standard semantics(WSS, for short) is another update operator pro-
posed by[Winslett, 1988a] which has drawn a lot of attention from researchers of reason-
ing about actions[Herzig and Rifi, 1999; Liberatore, 1997]. In this section, I first show the
semantics-based definition of the WSS, then a computational model of the WSS.
6.2.1 Semantic Model
Instead of minimizing changes, the WSS constrains changes of possible worlds to be in some
set of exceptions computed from the new information. More precisely, when a possible worldI
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is updated by a sentenceα, the truth values of all atoms are not allowed to change, except those
occurred inα:
I ⋄WSS α = {I
′ ∈ [α] |∆(I, I ′) ⊆ Atm(α)}
whereAtm(α) denotes the set of all atoms occurring inα.
One problem of the WSS is that it is dependent on the syntax of the new informati n, e.g., it
will obtain different successor worlds when a possible worldI = {h} is updated, respectively,
by two logical equivalent sentencesh∨¬h and⊤, sinceAtm(h∨¬h) = {h} andAtm(⊤) = ∅.5
Obviously, this problem can be easily solved by preprocessing the new information to remove all
redundant atoms. Formally, an atomp is called redundant in a sentenceα iff α[p/⊤] ≡ α[p/⊥],
whereα[p/β] is obtained by substituting all occurrences ofp in α with β. Given a sentenceα,
we denote byAtm↓(α) the set of non-redundant atoms ofα. E.g.,Atm↓(h ∨ ¬h) = ∅, sinceh
is redundant.
Based on above notion,[Herzig, 1996] has suggested a modification of the WSS:6
K ⋄WSS↓ α =
{
L if [K] = ∅ or [α] = ∅
Th(
⋃
I∈[K] I ⋄WSS↓ α) otherwise
where
I ⋄WSS↓ α = {I
′ ∈ [α] |∆(I, I ′) ⊆ Atm↓(α)}
To see that the WSS↓ handles disjunctive updates properly, let us consider Example 17
again. It is not difficult to see that nowK ⋄WSS↓ (w ∨ b) = Th({{w, b}, {w}, {b}}), since
K = Cn(¬w ∧ ¬b) andAtm↓(w ∨ b) = {w, b}. Therefore, the WSS↓ admits the possibility
that the coin touches squares with both colors.
Formally,[Herzig and Rifi, 1999] have shown that the WSS↓ does not satisfy all of the KM
postulates.7
Observation 6.3. [Herzig and Rifi, 1999] TheWSS↓ satisfies (K ⋄1), (K ⋄2), (K ⋄4), (K ⋄5)
5Some researchers believe that the syntax of the new information is relevant. E.g., they think the unpredictable
effect of “toss a coin” should be represented byh ∨ ¬h, whereh stands for “the coin lands with head side up”.
However, in my opinion, it is more suitable to deal with such (unpredictable)actions using a so-called (symmetric)
erasure[Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991a] instead of update, so the agent should erase its beliefs regardingh after
tossing a coin. Note that erasure is to contraction as update is to revision, and I leave a comprehensive study on
erasure as future work.
6It is worth mentioning that the same operator has also been proposed in[Dohertyet al., 1998], where it is named
themodified PMA.
7Note that, since theWSS↓ does not satisfy (K ⋄ 6), Condition of (XOR) of Observation 6.2 does not apply.
6.2. The WSS, and Extensions 113
and (K ⋄ 8), but violates (K ⋄ 3), (K ⋄ 6), (K ⋄ 7), (U6′) and (U7′).
On the other hand, the WSS↓ does capture all intuitively expected successor possible worlds
with minimal distance to the original possible world:
Observation 6.4. [Herzig and Rifi, 1999] LetI be a possible world andα a consistent sentence.
Then,
I ⋄PMA α ⊆ I ⋄WSS↓ α
As illustrated by Example 17, in general the WSS↓ is distinct from the PMA. But I am able
to show that the two coincide when the new information is not disjunctive:
Observation 6.5. Let I be a possible world, andα a consistent conjunction of literals. Then,
I ⋄PMA α = I ⋄WSS↓ α
An Alternative Model
As we have seen that the WSS↓ allows more changes than the PMA in general. It is an interesting
question whether the former is too liberal? At first glance, the WSS↓ indeed appears to be very
liberal, as it allows to change the truth values of all non-redundant atoms ofthe new information
regardless of their positions (meaning that how they occur in the new informati n). To show
that the WSS↓ is in fact not as liberal as it appears, I present in the sequel an alternativ model
of the WSS↓. I will show that the seemingly more promising alternative model is equivalent to
the original definition of the WSS↓. The following notions are needed for the presentation of
the alternative model.
Given a sentenceα, we denote byLit(α) the set of all literals made of non-redundant atoms
of α, that is,
Lit(α) = Atm↓(α) ∪ {¬p | p ∈ Atm↓(α)}
A partial modelof a sentenceα is a maximal consistent subset ofLit(α) that entailsα.
Formally, we denote byPM (α) the set of all partial models ofα:8
PM (α) = {L |L ∈ (Lit(α) ↓ ⊥) andL ⊢ α}
8Note that, according to Definition 2.5,Lit(α) ↓ ⊥ denotes the set of all maximal consistent subsets ofLit(α).
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Note that, each element ofPM (α) corresponds to a model ofα restricted to its non-redundant
atoms, e.g.,PM (w ∨ b) = {{w, b}, {w,¬b}, {¬w, b}}.
The so-calledpartial model assertionis an update operator gives all partial models of the
new information equal treatment. More precisely, when a possible worldI is update by a sen-
tenceα, each partial model ofα will be inserted intoI:
I ⋄PM α =
⋃
L∈PM (α)
Insert(L, I)
whereInsert(L, I) = I \ {p ∈ AT | ¬p ∈ L} ∪ {p ∈ AT | p ∈ L}.9
Obviously,Insert(L, I) is the result of changingI as little as possible to accommodateL.
Moreover, it is also quite reasonable to treat equally all partial models of thenew information.
Therefore, we argue that partial model assertion is a natural and justified update operator.
As a concrete example, let us recall again Example 17. Since[K] = [Cn(¬w ∧ ¬b)] =
{{}}, we haveK ⋄PM w ∨ b = Th({Insert(L, {}) |L ∈ PM (w ∨ b)}). As we have al-
ready seen thatPM (w ∨ b) = {{w, b}, {w,¬b}, {¬w, b}}. From Insert({w, b}, {}} =
{w, b}, Insert({w,¬b}, {}) = {w} and Insert{¬w, b}, {} = {b}, it follows thatK ⋄PM α =
Th({{w, b}, {w}, {b}}). Note that, this result is same as that obtained with the WSS↓.
The following result shows that partial model assertion is equivalent to theWSS↓.
Theorem 6.6. Let I be a possible world. Then for any sentenceα,
I ⋄WSS↓ α = I ⋄PM α
This theorem gives a strong support to the WSS↓. In particular, it indicates that the WSS↓ is
not as liberal as it appears.
Dealing with Domain Constraints
Unfortunately, the WSS↓ still cannot deal with domain constraints properly at least in the
way defined by (6.1). Let us recall Example 18. It is not difficult to see that Atm↓(sw1 ∧
(sw1 ∧ sw2 ↔ lt)) = {sw1, sw2, lt}. Therefore,K ⋄WSS↓ (sw1 ∧ (sw1 ∧ sw2 ↔ lt)) =
9This definition ofInsert is borrowed from[Hegner, 1987].
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{{sw1, sw2, lt}, {sw2}}, whereK = Cn({¬sw1, sw2,¬lt}). This obviously does not give the
expected results.
The problem which is well understood by now in the community of reasoning about actions
is that domain constraints alone are not sufficient to solve the ramification problem as they do
contain causality information.10 Based on this idea, Herzig and Rifi have therefore suggested
to extend the WSS↓ by a so-called dependence function.
Formally, a dependence function, denoted byDep, is a function which maps an atom to a set
of atoms whose truth value depends on it[Thielscher, 1996]. As an atom’s truth value depends
on itself, a minimal requirement for a dependence function is thatp ∈ Dep(p). Note that a
dependence function is part of the domain specification supplements the domain constraints.
Regarding Example 18, in addition toDC = {lt ↔ sw1 ∧ sw2)}, we haveDep(sw1) =
{sw1, lt},Dep(sw2) = {sw2, lt},Dep(lt) = {lt}, sincelt depends both onsw1 andsw2, but
sw1, sw2 are independents of each other.
A dependence functionDep can be extended to general sentences by stipulating:
Dep(α) =
⋃
p∈Atm↓(α)
Dep(p)
[Herzig and Rifi, 1999] have then suggested to extend the WSS↓ as follows:
I ⋄DepWSS↓ α = {I
′ ∈ [α] |∆(I, I ′) ⊆ Dep(α)} (6.2)
Note that the extended WSS↓ is a generalization of WSS↓, in the sense, that the two coincide
whenDep(p) = {p} for all p ∈ AT.
The extended WSS↓ can deal with domain constraints in a very straightforward way:
K ⋄DCWSS↓ α = Th(
⋃
I∈[K]
I ⋄DepWSS↓ α) +
∧
DC
or equivalently,
K ⋄DCWSS↓ α = Th({J ∈ [DC] | J ∈
⋃
I∈[K]
I ⋄DepWSS↓ α})
10Readers are referred to[Thielscher, 1997] for an excellent discussion on why causality information is necessary
for dealing with indirect effects.
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To see how the extended WSS↓ works, let us recall once again Example 18. Since
Dep(sw1) = {sw1, lt}, we now haveK ⋄DCWSS↓ sw1 = Th({{sw1, sw2, lt}}). This shows
that the extended WSS↓ produces the desirable results.
In fact, I am able to show that the extended WSS↓ also works with the another renown
benchmark example of the ramification problem.
Example 19. [Thielscher, 1997] We argument Example 18 by introducing a third switch, plus
a relay (cf. Figure 6.2.1). If the relay is activated (represented byre), it will force the second
switch to jump open. The relay is controlled by the first and third switch together.
Figure 6.2: An extended circuit
Let us investigate the particular state depicted. The expected result of toggling the first
switch,sw1, is that the relay becomes activated, which in turn causes the second switch, s 2,
jumping its position; hence the light bulb stays off.11
Formally, the dependencies among all components of the extended circuit are described by
the following domain constraints and dependence function:
DC = {sw1 ∧ sw2 ↔ lt, sw1 ∧ sw3 ↔ re, re→ ¬sw2}
Dep(sw1) = {sw1, sw2, re, lt}
Dep(sw2) = {sw2, lt}
Dep(sw3) = {sw3, sw2, re, lt}
Dep(re) = {re, sw2, lt}
11It might be however happen that the light turns on for a very short period of time, depending on the time it takes
to activate the relay and to affect the second switch. Nevertheless, the light is definitely off in the final stable state.
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The state displayed can be described by belief setK = Cn{¬sw1, sw2, sw3,¬re,¬lt}. It
is not difficult to see thatK ⋄DCWSS↓ sw1 = Th{{sw1, sw3, re}}. This result is obviously what
we expected.
Dealing with Conditional Effects
So far, the new information is assumed to be represented by a sentence. Inreaso ing about
action, we however often need to deal with actions with conditional effects.Therefore, the
WSS↓ needs to be further extended to deal with conditional update.
Formally, a conditional update is of the formϕ ⇒ α, whereϕ, α are sentences andϕ can
be considered as the precondition ofα. When a possible worldI is updated byϕ ⇒ α: I will
remain unchanged whenI 6|= ϕ; otherwiseI is updated byα:
I ⋄DepWSS↓ (ϕ⇒ α) =
{
I ⋄DepWSS↓ α if I |= ϕ
{I} otherwise
(6.3)
Note that, ifϕ = ⊤ thenI ⋄DepWSS↓ ϕ⇒ α will be same asI ⋄
Dep
WSS↓
α.
Accordingly, the WSS↓ can be extended as follows:
K ⋄DCWSS↓ (ϕ⇒ α) = Th(
⋃
I∈[K]
I ⋄DepWSS↓ (ϕ⇒ α)) +
∧
DC (6.4)
6.2.2 Computational Model
It is clear that the (extended) WSS↓ is not suitable for computation, as it is based on possible
worlds. In a computational setting, the beliefs of an agent should be represented by a belief base,
and an update operator should directly operate on belief bases. In the sequ l, a computational
update operator, which maps a belief base and the new information to an updated belief base, is
denote by⊚ (possibly indexed).
Ideally, a computational update operator is semantically characterized by theWSS↓. An
update operator⊚ is called acomputational modelor syntactical characterizationof the WSS↓
iff it satisfies the following condition:
Cn(B ⊚ α) = Cn(B) ⋄WSS↓ α (6.5)
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Put in words, for any belief baseB and sentenceα, the updated belief baseB ⊚ α is logically
equivalent to the result ofCn(B) updated byα using the WSS↓.
Proposal of Doherty et. al.,
[Dohertyet al., 1998] have proposed a succinct syntactical characterization of the WSS↓, based
on the notion of so-calledeliminant. Formally, given a sentenceα and an atomp, we write∃ p.α
(called aneliminantof p in α) to denote the sentenceα[p/⊤] ∨ α[p/⊥]. If P = {p1, · · · , pn}
is a set of atoms then∃P.α stands for∃ p1 · · · ∃ pn.α, which is called aneliminantof P in α.
Intuitively, an eliminant ofP in α can be viewed as a sentence representing the same knowledge
of α about all atoms from AT\ P and provide no information about atoms inP .
The syntactical characterization of the WSS↓ is then defined as follows
B ⊚DH α = {∃P.β |β ∈ B} ∪ {α} (6.6)
whereP = Atm↓(α).
Note that, there is a natural correspondence between the WSS↓ and the update operator
defined (6.6), in the sense that both of them try to liberate changes of the truval es of non-
redundant atoms of the new information.
Not surprisingly,[Dohertyet al., 1998] therefore were able to show that the latter is indeed
a syntactical characterization of the WSS↓.
Theorem 6.7. [Dohertyet al., 1998] Let ⊚DH be as defined by (6.6). Then for any belief base
B and new informationα:
Cn(B ⊚DH α) = Cn(B) ⋄WSS↓ α
Problems with Space Explosion
One major disadvantage of the approach proposed by Doherty et al., is that the size of the up-
dated belief baseB⋄DHα could be exponentially larger than the size ofB andα; more precisely,
in the worst case we would have|B ⋄DH α| = |B||α|+1 + |α|. An interesting question is that
could we find a more space-economic approach? A bad news is that it is unlikely we can avoid
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super-polynomial space explosion. To show this, we need to introduce theno ion of so-called
non-uniform complexity classes, which is based on advice-taking machines[Johnson, 1990].
Formally, anadvice-taking Turing machineis a Turing machine with an advice oracle, which
can be considered as a functiona from positive integers to strings. On inputx, the machine loads
stringa(|x|) and then continues as usual based on two inputsx anda(|x|). Note that, the oracle
stringa(|x|) only depends on the size of the inputx. We call an advice oraclea polynomial
iff |a(n)| < p(n) for some fixed polynomialp and all positive integersn. If X is a usual
complexity class defined in terms of resource-bounded machines (e.g., P orN ) thenX/poly
is the class of the problem that can be decided on machines with the same resource b nd
augmented by polynomial advice oracles. Any classX/poly is also known as the nun-uniform
X. In particular,P/poly appears to be much more powerful than P. However, it has been
shown very unlikely that NP⊆ P/poly, otherwise the polynomial hierarchy would collapse at
Σp2 [Karp and Lipton, 1980].
The result regarding the connection between NP andP/poly be used to show that it is
unlikely that there exists a computational model of the WSS↓ with polynomially space bound.
Theorem 6.8. Suppose there exist a polynomialp and a computational model⊚ of the WSS↓
such that|B ⊚ α| ≤ p(|B| + |α|) for any belief baseB and sentenceα. ThenNP⊆ P/poly.
The above theorem shows that in general super-polynomial space growth is inevitable for
any computational model of the WSS↓.
In reasoning about actions, it is reasonable to assume that an action will only cha ge a small
part of the world, in other words, the size of new informationα is usually very small compares to
the size of the belief baseB. In particular, we may assume that the size of the new information is
bounded by a constantk. By doing so, the size of an updated belief baseB⋄DHα is theoretically
polynomially bounded by the size ofB. But in practice this is still problematic: suppose the
new information of any action is encoded by a sentence of length4 (t at isk = 4); then after
performing just two actions, we might end up with a new belief base which is approximately25
times larger. Therefore, we need to find a more space-economic update operator for practice.
Proposal of Winslett
To avoid above-mentioned space explosion,[Winslett, 1990] has proposed a computational up-
date operator⊚W which approximates the WSS↓, in the sense, that an updated belief base
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B⊚W α is query equivalent (instead of logical equivalent) to the result ofCn(B) updated byα
using the WSS↓.12
Formally, two sets of sentencesA andB are calledquery equivalentwrt. another set of
sentencesC iff for any sentenceβ ∈ C:
A ⊢ β iff B ⊢ β
Note that,A andB are logically equivalent precisely when they are query equivalent wrt.the
underlying languageL.
The main idea of Winslett’s computational approach is to introduce for each atom p a so-
calledhistory atomp′. Given a set of atomsP and a sentenceα, we denoted byα[P/P ′] the
sentence obtained by substituting every atomp ∈ P in α with its history atomp′.
Then, Winslett’s computational update operator is formally defined as follows:
B ⊚W α = {β[P/P
′] |β ∈ B} ∪ {α} (6.7)
whereP = Atm↓(α).
Example 20. Recall Example 17. Suppose nowB = {¬w ∧ ¬b} andα = w ∨ b. Then
B ⊚W α = {¬w
′ ∧ ¬b′, w ∨ b}, sinceAtm(α) = {b, w}.
It is easy to see that the size of the update belief baseB⊚W α is linear to the size of original
belief baseB and the new informationα.
Obviously, in generalB ⊚W α is not logical equivalent toCn(B) ⋄WSS↓ α, as the former
might contain history atoms. However, it has been shown that the two arequery equivalentwrt.
sentences without history atoms.
Theorem 6.9. [Winslett, 1990; Liberatore, 1997] LetB be a belief base andα be a sentence.
Then for any sentenceβ which does not contain history atoms:
B ⊚W α ⊢ β iff (Cn(B) ⋄WSS↓ α) ⊢ β
For the extended WSS↓ defined by (6.4), Winslett has proposed an extended computational
12However, Winslett has not formally shown that super-polynomial space explosion is inevitable for computational
models of the WSS↓
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update operator:
B ⊚DCW (ϕ⇒ α) = {β[P/P
′] |β ∈ B}
∪ {ϕ[P/P ′] → α} ∪ DC
∪{¬ϕ[P/P ′] → (p↔ p′) | p ∈ P}
(6.8)
whereP = Dep(α).
Also, the extended computational update operator defined by (6.8) has been shown approx-
imating the extended WSS↓.
Theorem 6.10. [Winslett, 1990] Let DC be the domain constraints andDep be a dependence
function. AssumeB is a belief base andϕ ⇒ α is a conditional update. Then for any sentence
β without history atoms:
B ⊚DCW (ϕ⇒ α) ⊢ β iff (Cn(B) ⋄
DC
WSS↓
(ϕ⇒ α)) ⊢ β
6.3 Updating Possibilistic Beliefs
In Section 4.3.3, I have presented operators for revising possibilistic belief stat s, i.e., possibility
distributions and possibilistic bases. Note that, possibilistic belief states are arguably more prac-
tical than any other representations of beliefs (e.g., belief sets and OCFs)in the literature. In this
section, I will present update operators for possibilistic belief states. Likein S ction 4.3.3, I give
both a semantic model for updating possibility distributions,13 and a computational model for
updating possibilistic bases. As we will see that the semantic model is based on the (extended)
WSS↓, whereas the computational model generalizes the proposal of Winslett.
6.3.1 Updating Possibility Distributions
Recall that a possibility distributionπ is a mapping from the set of all possible worldsΘL to the
unit interval[0, 1], such that more plausible worlds are assigned higher weights. In this section,
we are interested in update operators which can deal with domain constraints. Therefore, I will
first show how domain constraints can be seamlessly encoded in a possibility dstribution. Note
13Due to the correspondence between possibilistic distributions and OCFs, thesemantic model can also be applied
to OCFs with a slight modification.
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that domain constraints are assumed indefeasible, possible worlds that violate them are therefore
considered as implausible. In a possibility distribution, such implausible worlds are assigned the
minimal weight0.
Formally, a possibility distributionπ respects (encodes) domain constraintsDC iff for any
possible worldW ∈ ΘL, π(W ) = 0 precisely whenW 6|= DC.
Given a possibility distributionπ that respectsDC, according to (4.15), for any sentenceβ
the following condition holds:
Nπ(β) = 1 iff DC ⊢ β
Put in words, all sentences must have necessary degrees less than1, except logical consequences
of the domain constraints.
Formally, an update operator is a function which maps a possibility distributionπ a d a
conditional updateϕ ⇒ α to an updated possibility distributionπ ⋄ (ϕ ⇒ α). To define such
an update operator, we essentially need to determine the weight of every possible world in the
updated possibility distribution.
Given a possible worldW , we denote bySup(ϕ⇒ α,W ) the set of plausible worlds whose
successor worlds containW , when they are updated byϕ⇒ α :14
Sup(ϕ⇒ α,W ) = {W ′ |W ′ |= DC andW ∈W ′ ⋄DepWSS↓ ϕ⇒ α}
Intuitively, Sup(ϕ⇒ α,W ) is the support ofW being the actual world after update.
It is clear that the weight of a plausible worldW in π ⋄ (ϕ ⇒ α) should be obtained from
the weights of its supporting plausible worlds inπ. For this purpose, we need to consider two
situations:
1. If Sup(ϕ⇒ α,W ) contains more than one supporting plausible worlds, then the strongest
support prevails, that is,(π ⋄ (ϕ⇒ α))(W ) = max{π(W ′) |W ′ ∈ Sup(ϕ⇒ α,W )}.
2. If Sup(ϕ ⇒ α,W ) = ∅, thenW is considered highly implausible. Therefore, we define
(π ⋄ (ϕ⇒ α))(W ) = wN, wherewN is a relatively small weight.15
Based on above discussion, the update operator for possibility distributions is then defined
14Note that, we need only to update plausible worlds.
15Technically, it is required that0 < wN < min{π(W ′) |W ′ |= DC}, in order to distinguishW from those
supported possible worlds and implausible worlds.
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as follows:
(π ⋄ (ϕ⇒ α))(W ) =







0 if W 6|= DC
wN else ifSup(W ) = ∅
max({π(W ′) |W ′ ∈ Sup(W )}) else
(6.9)
whereSup(W ) is a shorthand ofSup(ϕ⇒ α,W ).
Due to its definition, it is clear that an updated possibility distributionπ ⋄ (ϕ ⇒ α) also
respects domain constraintsDC.
Observation 6.11.Supposeπ is a possibility distribution that respectsDC andϕ ⇒ is a con-
ditional update. Then the updated possibility distributionπ ⋄ (ϕ⇒ α) also respectsDC.
To see an concrete example, let us recall Example 18. Suppose now our initial beliefs are
encoded by a possibility distributionπ (as shown in Table 6.1). According to (4.13), we have
Bel(π) = Th({W2}). Note that possible worldsW2,W4,W6 andW7 are weighted0 in π, since
they violate the domain constraint:DC = {sw1 ∧ sw2 ↔ lt}. According to (6.9), they should
also be assigned0 in π ⋄ sw1. Recall thatDep(sw1) = {sw1, lt}. The results of updating every
plausible world bysw1 are represented in the3rd column of Table 6.1 (with implausible worlds
crossed out). It is not difficult to see thatW1 andW3 are not supported by any plausible world.
They are therefore assigned inπ ⋄ sw1 the relatively small weightwN. Moreover, according
to (6.9), (π ⋄ sw1)(W5) = max{π(W1), π(W5)} = 0.5 sinceSup(sw1,W5) = {W1,W5}.
Similarly, we have(π ⋄ sw1)(W8) = max{π(W8), π(W3)} = 1. Finally, we obtain an updated
possibility distributionπ ⋄ sw1 as represented in last column. It is easy to see that this is indeed
a desirable result, sinceBel(π ⋄ sw1) = Th({W8}) according to (4.13).
Possible worlds π W ⋄DepWSS↓ sw1 π ⋄ sw1
W1 = {} 0.5 W5,W6 wN
W2 = {lt} 0 0
W3 = {sw2} 1 W7,W8 wN
W4 = {sw2, lt} 0 0
W5 = {sw1} 0.5 W5,W6 0.5
W6 = {sw1, lt} 0 0
W7 = {sw1, sw2} 0 0
W8 = {sw1, sw2, lt} 0.6 W7,W8 1
Table 6.1: An example of updating possibility distribution.
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6.3.2 Updating Possibilistic Bases
In this section, I present a computational approach to updating possibilistic bases. Recall that
a possibilistic base is a finite set of real number-weighted sentences. Like apossibility distri-
bution, a possibilistic base can also encode domain constraintsDC in a straightforward way.
Formally, we say that a possibilistic baseΣ = {〈β1, w1〉, · · · , 〈βn, wn〉} respects domain con-
straintsDC iff DC ⊆ {β1, · · · , βn} andwi = 1 precisely whenβi ∈ DC.
Given a possibilistic baseΣ that respectsDC, it is not difficult to see that its induced possi-
bility distributionπΣ also respectsDC.
Observation 6.12. SupposeΣ is a possibilistic base that respectsDC. Then the possibility
distributionπΣ induced fromΣ (as defined by (4.20) also respectsDC.
Suppose now we are to update a possibilistic baseΣ byϕ⇒ α, and the updated possibilistic
base is denoted byΣ1 = Σ  (ϕ ⇒ α). Let πΣ be the possibility distribution induced fromΣ
andπ1 = πΣ ⋄ (ϕ⇒ α). Ideally, it should hold that for any sentenceβ:
NΣ1(β) = Nπ1(β)
Unfortunately, the discussion in Section 6.2 suggests that such an update operator will in-
evitable cause super-polynomial space explosion.
Therefore, in the same spirit of Winslett’s computational update operator, Ipresent
here an approximation of the update operator for possibility distributions. Let σ =
{〈β1, w1〉, · · · , 〈βn, wn〉} be a possibilistic base that respectsDC andϕ ⇒ α a conditional
update. The updated possibilistic base, denoted byΣ1 = Σ  (ϕ ⇒ α), is formally defined as
follows:
Σ1 = {〈β, 1〉 |β ∈ DC} ∪ {〈β[P/P
′], 1〉 |β ∈ DC}
∪ {〈βi[P/P
′], wi〉 |wi < 1}
∪ {〈ϕ[P/P ′] → α,wH〉}
∪ {〈¬ϕ[P/P ′] → (p↔ p′), wH〉 | p ∈ P}
(6.10)
whereP = Dep(α).16
16To express that the new information is relatively plausible, I assumewH is real number such thatmax{wi |wi <
1} < wH < 1. Note that values ofwH and wN (which is used in updating possibility distributions) are
not explicitly specified. LetΣ = {〈β1, w1〉, · · · , 〈βn, wn〉} that respectsDC and πΣ the possibility distribu-
tion induced fromΣ. Then for any real numberwH such thatmax{wi |wi} < wH < 1, it is obvious that
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Recall Example 18 again. Now suppose our initial beliefs are encoded by apos-
sibilistic baseΣ = {〈lt ↔ sw1 ∧ sw2, 1〉, 〈¬sw1, 0.5〉, 〈sw2, 0.5〉, 〈¬lt, 0.6〉}. Since
Dep(sw1) = {sw1, lt}, we haveΣ1 = Σ  sw1 = {〈lt ↔ sw1 ∧ sw2, 1〉, 〈lt′ ↔
sw′1 ∧ sw2, 1〉, 〈¬sw
′
1, 0.5〉, 〈sw2, 0.5〉, 〈¬lt
′, 0.3〉, 〈sw1, wH〉}. It is not difficult to see thatΣ
maps exactly to the possibility distributionπ represented in the2nd column of Table 6.1. How-
ever, the updated possibilistic baseΣ1 is not equivalent to the updated possibility distribution
π ⋄ sw1, since the former contains history atoms.
The following result shows that the update operator for possibilistic basesind ed approxi-
mates the update operator for possibility distribution.
Theorem 6.13. SupposeΣ is a possibilistic base that respectsDC and πΣ is the possibility
distribution induced fromΣ as defined by (4.20). Letπ1 = π⋄(ϕ⇒ α) andΣ1 = Σ(ϕ⇒ α).
Then for any sentenceβ that contains no history atom:
NΣ1(β) = Nπ1(β)
One advantage of my update operator is that an updated possibilistic base can b omputed
in polynomial time (cf. Algorithm E.6 in Appendix E), provided so is the dependence func-
tion Dep.
Observation 6.14.Assume the dependence functionDep can be computed in polynomial time.
Then for the update operator defined by (6.10), the problem of computingan updated possibilis-
tic base is inFP.
It is also not difficult to see that the CF problem wrt. the possibilistic base update operator
is coNP-complete.
Observation 6.15.Assume the dependence functionDep can be computed in polynomial time.
Then for the update operator defined by (6.10), the CF problem iscoNP-complete.
It is worthy mentioning that complexities of most well-known update operators have been
shown beyond coNP-compete[Liberatore, 1997; Eiter and Gottlob, 1992].
0 < 1 − wH < min{πΣ(W
′) |W ′ |= DC}. In the sequel, I assumewN = 1 − wH in situations where possi-
bility distribution update and possibilistic base update are related.
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6.4 Discussions and Related Work
I have first shown in detail the problems of the PMA with disjunctive updates and domain
constraints. In reasoning about actions, both disjunctive updates and domain constraints are
however considered very important; in particular, the capability of handlingdomain con-
straints is commonly believed the key to solve the ramification problem[Shanahan, 1999;
Thielscher, 1997; Ginsberg and Smith, 1987]. Then, I have presented another well-known up-
date operator (i.e., the WSS) which is based on a weakened version of minimalchange policy.
By generalizing the WSS, an operator for updating possibility distributions has been proposed,
which can properly handle disjunctive updates and domain constraints.
It is well understood in reasoning about actions that causality information isnecessary
for dealing with indirect effects. The causality information exploited by the current update
operator is encoded by a dependence function. There are also proposals of other forms of
causality information in the literature, e.g., causal relationships[Thielscher, 1997] or causal
rules[McCain and Turner, 1995]; it is an interesting future work to do a comparison of all these
proposals.
As we have seen that the update operator for possibility distributions handles properly do-
main constraints. Now, I show that possibilistic reinforcement revision (cf.Section 4.3.3) also
can deal with domain constraints. Suppose a possibility distribution is to be revised by new
information〈α,w〉. As domain constraintsDC are indefeasible, it is reasonable to assume that
α is consistent withDC andw < 1. Then the revised possibility distribution also respectsDC:
Observation 6.16. Supposeπ is a possibility distribution that respectsDC. Let 〈α,w〉 be the
input information such thatα is consistent withDC andw < 1. Then the revised possibility
distributionπ(.|r〈α,w〉) also respectsDC.
Also, it is worthy mentioning that we can easily obtain an operator for updatingOCFs with
a slight modification of the current proposal. To my knowledge, there is no work on approaches
to updating OCFs in the literature, except[Kudoet al., 1999]. Note that, a major problem of the
update operator proposed by Kudo et. al., is that it suffers from the sameproblems of the PMA,
since it satisfies all of the KM postulates.
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Summary
In this chapter, I have studied approaches of belief update that are suitable for reasoning about
actions. Firstly, I have shown that the classical PMA is problematic with disjunctive updates
and domain constraints. Then, based on the WSS, I have presented a (semantic) possibilistic
distribution update operator, which can handle properly disjunctive updates and domain con-
straints. I have shown that super-polynomial space explosion is inevitablefor computational
models of possibilistic distribution update operator. To avoid this, I have proposed instead an
approximation of the possibilistic distribution update operator.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, I have mainly studied general frameworks and computational approaches of belief
change that can be potentially applied in reasoning about actions. Firstly, the motivations of
integrating belief change into reasoning about actions are described, along with the problems
that need to be solved. Then, the classical work in belief change is recapitulated, including
the distinction between belief revision and belief update, rationality postulates that hould be
satisfied by belief change operators and various constructive models. Also, I have discussed
the relation between belief change and relevant research fields. The results obtained in this
thesis might be also useful for these related fields, in particular, for non-monotonic reasoning.
A detailed investigation on this issue is left as future work.
One of the main contributions of the thesis is a new postulate of independence for it rated
belief revision. I have discussed why iterated belief revision is a difficult problem in principle.
Then, I have formally analyzed the problem of implicit dependence which is intrinsic to be-
lief revision but largely overlooked in the belief change community. Discussion show that the
AGM/DP postulates are too weak, hence recommend the inception of the independenc postu-
late. To provide formal justification, I have also presented an elegant semantic characterization
of the independence postulate. As a result, a new general framework for iterated belief revision
is obtained. A detailed comparison to related work suggests that the new framework is so far
the most satisfactory one in the literature.
I have also studied computational approaches to iterated belief revision. First of all, the
limitations of pure qualitative approaches (in particular, cut base revision)are discussed. Then,
I have proposed a so-called reinforcement base revision based on a cmpa t representation
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of beliefs. To show its intuition and satisfiability of desirable postulates, I havepresented a
semantic model of reinforcement base revision, i.e., reinforcement OCF revision. I have also
given an algorithm of reinforcement base revision which can be implementedstraightforwardly,
provided the underlying language is decidable. For propositional logics,I have shown that the
computational complexity of reinforcement base revision is optimal. It is an interesting topic
of future research to investigate the complexity of belief revision for some suitable decidable
fragments of first order logic (e.g., the guarded predicate logic of[Andrékaet al., 1998]). Note
that reinforcement base revision has a reinforcement effect (meaningthat it accumulates the
evidence degree of the new information) which is arguably a desirable feature for domains with
multi independent information sources. As a more practical solution to iteratedbelief revision, I
have presented a so-called possibilistic revision, in which possibility degrees of beliefs are real
numbers in the unit interval[0, 1].
To study formally the problem of “how agents exchange their beliefs in a rational manner?”,
I have introduced the concept of mutual belief revision. A process of mutual belief revision takes
two stages; in the first stage, two agents get together trying to reach a commonunderstanding; in
the second stage, two agents revise their belief states in order to incorporate the common agreed
views into their own belief states. In particular, I have presented both a semantic model and
a computational model for a concrete mutual revision operator by generalizing reinforcement
OCF revision and reinforcement base revision, respectively. I have shown several desirable
properties of the mutual revision operator, as well the complexity of the computational model.
Note that the work presented here is just the starting point of our research in formal study of
information exchange. The properties listed in this thesis can be consideredas the minimal
requirements for any rational mutual revision operators. It is of our great interest to further
study other desirable properties, and another interesting avenue of further research is to obtain
a set of AGM-style rationality postulates for mutual belief revision.
For reasoning about actions, belief update is very important to model actions with physi-
cal effects. I have shown that the classical KM theory is problematic with disjunctive updates
and domain constraints. Based on the WSS, I have presented a (semantic) poss bilistic distri-
bution update operator, which can handle properly disjunctive updates and domain constraints.
I have shown that super-polynomial space explosion is inevitable for computational models of
possibilistic distribution update operator. To avoid this, I have proposed instead a computational
approximation of the possibilistic distribution update operator. Note that, the curr nt approaches
of belief update are specific to propositional languages, and extending these approaches to more
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expressive languages is an interesting topic of future research.
Note that both types of belief change studied in this thesis have their own expectations on
the reasons of the new information: belief update assumes that the new information reflects
changes of the world, whereas the world is assumed static in belief revision. However, in many
situations, the new information received by the agent might be not labeled withsuch a reason.
There are also examples which require non-elementary interactions between revision and up-
date[Boutilier, 1995; Hunter and Delgrande, 2005]. It is of course interesting future work to
investigate the possibility of extending the current approaches to handle such sit ations.
Appendix A
Proofs of Results of Chapter 3
To prove Theorem 3.2, I first show by Observation A.1 and A.2 that, given a belief stateK, there
is a one-to-one correspondence between a SOS centered[K] and a faithful ranking onK.
Observation A.1. LetK be a belief state. Given a SOSS centered on[K], the binary relation
K onΘL generated fromS via the following condition:
(SSToFR) W1 K W2 iff for all S ∈ S if W2 ∈ S thenW1 ∈ S
is a faithful ranking onK, s.t., for any consistent sentenceα:
minS(α) ∩ [α] = min([α],K)
Proof. First, we show thatK is a total pre-order. It is obvious thatK is reflexive. To see that
K is transitive, assumeW1 K W2 andW2 K W3. We have to showW1 ∈ S for all S ∈ S
such thatW3 ∈ S. SupposeW3 ∈ S. It follows fromW2 K W3 thatW2 ∈ S. Subsequently
fromW1 K W2, it follows thatW1 ∈ S. The connectiveness ofK is shown by contradiction.
Assume there existW1,W2 such that neitherW1 K W2 norW2 K W1. It follows that there
areS1, S2 ∈ S such thatW2 ∈ S1, W1 /∈ S1 andW1 ∈ S2, W2 /∈ Ss. Obviously, then neither
S1 ⊆ S2 norS2 ⊆ S1, which contradicts the fact thatS is a SOS (see Definition 2.15).
We show next thatK satisfies all conditions of Definition 3.1. AssumeW1,W2 |= K.
Since for allS ∈ S, [K] ⊆ S, it follows thatW1 ∈ S for all S ∈ S. It follows immediately
thatW1 K W for all W ∈ ΘL. Similarly, W2 K W for all W ∈ ΘL. Hence, we have
W1 =K W2. SupposeW1 |= K, W2 6|= K. Since[K] ∈ S, it follows from (SSToFR) that
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W2 6K W1. HenceW1 ≺K W2. What remains to show is that there exist a set of minimal
elementsmin([α],K), for any consistent sentenceα. Supposeα is a consistent sentence. Since
there exists a minimal sphereminS(α) intersecting[α], it suffice to show thatminS(α)∩ [α] =
min([α],K):
1. To show by contradiction thatminS(α) ∩ [α] ⊆ min([α],K), assume there exists a
possible worldW such thatW ∈ minS(α)∩ [α] andW /∈ min([α],K). It follows from
W /∈ min([α],K) that there is aW1 ∈ [α] andW 6K W1. According to (SSToFR),
there existsS ∈ S such thatW1 ∈ S andW /∈ S. SinceS ∩ [α] 6= ∅, we have
minS(α) ⊆ S, this contradictsW ∈ minS(α).
2. Similarly, to showmin([α],K) ⊆ minS(α) ∩ [α], we assume there exists a possible
worldW such thatW ∈ min([α],K) andW /∈ minS(α) ∩ [α]. It follows immediately
thatW /∈ minS(α). According to (SSToFR) we haveW 6K W1, for allW1 ∈ minS(α).
SinceminS(α) ∩ [α] 6= ∅, it follows there exists a possibleW1 such thatW 6K W1 and
W1 ∈ [α], this contradictsW ∈ min([α],K).
Observation A.2. LetK be a belief state. Given faithful rankingK onK the family of sets of
possible worldsS constructed fromK via the following condition
(FRToSS)
{ For all W ∈ ΘL, {W ′ ∈ ΘL |W ′ K W} ∈ S
ΘL ∈ S
If [K] = ∅ then∅ ∈ S.
is a SOS centered on[K], s.t., for any consistent sentenceα:
minS(α) ∩ [α] = min([α],K)
Proof. We need to show thatS satisfies all conditions of Definition 2.15. LetS1 andS2 be
two spheres inS. Without loss of generality, we assumeS1 = {W ∈ ΘL |W K W1} and
S2 = {W ∈ ΘL |W K W2}. SinceK is total, we have eitherW1 K W2 orW2 K W1. It
follows that eitherS1 ⊆ S2 or S2 ⊆ S1. If K = ∅, it is obvious that[K] ∈ S and∅ ⊆ S for all
S ∈ S. SupposeK is consistent andW ∈ [K]. It follows from the properties ofK thatW1 
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W iff W1 ∈ [K]. Therefore[K] = {W1 |W1 K W} ∈ S and[K] ⊆ S for all S ∈ S. Hence
S satisfies the second condition. The third condition holds trivially. To show that S satisfies the
fourth condition, for any consistent sentenceα, we considerminS(α) = {W1 |W1 K W},
whereW ∈ min([α],K). It follows immediately thatminS(α) ∩ [α] = min([α],K). What
remains to show is thatminS(α) is indeed the minimal sphere intersects[α]. Suppose there is
a sphereS such thatS ⊂ minS(α) andS ∩ [α] 6= ∅. Without loss of generality, we assume
S = {W1 |W1 K W2}. It follow from S ⊂ minS(α) thatW2 ≺K W . SinceS ∩ [α] 6= ∅,
there must be a possible worldW1 such thatW1 ∈ [α] andW1 K W2, which contradicts
W ∈ min([α],K).
Theorem 3.2. Suppose∗ is an iterated revision operator. Then∗ satisfies (K ∗ 1)-(K ∗ 8) iff
there exists a faithful assignmenth, s.t., for any belief stateK and any sentenceα:
Bel(K ∗ α) =
{
L if ⊢ ¬α
Th(min([α],hK) otherwise
Proof.
⇐ Assume∗ is an iterated revision operator that satisfies (K ∗ 1)-(K ∗ 8). Obviously, for
any belief stateK, we can induce a (local) revision operator forBel(K), which satisfies (K*1)-
(K*8). It follows from Theorem 2.17 that there exists a SOSS centered on[K] such that for
any sentenceα,
Bel(K ∗ α) =
{
L if ⊢ ¬α
Th(minS(α) ∩ [α])) othwise
By Observation A.1, we can generate fromS a faithful rankingK on K such that for any
consistent sentenceα, minS(α) ∩ [α] = min([α],K). Thus for any belief stateK, we can
induce (assign) a faithful rankingK onK such that, for any sentenceα,
Bel(K ∗ α) =
{
L if ⊢ ¬α
Th(min([α],K)) othwise
⇒ Supposeh is a faithful assignment as required. For any belief stateK, by
Observation A.2, we can construct a SOSS centered on[K] fromhK, such that for any consis-
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tent sentenceα, minS(α) ∩ [α] = min([α],hK). It follows from Theorem 2.17, that the local
revision operator (induced from∗) on Bel(K) satisfies (K*1)-(K*8). Thus∗ satisfies (K ∗ 1)-
(K ∗ 8).
Observation 3.5. Suppose∗ is an iterated revision operator that satisfies (K*1)-(K*8). If ∗
satisfies (DP2), then it also satisfies (WDP2).
Proof. Suppose∗ satisfies (DP2) andβ ∈ Bel(K∗¬α). Sinceα ⊢ ¬¬α, it follows from (DP2)
thatK ∗ ¬α ≡ (K ∗ α) ∗ ¬α. Henceβ ∈ Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ ¬α).
Observation 3.6. Suppose∗ is an iterated revision operator that satisfies (K*1)-(K*8). If ∗
satisfies (Ind), then it also satisfies (WInd).
Proof. Suppose∗ satisfies (Ind) andα ∈ Bel(K ∗ ¬β). Assume⊢ β. Thenα ∈ Bel((K ∗ α) ∗
¬β) = L, due to (K*1) and (K*8). Assume0 β. If follows from (K*5) that Bel(K ∗ ¬β) is
consistent. Thus¬α /∈ Bel(K ∗¬β). According to (Ind), we haveα ∈ Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ ¬β).
To prove Theorem 3.7, we need the following Observation A.3’:
Observation A.3. Suppose∗ is an iterated revision operator that satisfies Postulates (K*1)-
(K*8). If β is consistent, thenα ∈ Bel(K ∗ β) precisely when there exists a worldW1 such
thatW1 |= α ∧ β andW1 ≺K W2 for all W2 |= ¬α ∧ β, whereK is a faithful ranking onK
corresponding to∗.
Proof.
⇒ Supposeα ∈ Bel(K ∗ β). Sinceβ is consistent,min([β],K) 6= ∅. AssumeW1 is pos-
sible worlds such thatW1 ∈ min([β],K). It is obviousW1 |= α, sinceα ∈
⋂
min([β],K).
Assume there isW2 such thatW2 |= ¬α ∧ β andW1 6≺K W2. SinceK is total, we have
W2 K W1. HenceW2 ∈ min([β],K), which contradictsα ∈ Bel(K ∗ β).
⇐ Assume there exists aW1 such thatW1 |= α∧β andW1 ≺K W2 for anyW2 |= ¬α∧β.
It follows that for allW ∈ min([β],K),W 6|= ¬α, i.e.,W |= α. Thusα ∈ Bel(K ∗ β).
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Theorem 3.7.SupposeL is a finitary propositional logic. Let∗ be an iterated revision operator
satisfying Postulates (K*1)-(K∗8). Then∗ satisfies Postulate (Ind) iff its corresponding faithful
assignment satisfies the following condition:
(IndR) IfW1 |= α andW2 |= ¬α, thenW1 K W2 impliesW1 ≺K∗α W2.
Proof.
⇐ Assume¬α /∈ Bel(K∗¬β). From Observation A.3, it follows that for any worldW |=
¬β ∧ ¬α, there exists another worldW ′ |= ¬β ∧ α such thatW ′ K W . Hence, sinceK
is total, there must be a worldW1 such thatW1 |= α ∧ ¬β andW1 K W2 for all W2 |=
¬α ∧ ¬β. Condition (IndR) then implies thatW1 ≺K∗α W2 for all W2 |= ¬α ∧ ¬β. Due to
Observation A.3, we have(K∗α)∗¬β ⊢ α.
⇒ AssumeW1 |= α, W2 |= ¬α, andW1 K W2. SinceL is finite, there exists¬β
such that[¬β] = {W1,W2} (i.e., ¬β =
∧
W1 ∨
∧
W2). From Theorem 3.2, it follows that
W1 ∈ [K ∗ ¬β]. Hence¬α /∈ Bel(K ∗ ¬β). Postulate (Ind) impliesα ∈ Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ ¬β).
Due to Postulates (K*2) and (K*5), [(K ∗α) ∗ ¬β] = {W1}. From Theorem 3.2, it follows that
W1 ≺K∗α W2.
Observation 3.8. Suppose∗ is an iterated revision operator that satisfies (K*1)-(K*8). If ∗
satisfies (Ind), then it also satisfies (DP3) and (DP4).
Proof. Assumeα ∈ Bel(K∗β). If ¬α /∈ Bel(K∗β), then (Ind) impliesα ∈ Bel((K∗α) ∗β).
If ¬α ∈ Bel(K ∗ β), thenBel(K ∗ β) is inconsistent. According to (K*5), β is inconsistent.
Henceα ∈ Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ β), due to (K*1) and (K*2). Thus∗ satisfies (DP3).
Assume¬α /∈ Bel(K ∗ β). It follows from (K*2) that β is consistent. (Ind) impliesα ∈
Bel((K∗α)∗β). Assume¬α ∈ Bel((K∗α)∗β). ThenBel((K∗α)∗β) is inconsistent, which
contradicts (K*5). Thus∗ satisfies (DP4).
Theorem 3.10.Let∗ be an iterated revision operator satisfying Postulates (K*1)-(K∗8). Then∗
satisfies Postulates (DP1)-(DP4) if it is induced from a faithful assignment that satisfies the
following conditions:
(DPR1) IfW1,W2 |= α, thenW1 K W2 iff W1 K∗α W2.
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(DPR2) IfW1,W2 6|= α, thenW1 K W2 iff W1 K∗α W2.
(DPR3) IfW1 |= α andW2 6|= α, thenW1 ≺K W2 impliesW1 ≺K∗α W2.
(DPR4) IfW1 |= α andW2 6|= α, thenW1 K W2 impliesW1 K∗α W2.
Proof.
(DPR1)⇒(DP1):
Suppose that (DPR1) holds. Assumeβ ⊢ α. It follows immediately that[β] ⊆ [α]. It follows
from (DPR1),W1 K W2 iff W1 K∗α W2 for all W1,W2 ∈ [β]. Hence,
⋂
min([β],K) =
⋂
min([β],K∗α). According to Theorem 3.2,K ∗ β ≡ (K ∗ α) ∗ β.
(DPR2)⇒(DP2):
Symmetric to the one above.
(DPR3)⇒(DP3):
Suppose that (DPR3) holds. AssumeK ∗ β ⊢ α. If β is inconsistent, then by (K*1) and (K*2)
we have(K∗α)∗β ⊢ α. Assumeβ is consistent. By Observation A.3, there existsW1 |= β∧α
andW1 ≺K W2 for all W2 |= β ∧ ¬α. Therefore, by (DPR3) there existW1 |= β ∧ α and
W1 ≺K∗α W2 for all W2 |= β ∧ ¬α. Apply Observation A.3 in another direction, we obtain
(K ∗ α) ∗ β ⊢ α.
(DPR4)⇒(DP4):
Suppose that (DPR4) holds. In the caseβ is inconsistent, (DP4) holds vacuously, sinceK ∗
β 0 ¬α contradicts with (K*1) and (K*2). AssumeK ∗ β 0 ¬α andβ is consistent. By
Observation A.3, for allW2 |= β ∧ ¬α, there existsW1 |= β ∧ α such thatW1 K W2. It
follows from (DPR4), for allW2 |= β ∧ ¬α, there existsW1 |= β ∧ α such thatW1 K∗α W2.
Apply Observation A.3 in another direction, we obtain(K ∗ α) ∗ β 0 ¬α.
Theorem 3.13. Suppose that an iterated revision operator satisfies Postulates (K*1)-(K*8).
The operator satisfies Postulates (DP1),(DP2) and (Ind) iff the operator and its corresponding
faithful assignment satisfy:
(DPR1⊳) If W1,W2 |= α, thenW1 ⊳K W2 iff W1 
⊳
K∗α W2.
(DPR2⊳) If W1,W2 6|= α, thenW1 ⊳K W2 iff W1 
⊳
K∗α W2.
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(IndR⊳) If W1 |= α andW2 6|= α, thenW1 ⊳K W2 implies eitherW1,W2
are not relevantly ordered wrt.K∗α or W1 ≺⊳K∗α W2.
Proof.
1. (DP1) is equivalent to (DPR1⊳).
(DP1)⇒(DPR1⊳):
Suppose that (DP1) holds. AssumeW1,W2 |= α andW1 ⊳K W2. It follows that there
existsγ such thatW1,W2 |= γ andW1 ∈ min([γ],K). It follows from α ∧ γ ⊢ α
and (DP1) thatmin([α ∧ γ],K) = min([α ∧ γ],K∗α). SinceW1 |= γ andW1 ∈
min([α],K), we haveW1 ∈ min([α ∧ γ],K). HenceW1 ∈ min([α ∧ γ],K∗α). If
follows fromW2 ∈ [α ∧ γ], thatW1 K∗α W2. Together withW1,W2 |= α ∧ γ, and
W1 ∈ min([α ∧ γ],K∗α), we obtainW1 ⊳K∗α W2. Analogously, we also have that
W1 
⊳
K∗α W2 impliesW1 
⊳
K W2.
(DPR1⊳)⇒(DP1):
Suppose that (DPR1⊳) holds. Assumeβ ⊢ α. We want to prove that(K ∗ α) ∗ β ≡
K ∗ β. We do this by showingmin([β],K) = min([β],K∗α). Given anyW1 such that
W1 ∈ min([β],K), we want to showW1 ∈ min([β],K∗α). AssumeW2 ∈ [β]. It is
easy to see thatW1 ⊳K W2. Sinceβ ⊢ α, it follows from (DPR1
⊳) thatW1 ⊳K∗α W2.
ThusW1 ∈ min([β],K∗α). Analogously, we also haveW1 ∈ min([β],K∗α) implies
W1 ∈ min([β],K).
2. (DP2) is equivalent to (DPR2⊳).
Symmetrical to the one above.
3. (Ind) is equivalent to (IndR⊳).
(Ind)⇒(IndR3⊳):
Suppose that (Ind) holds. Consider any two possible worlds such thatW1 |= α and
W2 6|= α. AssumeW1 ⊳K W2 andW1,W2 are relevantly ordered inK∗α, we have to
show thatW1 <⊳K∗α W2, i.e.,W1 
⊳
K∗α W2 andW1 <K∗α W2. SupposeW1 6
⊳
K∗α W2.
SinceW1,W2 are relevantly ordered inK∗α, we haveW2 ⊳K∗α W1. It follows that there
is a sentenceγ′ such thatW1,W2 |= γ′ andW2 ∈ min([γ′],K∗α). SinceW1 ⊳K W2,
there is also a sentenceγ such thatW1,W2 |= γ andW1 ∈ min([γ],K). It is easy to see
thatW1 ∈ min([γ ∧ γ′],K) andW2 ∈ min([γ ∧ γ′],K∗α). SinceW1 |= α, it follows
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thatK ∗ (γ ∧ γ′) 0 ¬α. By (Ind), we have(K ∗ α) ∗ (γ ∧ γ′) ⊢ α. This contradicts
W2 ∈ min([γ ∧ γ
′],K∗α) andW2 |= ¬α. Hence, we can concludeW1 ⊳K∗α W2.
What remain to show is thatW1 ≺K∗α W2. AssumeW1 6≺K∗α W2. SinceK∗α is
total, we haveW2 K∗α W1. FromW1 ⊳K∗α W2, it follows that there is a sentenceγ
′′
such thatW1,W2 |= γ′′ andW1 ∈ min([γ′′],K∗α). By a similar argument to the above
one, we haveK ∗ γ ∧ γ′′ 0 ¬α. By (Ind), it follows that(K ∗ α) ∗ γ ∧ γ′′ ⊢ α. On
the other hand, we haveW1 ∈ min([γ ∧ γ′′],K∗α) andW2 K∗α W1. It follows that
W2 ∈ min([γ ∧ γ
′′],K∗α). SinceW2 |= ¬α, it contradicts(K ∗ α) ∗ γ ∧ γ′′ ⊢ α.
(IndR⊳)⇒(Ind):
Suppose that (IndR⊳) holds. AssumeK ∗ β 0 ¬α, and(K ∗ α) ∗ β 0 α. It follows
from K ∗ β 0 ¬α that there existsW1 ∈ min([β],K) such thatW1 |= α. It follows
from (K ∗ α) ∗ β 0 α that there existsW2 ∈ min([β],K∗α) such thatW2 |= ¬α.
SinceW2 |= β andW1 ∈ min([β],K), we haveW1 ⊳K W2. Similarly, we have
W2 
⊳
K∗α W1. SinceW1 |= α andW2 |= ¬α, this contradicts (IndR
⊳), which says that
W1,W2 are well ordered inK∗α then it must the caseW1 ≺⊳K∗α W2.
Observation 3.14.SupposeL is a finite language. LetK be a faithful ranking on some belief
stateK. Then for anyW1,W2 ∈ ΘL,W1 andW2 are relevantly ordered inK.
Proof. SinceK is total, we have eitherW1 K W2 orW2 K W1. Without loss of generality,
we assumeW1 K W2. SinceL is finite, we can construct a sentenceγ =
∧
W1 ∨
∧
W2, such
that[γ] = {W1,W2}. It is easy to see thatW1 ∈ min([γ]),K). HenceW1 ⊳K W2.
Observation 3.15. Given an OCFk, the binary relation≤k defined by (3.3) satisfies (EE1)–
(EE5).
Proof. Due to the transitivity of≤ onN+, ≤k satisfies (EE1).
Assumeα ⊢ β. By contra-position, we have¬β ⊢ ¬α. Hence, for any possible worldW
if W |= ¬β thenW |= ¬α. According to (3.2), we havek(α) ≤ k(β), i.e.,α ≤k β. Thus≤k
satisfies (EE2).
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Assumek(α) > k(α ∧ β) andk(β) > k(α ∧ β). From (3.2), it follows that there existsW ,
s.t.,k(W ) = k(α ∧ β) andW |= ¬α ∨ ¬β. Sincek(α) > k(α ∧ β), according to (3.2), we
haveW 6|= ¬α, i.e.,W |= α. FromW |= ¬α ∨ ¬β, it follows thatW |= ¬β. It follows from
(3.2), thatk(β) ≤ k(α ∧ β), which contradictsk(β) > k(α ∧ β). Thus,≤k satisfies (EE3).
AssumeBel(k) is consistent. Supposeα /∈ Bel(k). According to (3.1) and (3.2),α /∈
Bel(k) iff there existsW , s.t.,k(W ) = 0 andW |= ¬α, i.e.,k(α) = 0. Therefore, we have
α /∈ Bel(k) iff k(α) ≤ k(β), for anyβ. Thus,≤k satisfies (EE4).
Assume0 α. According to (3.2),k(⊤) > k(α). Hence, by contra-position,≤k satisfies
(EE5).
Observation 3.16.Letk be an OCF andα a sentence, then for anym1,m2 ∈ N+,
Bel(kr,∗α,m1) = Bel(k
r,∗
α,m2
)
Proof. According to (3.4),kr,∗α,m(W ) = 0 iff W |= α andk(W ) = k(¬α), which means the
value ofm does not affect the set of worlds with rank0 in the revised OCF. From (3.1), it follows
immediately thatBel(kr,∗α,m1) = Bel(k
r,∗
α,m2).
Theorem 3.17.Assume an arbitrary but fixed evidence degree for any new information.Then
reinforcement OCF revision satisfies all AGM postulates (K*1)-(K*8) as well as (DP1), (DP2)
and (Ind).
Proof. Obviously, each OCFk can induce a faithful rankingk onk by letting :
W1 k W1 iff k(W1) ≤ k(W2)
According to (3.4),k∗α,m(W ) = 0 iff W |= α andk(W ) = k(¬α). From (3.2), it is easy
to see thatk∗α,m(W ) = 0 iff W ∈ min([α],k). As a direct consequence of Theorem 3.2, re-
inforcement OCF revision satisfies Postulates (K*1)–(K*8). Assumem is an arbitrary positive
integer. From (3.4), it it not difficult to see that the following conditions aresatisfied:
• If W1,W2 |= α, thenW1 k W2 iff W1 Kr,∗α,m W2
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• If W1,W2 6|= α, thenW1 k W2 iff W1 Kr,∗α,m W2
• If W1 |= α andW2 6|= α, thenW1 k W2 impliesW1 ≺Kr,∗α,m W2
As a direct consequence of Theorem 3.10 and 3.11, reinforcement OCF revision satisfies (DP1),
(DP2) and (Ind).
Observation 3.18. Let k be an OCF and〈α,m〉 be any new information. Then for any non-
tautological sentenceβ,
kr,∗α,m(β) =







k(β) +m if ⊢ α→ β
k(α→ β) − k(¬α) else if k(α→ β) = k(β)
min(k(α→ β) − k(¬α), k(β) +m) else
Proof. Assume⊢ α → β. From 0 β and (3.2), it follows that there existsW1 |= ¬β, s.t.,
k(W1) = k(β) andk(W ) ≥ k(W1) for anyW |= ¬β. Since⊢ α → β, we haveW1 |= ¬α.
According to (3.4),kr,∗α,m(W1) = k(W1)+m. Similarly, for anyW |= ¬β we havek
r,∗
α,m(W ) =
k(W ) +m. Again according to (3.2) we havekr,∗α,m(β) = k(β) +m.
Assume0 α → β andk(α → β) = k(β). From0 α → β and (3.2), it follows that there
existsW1 |= α ∧ ¬β, s.t.,k(W1) = k(α → β). According to (3.4),k
r,∗
α,m(W1) = k(W1) −
k(¬α). Sincek(α→ β) = k(β), according to (3.2) we havek(W ) ≥ k(W1) for anyW |= ¬β.
It follows from (3.4) that for anyW |= ¬β, kr,∗α,m(W ) is eitherk(W ) − k(¬α) or k(W ) +m.
Therefore, according to (3.2) we havekr,∗α,m(β) = k(β) − k(¬α) = k(α→ β) − k(¬α).
Assume0 α → β andk(α → β) 6= k(β). It is not difficult to see, according to (3.2),
that this is possible only ifk(α → β) > k(β). From0 α → β and (3.2), it follows that there
existsW1 |= α ∧ ¬β, s.t.,k(W1) = k(α → β) andk(W ) ≥ k(W1) for anyW |= α ∧ ¬β.
Analogously, there existsW2 |= ¬β, s.t.,k(W2) = k(β) andk(W ) ≥ k(W2) for anyW |= ¬β.
We consider two cases:
1. Assumek(α → β) − k(¬α) ≤ k(β) + m. According to (3.4),kr,∗α,m(W1) = k(W1) −
k(¬α). For anyW |= ¬β, according to (3.4), ifW |= α, thenkr,∗α,m(W ) = k(W ) −
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k(¬α) ≥ k(W1)−k(¬α); otherwisek
r,∗
α,m(W ) = k(W )+m ≥ k(W2)+m ≥ k(W1)−
k(¬α). From (3.2), it follows thatkr,∗α,m(β) = k(α→ β) − k(¬α).
2. Assumek(α→ β)−k(¬α) > k(β)+m. Sincek(α→ β) > k(β), according to (3.2), we
haveW2 |= ¬α. From (3.4), it follows thatk
r,∗
α,m(W2) = k(W2) +m. For anyW |= ¬β,
according to (3.4), ifW |= α, thenkr,∗α,m(W ) = k(W ) − k(¬α) ≥ k(W1) − k(¬α) >
k(W2) + m; otherwisek
r,∗
α,m(W ) = k(W ) + m ≥ k(W2) + m. From (3.2), it follows
thatkr,∗α,m(β) = k(β) +m. Therefore,k
r,∗
α,m(β) = min(k(α→ β) − k(¬α), k(β) +m).
Observation 3.19. Let k be an arbitrary OCF andα a new non-tautological sentence with
evidence degreem ∈ N+. Then
kr,∗α,m(α) = k(α) +m
Proof. A direct consequence of Observation 3.18.
Theorem 3.20.For arbitrarym1,m2 ∈ N+, reinforcement OCF revision satisfies the following
conditions:
(EDP1) Ifβ ⊢ α, then(kr,∗α,m1)
r,∗
β,m2
≡ kr,∗β,m2 .
(EDP2) Ifβ ⊢ ¬α, then(kr,∗α,m1)
r,∗
β,m2
≡ kr,∗β,m2 .
(EInd) If there existsm such thatkr,∗¬β,m 0 ¬α, then(k
r,∗
α,m1)
r,∗
¬β,m2
⊢ α.
Proof. If ⊢ ¬β, Condition (EDP1) holds trivially. Assume thatβ ⊢ α and0 ¬β. By (3.4),
kr,∗β,m2(W ) = 0 iff W |= β andk(W ) = k(¬β) (A.1)
Likewise,
(kr,∗α,m1)
r,∗
β,m2
(W ) = 0 iff W |= β andkr,∗α,m1(W ) = k
r,∗
α,m1(¬β) (A.2)
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Sinceβ ⊢ α, for anyW |= β we havekr,∗α,m1(W ) = k(W )− k(¬α) by (3.4). Sinceα→ ¬β ≡
¬β and0 ¬β, it follows from Observation 3.18 thatkr,∗α,m1(¬β) = k(¬β) − k(¬α). Hence,
(A.2) is equivalent to
(kr,∗α,m1)
r,∗
β,m2
(W ) = 0 iff W |= β andk(W ) = k(¬β)
This and (A.1) implies(kr,∗α,m1)
r,∗
β,m2
≡ kr,∗β,m2 . Condition (EDP2) can be proved analogously.
We prove Condition (EInd) by contradiction. To begin with, from the assumption that
kr,∗¬β,m 0 ¬α it follows that 0 β and 0 α → β. Furthermore, there existsW such that
kr,∗¬β,m(W ) = 0, W |= ¬β ∧ α, andk(W ) = k(β). With the help of (3.2), this implies
k(β) = k(α→ β).
Now assume that(kr,∗α,m1)
r,∗
¬β,m2
0 α. It follows that there existsW ′ such that
(kr,∗α,m1)
r,∗
¬β,m2
(W ′) = 0, W ′ |= ¬β ∧ ¬α, andkr,∗α,m1(W
′) = kr,∗α,m1(β). Sincek(W ) = k(β)
andW ′ |= ¬β, we havek(W ′) ≥ k(W ). Hence by (3.4),kr,∗α,m1(W
′) = k(W ′) +m1 > k(β).
But from Observation 3.18 it follows thatkr,∗α,m1(β) ≤ k(β), since0 β and0 α → β. This
contradictskr,∗α,m1(W
′) = kr,∗α,m1(β).
Observation 3.21. The amnesic revision∗a satisfies (DP1), (DP3) and (DP4), but violates
(DP2).
Proof. Note, in the case of the amnesic revision∗a a belief state is identified with its proposi-
tional beliefs.
Assume⊢ ¬β. According to (3.5), we have(K ∗a α) ∗a β = β andK ∗a β = β. Hence,
∗a satisfies (DP1), (DP2) and (DP3). Moreover, (DP4) is vacuously satisfied. In the rest of the
proof, we consider the case0 ¬β.
Assumeβ ⊢ α. We consider two cases:1) AssumeK 0 ¬α. It follows fromβ ⊢ α, that we
haveK∧α 0 ¬β. According to (3.5), ifK 0 ¬β then(K∗aα)∗aβ = (K∧α)∗aβ = K∧α∧β
andK ∗a β = K ∧β; otherwise(K ∗aα)∗a β = (K ∧α)∗a β = β andK ∗a β = β. 2) Assume
K ⊢ ¬α. Fromβ ⊢ α, if follows thatK ⊢ ¬β. Since0 ¬β andβ ⊢ α, we haveα 0 ¬β.
According to (3.5),(K ∗a α) ∗a β = α ∗a β = α ∧ β andK ∗a β = β. Therefore∗a satisfies
(DP1).
AssumeK ∗a β ⊢ α. We consider two cases:1) AssumeK 0 ¬β. According to (3.5),
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K ∗a β = K ∧ β. It follows from K ∧ β ⊢ α andK 0 ¬β, that we haveK ∧ α 0 ¬β.
According to (3.5),(K ∗a α) ∗a β is eitherK ∧α∧β orα∧β. 2) AssumeK ⊢ ¬β. According
to (3.5),K ∗a β = β. FromK ∗a β ⊢ α, it follows thatβ ⊢ α. Since∗a satisfies (*1), we have
(K ∗a α) ∗a β ⊢ α, Therefore∗a satisfies (DP3).
AssumeK ∗a β 0 ¬α. Obviously, we have0 ¬α. Consider two cases:1) AssumeK 0 ¬β.
According to (3.5),K ∗a β = K ∧ β. FromK ∧ β 0 ¬α andK 0 ¬β, it follows K ∧ α 0 β.
According to (3.5),(K ∗aα)∗aβ=K∧α∧β. From0 ¬α, it followsK∧α∧β 0 ¬α. 2) Assume
K ⊢ ¬β. According to (3.5),K ∗a β = β. Since∗a satisfies (*1), we have(K ∗a α) ∗a β ⊢ β.
From0 ¬β andβ 0 ¬α, it follows (K ∗a α) ∗a β 0 ¬α. Therefore∗a satisfies (DP4).
The following counterexample shows that∗a violates (DP2). Letα, β andK be, respec-
tively, p, ¬p andCn(p∨ q) (p, q are propositional atoms). Obviously,β ⊢ ¬α holds. According
to (3.5),(K ∗a α) ∗a β = Cn(¬q) andK ∗a β = Cn((p ∨ q) ∧ ¬q). Therefore∗a violates
(DP2).
Appendix B
Proofs of Results of Chapter 4
Observation 4.5.SupposeΞ = 〈B, f〉 is an EE base andkΞ is the OCF induced fromΞ. Let
W1,W2 be arbitrary two possible worlds. ThenW1,W2 are relevantly ordered.
Proof. Let kΞ(W1) = i andkΞ(W2) = j. According to (4.8), there exists two sentencesβi, βj
such thatW1 |= ¬βi,Wj |= ¬βj , f(βi) = i andf(βj) = j. Without loss of generality, we
assumei ≤ j. We want to show that there there exists a sentenceγ such thatW1,W2 |= γ
andW1 ∈ min([γ],kΞ). If i = 0, then letγ = ⊤. It is obviousW1,W2 |= γ andW1 ∈
min([γ],kΞ). If i > 0, then letγ = ¬βi ∨¬βj . It is obvious thatW1,W2 |= γ. Suppose there
exists a possible worldW such thatkΞ(W ) < kΞ(W1) andW |= γ. According to (4.8), we
haveW |= βi ∧ βj , which contradictsW |= γ.
Observation 4.6.SupposeΞ = 〈B, f〉 is an EE base, andkΞ is the induced OCF as defined by
(4.8). Then for any sentenceβ:
RankΞ(β) = kΞ(β)
Proof. Assume⊢ β. ThenRankΞ(β) = kΞ(β) = ∞.
Assume0 β andRankΞ(β) = i. It follows from (4.4) thatΞi+1 0 β andΞi ⊢ β. LetW be
a possible world such thatW |= Ξi+1∪{¬β}. FromΞi ⊢ β, it follows thatW 0 Ξi. Therefore,
there is a sentenceβi ∈ Ξ|i such thatW 6|= βi. It follows from (4.8) thatkΞ(W ) = i. LetW1
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be any possible world such thatkΞ(W1) < kΞ(W ). It follows from (4.8) thatW1 ⊢ Ξi; hence
W1 ⊢ β. According to (3.2), we havekΞ(β) = i.
Observation 4.7.SupposeΞ is an EE base andkΞ is the OCF induced fromΞ. Let 〈α,m〉 be
any new information. Then for any possible worldW :
kΞ1(W ) = kΞ
r,∗
α,m(W )
whereΞ1 = Ξ r 〈α,m〉.
Proof. AssumekΞ(W ) = i. By (4.8), we haveW |= Ξi+1 and there exists a sentenceβi ∈ Ξ|i
such thatW |= ¬βi.
If W |= ¬α, then (3.4) implies thatkΞ
r,∗
α,m(W ) = i+m. It follows from (4.7) thatΞ
i+m+1
1 =
Ξi+m+1 ∪ {β ∨ α |β ∈ Ξi+1} andα ∨ βi ∈ Ξ1|i+m. Obviously, we haveW |= Ξ
i+m+1
1 and
W 6|= α ∨ βi. Hence, according to (4.8),kΞ1(W ) = i+m.
If W |= α, then (3.4) implies thatkΞ
r,∗
α,m(W ) = i − kΞ(¬α). AssumeRankΞ(¬α) = r. It
follows from (4.7) thatΞi−r+11 ⊆ Ξ
i+1 ∪ {β ∨ α |β ∈ B} ∪ {α} andβi ∈ Ξ1|i−r. It is obvious
thatW |= Ξi−r+11 . It follows from (4.8) thatkΞ1(W ) = i− r = i− RankΞ(¬α). According to
Observation 4.6, we obtain thatkΞ1(W ) = i− kΞ(¬α).
Theorem 4.8.SupposeΞ is an EE base andkΞ is the OCF induced fromΞ. Let 〈α,m〉 be any
new information. The for any sentenceβ:
RankΞ1(β) = kΞ
r,∗
α,m(β)
whereΞ1 = Ξ r 〈α,m〉.
Proof. A direct consequence of Observation 4.6 and Observation 4.7.
Theorem 4.13.Let Ξ1, Ξ2 be two epistemically equivalent EE bases, then for any sentenceα
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and evidence degreesm1,m2 ∈ N+:
Bel(Ξ′1) = Bel(Ξ
′
2)
whereΞ′1 = Ξ1 r 〈α,m1〉 andΞ
′
2 = Ξ2 r 〈α,m2〉.
Proof. Supposeβ ∈ Bel(Ξ′1). It follows thatRankΞ′1(β) > 0. According to Observation 4.10,
then it must be the case that either⊢ α→ β or RankΞ1(α→ β) > RankΞ1(¬α).
If ⊢ α→ β, then according to Observation 4.10, we haveRankΞ′2(β) = RankΞ2(β)+m2 >
0.
If RankΞ1(α → β) > RankΞ1(¬α) then alsoRankΞ2(α → β) > RankΞ2(¬α), sinceΞ2
is epistemically equivalent toΞ1. Again, it follows from Observation 4.10 thatRankΞ′2(β) >
RankΞ1(α→ β) − RankΞ1(¬α) > 0.
The above discussion shows thatBel(Ξ′1) ⊆ Bel(Ξ
′
2). Symmetrically, we also can show
thatBel(Ξ′2) ⊆ Bel(Ξ
′
1).
Theorem 4.14.LetΞ1,Ξ2 be two equivalent EE bases and〈α,m〉 any new information. Then
Ξ1 r 〈α,m〉 ∼= Ξ2 r 〈α,m〉
Proof. A direct consequence of Observation 4.10.
Theorem 4.17.For reinforcement base revision, the problem of CF is∆p2 [O(log n)]-complete.
Proof. We first show that the problem is in∆p2 [O(log n)]. It is easy to see that to compute a
revised EE baseΞ1 = Ξr 〈α,m〉, we mainly need to calculateRankΞ(¬α) (cf. Algorithm E.2
in Appendix). Apparently, Algorithm E.1 shows thatRankΞ(¬α) can be computed with at most
logarithmic many times of NP-oracle calls. Once computed the revised EE baseΞ1, we just
need one additional NP-oracle to decide whetherΞ1 entailsβ. Therefore, the problem is in
∆p2 [O(log n)].
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To show that the problem is∆p2 [O(log n)]-hard, we give a polynomial (many-to-one) reduc-
tion from the problem of CF for cut base revision to it. Given any prioritizedbase〈B,≤B〉,
we can construct a EE baseΞ = 〈B, f〉 by assigning evidence degree1 to all sentences in
the lowest class and evidence degree2 to all sentences in the next higher class, and so on. It
is easy to see that for any sentencesα andβ: 〈B,≤B〉 cut α ⊢ β iff Ξ1 entailsβ where
Ξ1 = Ξ r 〈α, 1〉. From Theorem 4.16, it follows that the problem of CF for reinforcement
base revision is∆p2 [O(log n)]-hard
Theorem 4.18.For reinforcement base revision, the problem of computing a revised belief state
is NP-equivalent.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4.17 already shows that the problem is NP-easy.It i not difficult
to see that for any sentenceα: α is satisfiable iffα ∈ {〈α, 1〉}r 〈⊤, 1〉. Therefore, the problem
is also NP-hard.
Theorem 4.22. Let k be an OCF and〈α,m〉 be any new information. Then for any possible
worldsW ,
kc,∗α,m(W ) =
{
kr,∗
α,m−k(α)(W ) if k(α) < m
((kr,∗¬α,m′)
r,∗
α,m)(W ) otherwise
wherem′ ∈ N+ is an arbitrary positive integer.
Proof.
Assume k(α) < m, it follows directly from (4.11) and (3.4) thatkc,∗α,m(W ) =
kr,∗
α,m−k(α)(W ).
Assumek(α) ≥ m. SupposeW |= α. According to (4.11),kc,∗α,m(W ) = k(W ) − k(¬α),
whereas (3.4) implies that((kr,∗¬α,m′)
r,∗
α,m)(W ) = k
r,∗
¬α,m′(W ) − k
r,∗
¬α,m′(¬α). Again, (3.4) im-
plies thatkr,∗〈¬α,m′〉(W ) = k(W ) + m
′. From Observation 3.19, it follows thatkr,∗¬α,m′(¬α) =
k(¬α) + m′. Therefore,((kr,∗¬α,m′)
r,∗
α,m)(W ) = k(W ) − k(¬α). Thus,((k
r,∗
¬α,m′)
r,∗
α,m)(W ) =
kc,∗〈α,m〉(W ). SupposeW 6|= α. It follows from (4.11) thatk
c,∗
α,m(W ) = k(W ) − k(α) + m,
whereas (3.4) implies that((kr,∗¬α,m′)
r,∗
α,m)(W ) = k
r,∗
¬α,m′(W ) + m. According to (3.4),
kr,∗¬α,m′(W ) = k(W ) − k(α). Therefore,((k
r,∗
¬α,m′)
r,∗
α,m)(W ) = k(W ) − k(α) + m. Thus,
((kr,∗¬α,m′)
r,∗
α,m)(W ) = k
c,∗
〈α,m〉(W ).
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Theorem 4.23.For conditionalization, the problem of CF is∆p2 [O(log n)]-complete.
Proof. It suffice to show thatΞ r α ≡ Ξ c α for any EE baseΞ and new information〈α,m〉.
If B 0 α, this holds trivially. AssumeB ⊢ α. ThenΞ r α ≡ Ξ ≡ Ξ c α, since both
conditionalization and reinforcement base revision satisfy the AGM postulates.
Theorem 4.24.For adjustment, the problem of CF is∆p2 [O(log n)]-complete.
Proof. It suffice to show thatΞ r α ≡ Ξ j α for any EE baseΞ and new information〈α,m〉.
AssumeB ⊢ α. ThenΞ r α ≡ Ξ ≡ Ξ j α, since both adjustment and reinforcement base
revision satisfy the AGM postulates. AssumeB 0 α. It is easy to see that the only difference
betweenΞr α andΞj α is that the former contains some more sentences of the formα∨βi.
Since both of them containα, thereforeΞ r α ≡ Ξ ≡ Ξ j α.
To prove Theorem 4.26, we need the following observation.
Observation B.1. Let k be an OCF, andP(k) the possibility distribution as defined by (4.16).
Then for any sentenceα,
Ππk(α) = e
−k(¬α)
Proof. Recall thatΠπ(α) is defined asmax({π(W ) |W |= α}). LetW1 be a possible world
such thatπk(W1) = Ππk(α) = max({πk(W ) |W |= α}). Sincef(x) = e
−x is monotonically
decreasing, we havek(W1) = min({k(W ) |W |= α}). It follows from (3.2) thatk(W1) =
k(¬α). ThusΠπk(α) = e
−k(¬α).
Theorem 4.26. Supposek is an OCF, and〈α,m〉 (with m ∈ N+) is input information. Let
k∗〈α,m〉 be the revised OCF using reinforcement OCF revision. Then for any possible worldW ,
πk∗
〈α,m〉
(W ) = πk(W |r〈α, 1 − e
−m〉)
Proof. AssumeW |= α. According to (4.16), πk∗
〈α,m〉
(W ) = e−k
∗
α,m(W ). It follows from (3.4)
thate−k
∗
α,m(W ) = e−(k(w)−k(¬α)). On the other hand, (4.17) impliesπk(W |r〈α, 1 − e−m〉) =
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πk(W )
Ππk (α)
. It follows from (4.16) and Observation B.1 thatπk(W |r〈α, 1−e−m〉) = e
−k(w)
e−k(¬α)
. Hence
πk∗
〈α,m〉
(W ) = πk(W |r〈α, 1 − e
−m〉).
AssumeW 6|= α. Similarly, according to (4.16) and (3.4),πk∗
〈α,m〉
(W ) = e−(k(W )+m). It
follows from (4.17) thatπk(W |r〈α, 1−e−m〉) = πk(W )×e−m. (4.16) impliesπk(W |r〈α, 1−
e−m〉) = e−k(W ) × e−m. Henceπk∗
〈α,m〉
(W ) = πk(W |r〈α, 1 − e
−m〉).
Observation 4.27.SupposeΣ is a possibilistic base, andπΣ is the induced possibility distribu-
tion as defined by (4.20). Then for any sentenceβ:
NΣ(β) = NπΣ(β)
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Observation 4.6.
Theorem 4.28.Let Σ be a possibilistic base and〈α,w〉 be the input information. Then for all
possible worldsW ,
πΣ(W |r〈α,w〉) = πΣ1(W )
whereΣ1 = Σ r 〈α,w〉.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.7.
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Observation 5.2.Let k be an arbitrary OCF andλ be an OCF encodes〈α,m〉. Then for any
possibleW ,
(k∗α,m)(W ) = (k ⊗ λ)(W )
Proof. AssumeW |= ¬α. It follows from (5.7) thatλ(W ) = m > 0. According to (3.4)
and (5.5),(k1∗α,m)(W ) = (k1 ⊗ λ)(W ) = k1(W ) +m.
AssumeW |= α. It follows from (5.7) thatλ(W ) = 0 andλ−(0) = {W ′ |W ′ |= α}.
According to (5.6) and (3.2),mk1,λ = min{n | k
−
1 (n) ∩ {W
′ |W ′ |= α} 6= ∅} = k1(¬α).
Therefore, we have(k1∗α,m)(W ) = k1(W ) − k1(¬α) = (k1 ⊗ λ)(W ) = k1(W ) −mk1,λ.
Observation 5.4.The OCF mutual belief revision defined by Definition 5.3 satisfies the follow-
ing properties :
1. dinc(M(k1, k2)) ≤ dinc(k1, k2);
2. dinc(M(k1, k2)) = dinc(k1, k2) iff Bel(k1) ⊆ Bel(M1(k1, k2)) and Bel(k2) ⊆
Bel(M2(k1, k2)).
Proof. Assumedinc(k1, k2) = r. It follows from (5.2) thatk
−
1 (r − 1) ∩ k
−
2 (r − 1) = ∅ and
k−1 (r) ∩ k
−
2 (r) 6= ∅.
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From (5.5) and (5.8), it follows thatk−1 (r) ∩ k
−
2 (r) ⊆ (M1(k1, k2))
−(r) and k−1 (r) ∩
k−2 (r) ⊆ (M2(k1, k2))
−(r). According to (5.2), we then havedinc(M(k1, k2)) ≤ r.
SupposeBel(k1) ⊆ Bel(M1(k1, k2)) andBel(k2) ⊆ Bel(M2(k1, k2)). It follows from
(5.5) and (5.8) thatmk1,k2 = mk2,k1 = 0. Therefore, we have(M1(k1, k2))
−(r−1) ⊆ k−1 (r−1)
and(M2(k1, k2))−(r − 1) ⊆ k
−
2 (r − 1). From (M1(k1, k2))
−(r − 1) ∩ (M1(k1, k2))
−(r −
1) ⊆ k−1 (r − 1) ∩ k
−
2 (r − 1) = ∅, it follows that dinc(M(k1, k2)) > r − 1. As we have
already showndinc(M(k1, k2)) ≤ r, it follows thatdinc(M(k1, k2)) = r. To show the other
direction, we assume without loss of generality thatBel(k1) 6⊆ Bel(M1(k1, k2)). It follows
from (5.5) and (5.8) thatmk1,k2 = r1 > 0 andk
−
1 (r) ∩ k
−
2 (r) ⊆ (M1(k1, k2))
−(r − r1).
We consider two cases:1). AssumeBel(k2) 6⊆ Bel(M2(k1, k2)). It follows thatmk2,k1 =
r2 > 0 andk
−
1 (r) ∩ k
−
2 (r) ⊆ (M2(k1, k2))
−(r − r2). Therefore, according to (5.2), we have
dinc(M(k1, k2)) < r. 2). AssumeBel(k2) ⊆ Bel(M2(k1, k2)). It follows from (5.5) and (5.8)
thatM2((k1, k2))−(0) = k
−
1 (r) ∩ k
−
2 (0) 6= ∅. From k
−
1 (r) ∩ k
−
2 (0) ⊆ k
−
1 (r) ∩ k
−
2 (r) ⊆
(M1(k1, k2))
−(r − r1), it follows dinc(M(k1, k2)) ≤ r − r1 < r.
Observation 5.5.The OCF mutual belief revision defined by Definition 5.3 satisfies the follow-
ing properties (for eachi ∈ {1, 2}):
(M1) Bel(γ1(k1, k2)) + Bel(γ2(k1, k2)) ⊆ Bel(Mi(k1, k2));
(M2) if k1 andk2 are consistent, thenBel(Mi(k1, k2)) = Bel(k1) + Bel(k2);
(M3) ki andMi(k1, k2) are consistent iffBel(ki) ⊆ Bel(Mi(k1, k2));
(M4) M1(k1, k2) = M1(k1, γ2(k1, k2)),M2(k1, k2) = M2(γ1(k1, k2), k2);
(M5) if Bel(k1) ⊆ Bel(M1(k1, k2)) andBel(k2) ⊆ Bel(M2(k1, k2)),
thenMi(k1, k2) ≡Mi(M(k1, k2)).
Proof. It is easy to see that (M1)–(M4) hold from the construction of the OCF model (cf.
Figure 5.1).
To show (M5), we assumeBel(k1) ⊆ Bel(M1(k1, k2)) andBel(k2) ⊆ Bel(M2(k1, k2)).
Assumedinc(k1, k2) = r. From Observation 5.4, it follows thatdinc(M(k1, k2)) = r. Ac-
cording to (5.5) and (5.8), we have for allr′ ≤ r, (M1(k1, k2))−(r′) = k
−
2 (r) ∩ k
−
1 (r
′) and
(M2(k1, k2))
−(r′) = k−1 (r) ∩ k
−
2 (r
′). It follows that(M2(k1, k2))−(r) = k
−
1 (r) ∩ k
−
2 (r) and
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(M1(k1, k2))
−(0) = k−2 (r)∩ k
−
1 (0). Therefore,(M1(M(k1, k2)))
−(0) = (M2(k1, k2))
−(r)∩
(M1(k1, k2))
−(0) = (M1(k1,K2))
−(0). It follows thatM1(k1, k2) ≡ M1(M(k1, k2)). Simi-
larly, we haveM2(k1, k2) ≡M2(M(k1, k2)).
Observation 5.6. SupposeΞ1,Ξ2 are two EE bases andkΞ1 , kΞ2 are the OCFs induced from
Ξ1 andΞ2, respectively. Then
dinc(kΞ1 , kΞ2) = dinc(Ξ1,Ξ2)
Proof. Assumei = dinc(Ξ1,Ξ2). According to (5.1) and (4.8), we havek
−
Ξ1
(n) = {W |W |=
Ξn+11 } andk
−
Ξ2
(n) = {W |W |= Ξn+12 } for anyn. It follows from (5.9) thatΞ
i+1
1 ∪ Ξ
i+1
2 0 ⊥
andΞi1 ∪ Ξ
i
2 ⊢ ⊥. SinceΞ
i+1
1 ∪ Ξ
i+1
2 0 ⊥, there exists a possible worldW |= Ξ
i+1
1 ∪ Ξ
i+1
2 .
It follows thatk−Ξ1(i) ∩ k
−
Ξ2
(i) 6= ∅. SinceΞi1 ∪ Ξ
i
2 ⊢ ⊥, it follows thatk
−
Ξ1
(n) ∩ k−Ξ2(n) = ∅
for anyn < i. Therefore,i = min{n | k−Ξ1(n) ∩ k
−
Ξ2
(n) 6= ∅}, which is equal todinc(kΞ1 , kΞ2)
according to (5.2).
To prove Observation 5.7, we need the following result.
Observation C.1. SupposeΞ is an EE base andkΞ its induced OCF. Letr be any natural
number. Then for any possible worldW :
(kΞ − r)(W ) = kΞ′(W )
whereΞ′ = Ξ − r andkΞ′ is the OCF induced fromΞ′.
Proof. AssumekΞ(W ) ≤ r. According to (5.3), we have(kΞ − r)(W ) = 0. It follows
from (4.8) thatW |= Ξr+1. According to (5.2),Ξr+1 contains all sentences ofΞ1. Therefore, we
havekΞ1(W ) = 0, due to (4.8). AssumekΞ(W ) = i > r. According to (5.3),(kΞ−r)(W ) = i.
It follows from (4.8) thatW |= Ξi+1 and there is a sentenceα ∈ Ξ|i such thatW |= ¬α.
According to (5.2), we haveΞi+11 = Ξ
i+1 andΞ1|i = Ξ|i. Therefore, (4.8) implieskΞ1(W ) =
i.
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Observation 5.7. SupposeΞ1,Ξ2 are two EE bases andkΞ1 , kΞ2 are the OCFs induced from
Ξ1 andΞ2, respectively. Then
γ(kΞ1 , kΞ2) = 〈kΞ′1 , kΞ′2〉
WherekΞ′1 , kΞ′2 are OCFs induced respectively fromγ1(Ξ1,Ξ2) andγ2(Ξ1,Ξ2).
Proof. It follows directly from Observation 5.6 and C.1.
We need the following observation for the proof of Theorem 5.8.
Observation C.2. SupposeΞ1 = 〈B1, f1〉,Ξ2 = 〈B2.f2〉 are two EE bases andkΞ1 , kΞ2 are
the OCFs induced fromΞ1 andΞ2, respectively. Then
mkΞ1 ,kΞ2 = RankΞ1(¬
∧
B2)
Proof. AssumemkΞ1 ,kΞ2 = i. According to (5.1) and (4.8),W ∈ k
−
Ξ2
(0) iff W |= B2, for
any possible worldW . It follows from (5.6) thati = min{n | k−Ξ1(n) ∩ {W |W |= B2} 6=
∅}. Therefore, (5.1) impliesi = min{kΞ1(W ) |W |= B2}, which is equal tokΞ1(¬
∧
B2)
according to (3.2). It follows from Theorem 4.6 thati = RankΞ1(¬
∧
B2).
Theorem 5.8. SupposeΞ1 = 〈B1, f1〉,Ξ2 = 〈B2, f2〉 are two EE bases andkΞ1 , kΞ2 are the
OCFs induced fromΞ1 andΞ2, respectively. Then for any possible worldw:
(kΞ1 ⊗ kΞ2)(W ) = kΞ(W )
WhereΞ = Ξ1 ⊗ Ξ2 andkΞ is the OCF induced fromΞ.
Proof. AssumekΞ1(W ) = i. It follows from (4.8) thatW |= Ξ
i+1
1 and there exists a sentence
ψ ∈ Ξ1|i such thatW |= ¬ψ. Let r = RankΞ1(¬
∧
B2). Due to Observation C.2, it follows
that see thatr = min{kΞ1(W ) |W |= B2} = mkΞ1 ,kΞ2 . We distinguish two cases:
1). SupposekΞ2(W ) = 0. According to (5.5),(kΞ1⊗kΞ2)(W ) = i−r. Moreover, according
to (5.11),Ξi+1−r = Ξi+11 ∪Ξ
i+1−r
2 ∪{β∨α |β ∈ B1, α ∈ B2 andf1(β)+f2(α) ≥ i+1− r}.
SincekΞ2(W ) = 0, it follows from (4.8) thatW |= Ξ
1
2 = B2. Therefore, it is easy to see that
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W |= Ξi+1−r, sinceW |= Ξi+11 . According to (5.11), we haveψ ∈ Ξ|i−r. It follows from (4.8),
we havekΞ(W ) = i− r.
2). SupposekΞ2(W ) = j > 0. According to (5.5),(kΞ1 ⊗ kΞ2)(W ) = i + j. It follows
from (4.8) thatW |= Ξj+12 and there exists a sentenceϕ ∈ Ξ2|j such thatW |= ¬ϕ. According
to (5.11),Ξi+j+1 = Ξi+j+1+r1 ∪ Ξ
i+j+1
2 ∪ {β ∨ α |β ∈ B1, α ∈ B2 andf1(β) + f2(α) ≥
i+ j + 1}. SinceW |= Ξi1 andW |= Ξ
j
2, it is obvious thatW |= Ξ
i+j+1. According to (5.11),
we haveψ ∨ ϕ ∈ Ξ|i+j . SinceW |= ¬(ψ ∨ ϕ), it follows from (4.8) thatkΞ(W ) = i+ j.
Theorem 5.13. The problem of computingM(Ξ1,Ξ2), for arbitrary EE basesΞ1 and Ξ2, is
NP-equivalent.
Proof. The main computation lays in calculatingdinc(Ξ1,Ξ2), RankΞ1(¬
∧
B′2) and
RankΞ2(¬
∧
B′1), whereB
′
1 andB
′
2 are belief bases ofγ1(Ξ1, Xi2) andγ2(Ξ1, Xi2) respec-
tively. It is not difficult to see thatdinc(Ξ1,Ξ2) = RankΞ(⊥), whereΞ = Ξ1 ∪ Ξ2. Therefore,
according to Algorithm E.1, they can be computed in polynomial time, calling at mostlogarith-
mic times the decision procedure. Hence, the problem is inF∆p2 [O(log n)] ⊆ F∆
p
2 .
To showNP-hardness, it suffices to observe that for an arbitrary sentenceα, α is satisfiable
iff α occurs inM1({〈α, 1〉}, {〈⊤, 2〉}).
Theorem 5.14. The problem of deciding whether bothM1(Ξ1,Ξ2) andM2(Ξ1,Ξ2) entail β,
for arbitrary EE basesΞ1,Ξ2 and sentenceβ, is ∆
p
2 [O(log n)]-complete.
Proof. It is easy to see that the size ofM(Ξ1,Ξ2) is polynomial to that of〈Ξ1,Ξ2〉. Once we
have computedM(Ξ1,Ξ2), two additional calls of the decision procedure suffice to solve the
problem. Therefore, it is in∆p2 [O(log n)] (see the proof of Theorem 5.13).
The∆p2 [O(log n)]-hardness follows from the fact that the current problem generalizesthe
CF problem wrt. reinforcement base revision which is∆p2 [O(log n)]-hard (cf. Theorem 4.17).
SupposeΞ1 = 〈B1, f1〉 is an EE base andα, β any sentences. In order to decideΞ1 r α ⊢ β,
we constructΞ2 = {〈α,m〉} such thatm > max{f1(βi) |βi ∈ B1}. It is not difficult to see
thatBel(M2(Ξ1,Ξ2)) ⊆ Bel(M1(Ξ1,Ξ2)) andΞ1α ⊢ β iff M1(Ξ1,Ξ2) entailsβ. Therefore
Ξ1 r α ⊢ β iff β is implied by bothM1(Ξ1,Ξ2) andM2(Ξ1,Ξ2).
Appendix D
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Observation 6.5.Let I be a possible world, andα a consistent conjunction of literals. Then,
I ⋄PMA α = I ⋄WSS↓ α
Proof. Thanks to Observation 6.4, we only need to show thatI ⋄WSS↓ α ⊆ I ⋄PMA α. Assume
there is possible worldI ′ such thatI ′ ∈ I ⋄WSS↓ α andI
′ /∈ I ⋄PMA α. It follows that there
is a possible worldI ′′: I ′′ ∈ [α] and∆(I, I ′′) ⊂ ∆(I, I ′). Therefore, there exists at least one
atomp such thatp /∈ ∆(I, I ′′) andp ∈ ∆(I, I ′). Assume, without loss of generality, thatp ∈ I.
Then we havep ∈ I ′′ andp /∈ I ′. FromI ′, I ′′ ∈ [α] andα is a consistent conjunction of literals,
it follows thatp /∈ Atm↓(α), which contradictsI ′ ∈ I ⋄WSS↓ α.
Theorem 6.6.Let I be a possible world. Then for any sentenceα,
I ⋄WSS↓ α = I ⋄PM α
Proof. We first showI⋄PMα ⊆ I⋄WSS↓α. AssumeI
′ ∈ I⋄PMα. Then there existsL ∈ PM (α)
andI ′ = Insert(L, I). FromL ⊢ α andInsert(L, I) |= L, it follows thatI ′ ∈ [α]. Moreover,
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L ∈ PM (α) impliesAtm(U) ⊆ Atm↓(α). It is follows immediately that∆(I, Insert(L, I)) ⊆
Atm↓(α). Therefore,I ′ ∈ I ⋄WSS↓ α.
What remains to show is thatI ⋄WSS↓ α ⊆ I ⋄PM α. AssumeI
′ ∈ I ⋄WSS↓ α. It follows
that I ′ ∈ [α] and∆(I, I ′) ⊆ Atm↓(α). Let T = {p | p ∈ I ′ andp ∈ Atm↓(α)} andL =
T ∪ {¬p | p /∈ T andp ∈ Atm↓(α)}. Obviously,L is a maximal consistent subset ofLit(α).
FromI ′ |= α, it follows thatL ⊢ α. Therefore,L ∈ PM (α). We will show by contradiction
thatI ′ = Insert(L, I). Assume, without loss of generality, there is an atomp such thatp ∈ I ′
andp /∈ Insert(L, I). We distinguish two cases:
1. Assumep ∈ Atm↓(α). Fromp ∈ I ′, it follows thatp ∈ L. Therefore,p ∈ Insert(L, I),
which contradictsp /∈ Insert(L, I).
2. Assumep /∈ Atm↓(α). From∆(I, I ′) ⊆ Atm↓(α), it follows thatp ∈ I. It is easy to see
that∆(I, Insert(L, I)) ⊆ Atm↓(α). Therefore, it must be the case thatp ∈ Insert(L, I),
which contradicts our assumption.
Hence, we obtainI ′ = Insert(L, I). It follows thatI ′ ∈ I ⋄PM α.
Theorem 6.8. Suppose there exist a polynomialp and a computational model⊚ of the WSS↓
such that|B ⊚ α| ≤ p(|B| + |α|) for any belief baseB and sentenceα. ThenNP⊆ P/poly.
Proof. This proof is based on ideas of the proof of Theorem 8 in[Cadoliet al., 1995]. We will
show that if there exists a polynomially space bounded computational model of thWSS↓, then
3SAT1 is in P/poly. The proof consists of two steps.
Step 1: For any integern, we first construct a belief setBn and a sentenceαn, whose
sizes are polynomial wrt.n. Let X = {x1, · · · , xn} andY = {y1, · · · , yn} be two dis-
joint set of atoms and letC be a set of new atoms for each 3-literal clause overX, i.e.,
C = {c1 | γi is a 3-literal clause ofX}. We defineBn andαn as follows:
Bn = {xi 6≡ yi, γi ∨ ¬ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
αn =
∧n
i=1(¬x1 ∧ ¬yi)
It is easy to see that|Bn| ∈ O(n3) and|αn| ∈ O(n).
1A 3-literal clause is clause consists of precisely 3 literals and a 3CNF is a conjunction of 3-literal clauses.3SAT
is the satisfiability problem for 3CNFs, which has been shown NP-complete.
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Then we show that for any 3CNFβ of sizen, there exists an interpretationIβ (on atoms
X∪Y ∪C) such thatIβ |= B ⋄WSS↓ α iff β is satisfiable. We assume, without loss of generality,
thatAtm(β) ⊆ X.2 ThenIβ can be constructed as follows:
Iβ = {ci ∈ C | γi is a clause ofβ}
We now show thatβ is satisfiable iffIβ |= Bn ⋄WSS↓ αn. It is easy to see thatAtm↓(αn) =
X ∪ Y andIβ |= αn.
⇒ Assumeβ is satisfiable andI is a model ofβ. We construct another interpretationI ′ =
(I ∩X) ∪ Iβ ∪ {yi |xi 6∈ I}. It is easy to see thatI ′ |= Bn and∆(I ′, Iβ) ⊆ Atm↓(αn).
From the definition of the WSS↓, it follows thatIβ |= B ⋄WSS↓ α.
⇐ AssumeIβ |= Bn ⋄WSS↓ αn. Then there exists an interpretationI such thatI |= Bn
and∆(I, Iβ) ⊆ Atm↓(αn). We claim thatI |= β. AssumeI 6|= β. Then there exists
a 3-literal clauseγi of β such thatI 6|= γi. From∆(I, Iβ) ⊆ Atm↓(αn) andci ∈ Iβ , if
follows thatci ∈ I. This impliesI 6|= γi ∨ ¬ci, which contradictsI |= Bn. Thus,β is
satisfiable.
Step 2:Suppose⊚ is a polynomial space bounded WSS base update operator. Then 3SAT can
be solved by an advice taking Turing machine in this way: given a arbitrary 3CNFβ of sizen,
the machine computesIβ after loading the adviceBn⊚αn, then it verifiesIβ |= Bn⊚αn? From
|Bn| ∈ O(n
3), |αn| ∈ O(n) and⊚ is polynomially space bounded, it follows thatBn ⊚ αn has
polynomial size wrt.n. Therefore,Iβ |= Bn ⊚ αn can be verified in polynomial time, which
shows that3SAT ∈ P/poly. Since3SAT is NP-complete, this implies NP⊆ P/poly.
Observation 6.11. Supposeπ is a possibility distribution that respectsDC and ϕ ⇒ is a
conditional update. Then the updated possibility distributionπ ⋄ (ϕ⇒ α) also respectsDC.
Proof. We need to show thatπ ⋄ ϕ⇒ α(W ) = 0 iff W 6|= DC. SupposeW is an implausible
world such thatW 6|= DC. It follows directly from (6.9) thatπ ⋄ ϕ⇒ α(W ) = 0. Suppose
W is a possible world such thatW |= DC. AssumeW 6|= α. According to (6.3), we have
Sup(ϕ ⇒ α,W ) = ∅. It follows from (6.9) thatπ ⋄ ϕ⇒ α(W ) = wN > 0. AssumeW |= α.
2Note that, we can always substitute atoms ofβ respectively by elements ofX to obtain a new sentenceβX such
thatβ is satisfiable iffβX is satisfiable.
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Then, according to (6.3),W ∈ Sup(ϕ ⇒ α,W ). Sinceπ(W ) > 0, it follows from (6.9) that
π ⋄ ϕ⇒ α(W ) = max({π(W ′) |W ′ ∈ Sup(ϕ⇒ α,W )}) > 0.
Observation 6.12. SupposeΣ is a possibilistic base that respectsDC. Then the possibility
distributionπΣ induced fromΣ (as defined by (4.20) also respectsDC.
Proof. Let Σ = {〈β1, w1〉, · · · , 〈βn, wn〉}. SupposeW is a possible world such thatW |= DC.
SinceΣ respectsDC, it follows thatW 6|= βi implieswi < 1 for any βi. Then according
to (4.20), we haveπΣ(W ) > 0. SupposeW is an implausible worlds such thatW 6|= DC. Then
there exists a sentenceβi ∈ DC with W 6|= βi. SinceΣ respectsDC, it follows thatwi = 1.
According to (4.20), we haveπΣ(W ) = 1 − 1 = 0.
Theorem 6.13. SupposeΣ is a possibilistic base that respectsDC and πΣ is the possibility
distribution induced fromΣ as defined by (4.20). Letπ1 = π⋄(ϕ⇒ α) andΣ1 = Σ(ϕ⇒ α).
Then for any sentenceβ that contains no history atom:
NΣ1(β) = Nπ1(β)
Proof. AssumeΣ = {〈β1, w1〉, · · · , 〈βn, wn〉} andP = Dep(α).
If ⊢ β, thenNΣ1(β) = Nπ1(β) = ∞, according to (4.15) and (4.18). In the rest of the
proof, we assume0 β.
AssumeDC ⊢ β. It follows from (4.18) and (6.10) thatNΣ1(β) = 1. Moreover,
Observation 6.12 and Observation 6.11 imply thatπ1 also respectsDC, i.e., for any possible
worldW : π1(W ) = 0 iff W 6|= DC. FromDC ⊢ β, it follows that for all possible worldW : if
W |= ¬β thenπ1(W ) = 0. Therefore,Nπ1(β) = 1 − max({π1(W ) |W |= ¬β}) = 1.
AssumeDC 0 β andNΣ1(β) = wH. It follows from (4.18) thatΣ
wH
1 ⊢ β. We need
to show thatNπ1(β) = 1 − max({π1(W ) |W |= ¬β}) = wH. SinceDC 0 β, there exists
a possible worldW1 such thatW1 |= DC andW1 |= ¬β. Sinceπ1 respectsDC, we have
π1(W1) > 0. Hence,W ∈ argmaxW |=¬β π1(W ) impliesW |= DC, We show next thatW ∈
argmaxW |=¬β π1(W ) impliesW 6|= ϕ → α. Suppose there is a possible worldW2 such that
W2 ∈ argmaxW |=¬β π1(W ) andW2 |= ϕ → α. It follows immediately thatW2 |= DC. Then
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we construct another possible worldW ′2 fromW2 by changing the truth value of the history atom
p′ to be same asp for all p ∈ P , that is,W ′2 = Insert(U,W2) whereU = {p
′ | p ∈ P andp ∈
W2} ∪ {¬p
′ | p ∈ P andp 6∈ W2}. It follows immediately thatW ′2 |= {¬ϕ[P/P
′] → (p′ ↔
p) | p ∈ A}. FromW2 |= {ϕ → α,¬β} ∪ DC, it follows thatW ′2 |= {ϕ[P/P
′] → α,¬β} ∪
DC∪DC[P/P ′]. Therefore, we obtainW ′2 |= Σ
wH
1 andW
′
2 |= ¬β, which contradictsΣ
wH
1 ⊢ β.
It is easy to see that for any possible worldW : if W 6|= ϕ → α thenSup(ϕ ⇒ α,W ) = ∅.
Therefore, according to (6.9), we haveNπ1(β) = 1 − max({π1(W ) |W |= ¬β}) = 1 − wN.
Therefore, we haveNΣ1(β) = Nπ1(β), since it is assumed that1 − wN = wH.
AssumeNΣ1(β) = w < wH. It follows from (4.18) thatΣ
>w
1 0 β and Σ
w
1 ⊢ β. In
order to showNπ1(β) = 1 − max({π1(W ) |W |= ¬β}), we will prove in two steps that
max({π1(W ) |W |= ¬β}) = 1 − w.
1. We claim thatmax({π1(W ) |W |= ¬β}) ≥ 1 − w. SinceΣ>w1 0 β, there is a possible
worldW1 such thatW1 |= Σ>w1 andW1 |= ¬β. FromΣ
w
1 ⊢ β, it follows that there is a
sentenceγ such that〈γ,w〉 ∈ Σ, 〈γ[P/P ′], w〉 ∈ Σ1 andW1 |= ¬γ[P/P ′]. FromW1 |=
Σ>w1 , it follows thatW1 |= {¬ϕ[P/P
′] → (p ↔ p′) | p ∈ P} andW1 |= ϕ[P/P ′] → α.
We distinguish two cases:
• AssumeW1 |= ¬ϕ[P/P ′]. SinceW1 |= {¬ϕ[P/P ′] → (p ↔ p′) | p ∈ P}, we
haveW1 |= {p ↔ p′ | p ∈ P}. It follows immediately thatW1 |= ¬ϕ. From
W1 |= Σ
>w
1 andW1 |= ¬γ[P/P
′], it follows thatW1 |= Σ>w andW1 |= ¬γ.
According to (4.20), we haveπΣ(W1) = 1 − w. SinceW1 |= ¬ϕ andW1 |= DC,
according to (6.3), we haveW1 ∈ Sup(ϕ ⇒ α,W1). By (6.9), we haveπ1(W1) ≥
πΣ(W1) = 1 − w.
• AssumeW1 |= ϕ[P/P ′]. FromW1 |= ϕ[P/P ′] → α, it follows thatW1 |= α.
We construct another possible worldW ′1 from W1 by changing the truth value of
atomp to be same asp′ for all p ∈ P , that is,W ′1 = Insert(U,W1) whereU =
{p | p ∈ P andp′ ∈ W1} ∪ {¬p | p ∈ P andp′ 6∈ W1}. FromW1 |= Σ>w1 and
W1 |= ¬γ[P/P
′], it follows thatW ′1 |= Σ
>w andW ′1 |= ¬γ. In particular, we have
W ′1 |= DC. Then, according to (4.20), we haveπΣ(W
′
1) = 1 − w. If follows from
∆(W ′1,W1) ⊆ A andW1 |= α, thatW
′
1 ∈ Sup(ϕ ⇒ α,W1). According to (6.9),
we haveπ1(W1) ≥ 1 − w. FromW1 |= ¬β, it follows thatmax({π1(W ) |W |=
¬β}) ≥ 1 − w.
2. Then we show thatmax({π1(W ) |W |= ¬β}) ≤ 1 − w. Suppose there exists a possible
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worldW2 such thatW2 |= ¬β andπ1(W2) > 1 − w. According to (6.9), there must be
another possible worldW ′2 such thatπΣ(W
′
2) > 1 − w andW
′
2 ∈ Sup(ϕ ⇒ α,W2), that
is,W ′2 |= DC andW2 ∈ W
′
2 ⋄
Dep
WSS↓
ϕ⇒ α. SinceπΣ(W ′2) > 1 − w, according to (4.20)
we haveW ′2 |= Σ
w. Again, we distinguish two cases:
• AssumeW ′2 |= ¬ϕ. It follows thatW
′
2 ⋄
Dep
WSS↓
ϕ ⇒ α = {W ′2}. Therefore, we have
W ′2 = W2, sinceW2 ∈ W
′
2 ⋄
Dep
WSS↓
ϕ⇒ α. We construct a possible worldW ′′2 from
W ′2 by changing the truth value of the history atomsp
′ to be same asp for all p ∈ P ,
that is,W ′′2 = Insert(U,W
′
2) whereU = {p
′ | p ∈ P andp ∈ W ′2} ∪ {¬p
′ | p ∈
P andp /∈ W ′2}. It follows immediately thatW
′′
2 |= {¬ϕ[P/P
′] → (p ↔ p′) | p ∈
P}. FromW ′2 |= Σ
w andW ′2 |= ¬ϕ, it follows thatW
′′
2 |= {βi[P/P
′] |w ≤ wi <
wH} andW ′′2 |= ϕ[P/P
′] → α. SinceW ′2 |= DC, we haveW
′′
2 |= DC∪DC[P/P
′].
Hence,W ′′2 |= Σ
w
1 . FromW2 = W
′
2 |= ¬β, it follows thatW
′′
2 |= ¬β. This
contradictsΣw1 ⊢ β.
• AssumeW ′2 |= ϕ. It follows thatW2 |= α and∆(W2,W
′
2) ⊆ P . We construct a
possible worldW ′′2 fromW2 by change the truth value of the history atomsp
′ to be
same as the truth value ofp inW ′2 for all p ∈ P , that is,W
′′
2 = Insert(U,W2) where
U = {p′ | p ∈ P andp ∈ W ′2} ∪ {¬p
′ | p ∈ P andp /∈ W ′2}. It is easy to see that
∆(W ′2,W
′′
2 ) ⊆ P , since∆(W2,W
′
2) ⊆ P . FromW2 |= DC ∪ {α,¬β} andW
′
2 |=
DC ∪ {ϕ}, it follows thatW ′′2 |= DC ∪ DC[P/P
′] ∪ {α,¬β, ϕ[P/P ′]}. Similarly,
we haveW ′′2 |= {βi[P/P
′] |w ≤ wi < wH}, sinceW ′2 |= {βi |w ≤ wi < wH}.
FromW ′′2 |= ϕ[P/P
′], it follows thatW ′′2 |= {¬ϕ[P/P
′] → (p ↔ p′) | p ∈ A}.
Therefore, we haveW ′′2 |= Σ
w
1 ∪ {¬β}, which contradictsΣ
w
1 ⊢ β.
Observation 6.15.Assume the dependence functionDep can be computed in polynomial time.
Then for the update operator defined by (6.10), the CF problem iscoNP-complete.
Proof. Since an updated possibilistic base can be computed in polynomial time, it is obvious
that the CF problem is in coNP.
To show the coNP-hardness of the problem, it suffices to observe that for any sentencesα, β
we haveα ⊢ β iff {〈α, 0.5〉}  ⊤ entailsβ.
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Observation 6.16.Supposeπ is a possibility distribution that respectsDC. Let 〈α,w〉 be the
input information such thatα is consistent withDC andw < 1. Then the revised possibility
distributionπ(.|r〈α,w〉) also respectsDC.
Proof. As α is consistent withDC, there exits a possible worldW1 such thatW1 |= DC and
W1 |= α. Sinceπ respectsDC, we haveπ(W ) = 0 iff W 6|= DC. It follows immediately that
π(W1) > 0 andΠπ(α) > 0. We need to show thatπ(W |r〈α,w〉) = 0 iff W 6|= DC. Suppose
W is an implausible world such thatW 6|= DC. SinceΠπ(α) > 0, it follows from (4.17)
thatπ(W |r〈α,w〉) =
π(w)
Ππ(α)
= 0. SupposeW is a possible world such thatW |= DC. As π
respectsDC, we haveπ(W ) > 0. Sincew < 1, it follows from (4.17) thatπ(W |r〈α,w〉) =
(1 − w) × π(W ) > 0.
Appendix E
Algorithms
Input : Ξ = {〈β1, ei〉, . . . , 〈βn, en〉} such thatei ≤ ei+1, β
Output : r = RankΞ(β)
begin
if ⊢ β then
r = ∞ ;
else if{β1, · · · , βn} 0 β then
r = 0 ;
else
i = 1 ;
j = n ;
while i ≤ j do
k = i+ ⌈ j−i2 ⌉;
if Ξek ⊢ β then
if Ξek+1 0 β then
r = ek;
return r ;
else
i = k + 1;
endif
else
j = k;
endif
endw
endif
return r ;
end
E.1: Algorithm of computing rank of a sentence
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Input : Ξ = {〈β1, ei〉, . . . , 〈βn, en〉}, α,m
Output : Ξ1 such thatΞ1 = Ξ r 〈α,m〉
begin
Ξ1 = { };
r = RankΞ(¬α);
for i = 1 . . . n do
if ei > r then
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈βi, ei − r〉} ;
endif
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈βi ∨ α, ei +m〉} ;
endfor
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈α,m〉} ;
return Ξ1;
end
E.2: Reinforcement base revision
Input : Ξ = {〈β1, ei〉, . . . , 〈βn, en〉}, α,m
Output : Ξ1 such thatΞ1 = Ξ c 〈α,m〉
begin
Ξ1 = { };
if {β1, · · · , βn} ⊢ α then
r = RankΞ(α);
for i = 1 . . . n do
if ei > r then
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈βi ∨ α, ei − r +m〉} ;
endif
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈βi ∨ ¬α, ei〉} ;
endfor
else
r = RankΞ(¬α);
for i = 1 . . . n do
if ei > r then
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈βi, ei − r〉} ;
endif
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈βi ∨ α, ei +m〉} ;
endfor
endif
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈α,m〉} ;
return Ξ1 ;
end
E.3: Base conditionalization
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Input : Ξ = {〈β1, ei〉, . . . , 〈βn, en〉}, α,m
Output : Ξ1 such thatΞ1 = Ξ j 〈α,m〉
begin
Ξ1 = { };
if {β1, · · · , βn} ⊢ α then
r = RankΞ(α);
for i = 1 . . . n do
if ei > r then
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈βi, ei〉} ;
else
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈βi ∨ ¬α, ei〉} ;
endif
endfor
else
r = RankΞ(¬α);
for i = 1 . . . n do
if ei > r then
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈βi, ei〉} ;
else ifei > m then
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈βi ∨ α, ei〉} ;
endif
endfor
endif
Ξ1 = Ξ1 ∪ {〈α,m〉} ;
return Ξ1;
end
E.4: Base adjustment
Input : Σ = {〈β1, wi〉, . . . , 〈βn, wn〉}, α, w
Output : Σ1 such thatΣ1 = Σ r 〈α,w〉
begin
Σ1 = { };
r = NΣ(¬α);
for i = 1 . . . n do
if wi > r then
Σ1 = Σ1 ∪ {〈βi,
wi−r
1−r 〉} ;
endif
Σ1 = Σ1 ∪ {〈βi ∨ α,wi + w − w × wi〉} ;
endfor
Σ1 = Σ1 ∪ {〈α,w〉} ;
return Σ1 ;
end
E.5: Possibilistic reinforcement base revision
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Input : Σ = {〈β1, wi〉, . . . , 〈βn, wn〉}, ϕ⇒ α,Dep
Output : Σ1 such thatΣ1 = Σ  (ϕ⇒ α)
begin
Σ1 = {};
P = Dep(α) ;
for i = 1 . . . n do
if wi = 1 then
Σ1 = Σ1 ∪ {〈βi, wi〉} ;
else
Σ1 = Σ1 ∪ {〈βi[P/P
′], wi〉} ;
endif
endfor
foreachp ∈ P do
σ1 = Σ1 ∪ {〈¬ϕ[P/P
′] → (p↔ p′), wH〉} ;
endfch
Σ1 = Σ1 ∪ {〈ϕ[P/P
′] → α,wH〉} ;
return Σ1 ;
end
E.6: Possibilistic base update
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